From an equipment and capabilities point of view, the Russian air force and navy suffered most, because both are reliant on technology easily subject to degradation and their personnel require intensive specialist training. From 1993 until 2009, the air force received only a handful of new SU-34 combat aircraft. Pilot skills suffered as shortages of fuel and insufficient numbers of functioning aircraft meant that aircrew were able to fly only a fraction of the regulation training hours. The navy’s share of the defence budget decreased dramatically throughout the 1990s and it only procured a single new large vessel during this decade, the missile cruiser Petr Velikii, in 1996. Apart from a number of ballistic-missile submarines, which were consistently maintained as part of the nuclear triad, Russia had no real operational navy until the 2008 modernization plans addressed this situation. The ability to project naval power beyond one’s shores arguably is an essential characteristic of a global military actor. The degradation of this ability contributed significantly to Russia’s loss of this status in the eyes of the world. Moreover, until around 2000, the Russian armed forces received no combat training to speak of because of the dearth of funding available. Joint large-scale exercises, enabling the training of combined arms operations, were introduced only in the first half of the 2000s, as were long-range patrols of TU-95 bombers, which had last been seen in 1992 (Herspring 2005a: 139; Barany 2007: 57–8; Vendil Pallin 2009: 99; Renz and Thornton 2012: 48–9).
A significant consequence of the lack of funding during the 1990s was the degradation of the image of military service as a profession owing to steadily worsening service conditions. Salaries paid to Russian officers until the mid-2000s were far from competitive, even compared to those received by civilians working in the public sector. Poor living standards and the lack of adequate housing for military personnel were major concerns. Soldiers were routinely unable to access benefits they had been promised contractually and, in spite of the scores of political initiatives to deal with this situation throughout the 1990s, the problem was never resolved. This devalued the prestige and desirability that was afforded military careers during Soviet times and led to serious difficulties regarding the retention and recruitment of professional military personnel. It also aggravated the problem of corruption and crime within the military. The poor image of military service affected the willingness of young Russian men to serve as conscripts. Reasons for the low esteem of conscript service in Russia are well known. In addition to the fate suffered by many young draftees during the first Chechen War, the image problem was the result of poor conditions of service and in particular the notorious dedovshchina, a brutal practice of hazing and violence against soldiers with sometimes fatal results (Herspring 2005b). This further exacerbated the country’s already serious difficulties with calling up enough conscripts as a result of the demographic crisis and declining birth rates. During the 1990s, the majority of men eligible for conscript service evaded the draft by way of exemptions or by paying a bribe. Inevitably, a lack of pride in their profession and feeling of humiliation amongst military personnel further degraded the armed forces’ effectiveness and capabilities (Golts 2004; Renz 2012b: 200–2).
It is beyond doubt that the Russian military was subjected to serious neglect throughout the 1990s, especially compared to the status it had enjoyed throughout the Soviet era. However, the often hyperbolic portrayals of the Russian armed forces up until the annexation of Crimea as a military perilously close to collapse went too far. In spite of all the problems it experienced, the Russian military was able to address the country’s perceived military security threats when it was tasked to do so by the political leadership. As discussed in chapter 4, Russian soldiers were deployed in large numbers to conflict situations both within and outside of the country’s borders throughout the 1990s. In relative terms, the Russian military outrivalled that of any of the other former Soviet state at any point of the post-Cold War period, due to the sheer disparity in size and the fact that the militaries of those countries were affected by similar levels of neglect. Although the operational performance of Russian forces in conflicts fought up until the war in Georgia in 2008 was far from stellar, and especially the Chechen wars stretched their capabilities in every possible way, the country never risked a situation that could lead to its forces’ comprehensive defeat. It is also fair to note that the failure to cope with ethnic conflicts and insurgencies is not unique to the Russian military.
It is important to bear in mind that throughout the post-Soviet period, a number of Russian quasi-military organizations made up for some shortcomings in the regular armed forces’ capabilities for dealing with military operations other than war. As discussed in detail in the next chapter, Russia maintains a number of institutionally distinct militarized force structures other than the regular army specializing in specific small-scale contingencies and soft security threats. These are rarely factored into assessments of Russian military capabilities, because they do not fit neatly into a Western framework. However, they have been making a significant, and often overlooked, contribution to Russian crisis response, humanitarian missions, counter-terrorism campaigns and anti-drug operations, both within the country and on an international level.
Throughout the 1990s, the Russian military retained its capability to deter potential global threats from further afield with one of the world’s strongest nuclear arsenals. Unlike the other branches of the armed forces, the strategic rocket forces were maintained throughout the post-Soviet period and, as a result, so too was parity in nuclear military power with the United States. The Russian defence industry held its position as one of the world’s largest arms exporters throughout the post-Soviet era, even if this did not benefit its own armed forces at the time. Although Russian defence producers have not been able to compete with Western high-tech weaponry and electronics, they have always been competitive in many other areas, including the production of fighter jets, tanks, helicopters and submarines, and have exported such legacy systems in large numbers (Renz 2014: 65). There is probably much truth in what Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko have called an old adage: ‘the Russian army is never as strong as it describes itself, but it is never as weak as it seems from the outside’ (2004: 112).
The period of neglect of the armed forces during the 1990s seriously degraded Russian military capabilities and power. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, lack of attention paid by the country’s leadership to the maintenance of a strong military is uncharacteristic if seen within the context of modern Russian history. In many ways this period of neglect should have come as more of a surprise than the more recent efforts to revive Russian military power. The Russian armed forces experienced their ‘time of trouble’ throughout the Yeltsin years for the combination of reasons outlined above. These reasons did not include the conscious decision on the part of the political leadership to give up on the aspirations of being a global military actor, or the belief that a strong military was no longer necessary. It is true that when the Cold War ended, many believed, both in Russia and in the West, that the centrality of military power would diminish, not least because with the end of bipolarity the threat of a global conflict had waned. However, such beliefs were short-lived when it emerged that military power continued to be an essential instrument of statecraft especially for great powers, such as the United States and also increasingly China (Renz 2016a: 24–5).