Armored Battle Groups or Kampfgruppen
As the war continued, antitank defenses increased and it became increasingly important to react more flexibly to developing situations. Large maneuver elements were often not in a position to do that. Combat-ready tanks (at times without concern for what company they belonged to) were assembled into a "gepanzerte Gruppe" (armored group) and reinforced with SPW-Kompanien (armored-personnel carrier companies). These then formed so-called "Panzerkampfgruppen." Panzerpionier and artillery forces were generally assigned to support them. Depending on the situation, the Panzeraufk-larungsabteilung might also be involved. In this case, however, it was frequently employed more in the role of a (light) Panzergrenadierbataillon than for reconnaissance purposes. Divisions that had two Panzerabteilungen could also form two Kampfgrup-pen, though one of the battalions would have to work with a towed artillery battalion supporting it.
This combination of armored forces proved to be the most successful organization of troops. Only the "purebred" combination that was the Panzerkampfgruppe constituted a team of combined arms. It could work together in ideal fashion due to its armor and comparable operational and tactical mobility. None of the different branches had to exert undue concern for the other or employ it in a situation that endangered it.
The non-armored portion of the division served as the reserve, guarded areas or acted as normal positional troops in defense. That often caused logistical problems, since the Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) usually had to be with the Panz-erkampfgruppe. Additional problems arose because no staff for the Kampfgruppe was permanently organized. Instead, it had to be formed by arbitrarily taking people from the parent organization. It would have been more proficient to have a permanent personnel organized for it. Armored battalions were also not given the logistical capacity to operate separately.
The organization and equipment of the Panzer-aufklarungsabteilung also did not prove successful. Rather, it left the regiments and battalions lacking their own efficient reconnaissance elements. As for the Panzerjagerabteilung was concerned, it was increasingly proposed to integrate it by companies into the infantry regiments or even into the Panzer-grenadierbataillone, since the antitank battalion was only suitable for limited separate employment anyway.
The Panzerkampfgruppe as an organization was not officially introduced during the war. Instead existing organizations were improved incrementally, such as by the formation of supply companies. Inadequate to the end were the numbers and the outfitting of the Panzergrenadiere, the latter due to the lack of adequate production of SPW's. Most were only motorized and, in fact, really only infantry, since they had to perform all assignments dismounted.
Panzerbrigade 1944
The activation of separate Panzerbrigaden was a half-hearted attempt to form streamlined armored maneuver formations {thirteen were planned altogether) . Certainly the intent in forming them was to create organic Panzer-kampfgruppen. The main deficiency, however, was in the totally inadequate logistics elements. The result was that these formations were "out of gas" within a few days. They were insufficiently capable of sustaining themselves as a separate formation.
Reorganization after Second World War
The new Bundeswehr was, it is true, primarily created by former Wehrmacht officers. However, wartime experiences were not always adopted in a consistent fashion. Of course, many aspects appeared again in the training. After a good beginning in 1956, however, much too large and ponderous divisions on the US pattern began to be formed. Introduced again was a situation where the lowest command level that was capable of combat with combined arms was at the level of the brigade, with similarly unwieldy Panzer or Panzergrenadier-bataillone.
During the 1970's there were several reorganizations, such as the formation of a fourth Panzer-/Panzergrenadierbataillon in the brigade. Nevertheless, the brigade was increasingly deprived of its logistical independence so that it was increasingly dependant upon the division or even the corps for command and control of combined arms operations.
The main reason for that, of course, was primarily the fact that the primary mission at the operational level—given the strategic framework at the time—was the defense of the national borders that were very close at hand. The Panzergrenadiere suffered a lot as a result. The unfortunate separation of the rifle squad from its armored personnel carriers and its commitment to digging into field fortifications was obligatory. Only the tanks were committed in mobile operations, but even they were often cooped up in the context of small battle positions in a stationary role. They assumed the role of mobile bunkers. The primary objective was not the defeat of the enemy but to hold onto terrain.
Entire generations of officers matured in that erroneous thought pattern. After the decline of the direct East-West confrontation, it required significant efforts to bring the setting of operational
objectives back to Panzer-type basics. There again, as in the 1920's and 1930's, the followers of the "pure theory" were confronted with the narrow-mindedness and provinciality of ignoramuses in operational theory.
Nevertheless, in Germany today, as earlier, the tactical/operational fundamentals for the commitment of Panzertruppen are used in a manner similar to the way they crystallized during the Second World War, even if obviously influenced by the present-day technological setting, the essentially greater significance of combat-support requirements and the increased effectiveness of all weapons against armor.
After this short historical overview let us have a close look at the German principles of armor warfare. I would like to start with the main types of combat (Gefechtsarten): offensive operations, defensive operations and delaying actions.
Maps
Rommel (Panzer Army Africa) 14 February 1941 arrives in North Africa with Deutsches Afrika Korps, abbreviated DAK, to oppose a British desert force (later British Eighth Army) under Field Marshal Wavell threatening Tripoli. Military operations extending over two years involve DAK and-ltalian units in heavy fighting, developing into a confrontation between Army Croups; Afrika - First Italian Army (formerly Panzer Army Africa) plus Fifth Panzer Army versus British 18th Army Group - First and Eighth Armies plus US (II) and a French Corps.
Despite a nominal military balance, the key to successful panzer action lies in supply facilities, but German-Italian sea and air transports running a Mediterranean gauntlet, rarely escape the punishing attention of naval and air attacks mounted from Malta or Alexandria - notwithstanding the aggressive presence of German 2nd Air Fleet based in Sicily. Hitler's shortsightedness over reinforcements for Rommel, coinciding with an OKW view that the theatre is a sideshow, invites disaster and his decision to cancel 'Hercules', a Luftwaffe plan for eliminating Malta by airborne invasion, will prove fatal. Rommel (1) (Panzer Army Africa) 31 March 1941.'Sunflower' slowly increasing in power is Rommel's first offensive with DAK, but instead of 'blocking' Wavell, Rommel outmanoeuvres Eighth Army to reach Sollum on the Egyptian border but is thrown back to El Agheila.