It is clear that even a quarter of a century after the Cold War ended, quantity continues to matter as much as quality in the military ambitions of powerful states, including Russia. As John Mearsheimer put it, ‘great powers require big armies’ (2001: 6). Early post-Cold War expectations anticipating the saliency of military power to diminish and the idea that with the spread of democracy and economic interdependence, state competition between great powers in the future would revolve around economic matters, did not come to pass (Art 1996: 7–9). The maintenance of strong military forces for many states continued to be seen as an important asset. In the absence of a clear adversary against whom to measure required military capabilities, for example, the United States took the ‘two-war’ standard as the basis on which to decide the required size of its military in 1991. At this point in time there was no obvious existential threat emanating from a specific state adversary. However, it was decided that armed forces strong enough to cope with the potentiality of two simultaneous major regional wars were essential in order to ensure the country’s ability to defend its territory and to deter potential foes, at the same time as maintaining capabilities sufficient for the engagement in crisis response, humanitarian operations and other contingencies (Goure 2013: 1).
Compared to the armed forces of other large powers, even a one-million-strong Russian military does not stand out. The US military has around 1.4 million professional personnel. China’s People’s Liberation Army is made up of a force of over 2.3 million professional servicemen and women (The Military Balance 2016: 484–6). Unlike the US, Russia does not have strong military allies and is unable to bolster its military strength with coalition warfare. NATO’s total numerical strength amounts to over 3.3 million. A sizeable military is important for Russia’s self-perception as a great power and for this reason it is unlikely that it will ever abandon quantity entirely in favour of smaller, more compact armed forces, even if this would make good financial sense. As discussed in chapter 1 and elaborated further in chapter 5, geostrategic concerns pertaining to Russia’s territorial size and location are another factor why mass and at least a degree of mobilization have always been important. The perceived need to be prepared for a multitude of potential geostrategic threats from the South, East and West has been a constant in the history of the country’s defence policy decision making dating back centuries (Kagan and Higham 2002: 2–3). In today’s Russia, small, mobile forces would be fully sufficient for dealing with local conflicts, insurgencies and terrorism in the Caucasus, Central Asia and in other former Soviet states. Such forces would do nothing, however, to alleviate feelings of insecurity vis-à-vis potential future hostility from China and especially NATO, which returned to the centre of Russian threat perceptions during the 1990s.
Unlike the fully professional standing armed forces of the US and China, a large part of Russia’s 800,000 service personnel continues to be made up of conscripts, further putting into perspective the limitations of its military strength. In 2008 the term of conscript service was reduced from two years to twelve months. Although this helped alleviate problems with draft evasion, the decision was also a double-edged sword. The shorter term in conscript service inevitably resulted in a drop in skill and experience levels, with many conscripts not even serving long enough to take part in a large-scale military exercise (Renz and Thornton 2012: 46). Owing to the high percentage of conscripts in the Russian armed forces, the implications of this for the quality of Russia’s available military strength are considerable.
The reduction in the length of service also meant that now twice as many young men had to enter conscript service each year if manpower levels were to be maintained. By 2011, the annual intake of conscripts reportedly had stabilized at 300,000. Given that only about 700,000 Russian men reach conscription age each year, this number cannot be substantially increased in the foreseeable future. In other words, there are simply not enough young men to conscript in order to make up a military of one million (Lavrov 2015). The need to lessen the reliance on conscription and to professionalize the Russian armed forces has been a constant in all military reform initiatives from the early 1990s (Spivak and Pridemore 2004). A fully professional military continues to be on the wish-list of Russian military modernization, but statements by Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and plans by his ministry indicated as late as 2013 that this would not happen at least until 2025 or even later (Lavrov 2015). Given the financial constraints of Russian military modernization (discussed further below), the move to a fully professional military is simply too costly.
Russia’s inability to do away with conscription does not necessarily mean that its armed forces can never be fully modernized. The predominant tendency in the West has been to move towards fully professional forces over the past two decades, but some highly developed countries, including Israel, Norway and Finland, also continue to maintain a mixed recruitment system for their armed forces. In such systems, a core of highly trained professionals ensures the technological expertise and other skills required for the conduct of modern combined arms operations, whilst an element of conscription and mobilization is maintained for eventualities where greater numbers of infantry soldiers might be needed (Leander 2004: 572). In contemporary Russia, a system of combining conscripts with professionals in units is the only affordable option if a manpower level of even close to one million is to be maintained. This was recognized from the outset in the 2008 modernization programme. The former chief of the general staff, Nikolai Makarov, envisaged the creation of more permanent readiness units staffed entirely by professional soldiers. Such units would increase Russian rapid reaction capabilities within a mixed system of recruitment, which would also provide less-well-trained forces for use in ‘calmer’ areas (Klein 2009: 116).
The 2008 modernization programme has yielded results in this area. A growing number of professionals have been allocated to rapid reaction units in Russia’s armed services. The airborne forces (VDV) benefited especially. Already containing fully professional elite regiments since 2002, the VDV came to have more than 50 per cent of its staff serving under contract by 2015. The percentage of professionals serving in specialist positions also grew, such as those involving the operation of advanced equipment and weaponry (Lavrov 2015). Advances in mobility were demonstrated in Crimea, where VDV units acted swiftly and in cooperation with other rapid reaction forces from the special forces reconnaissance brigades and naval infantry (Bartles and McDermott 2014: 57; Marcus 2014). These advances are certainly notable. It has to be kept in mind, however, that the elite troops who carried out the Crimea operation make up less than 1 per cent of Russia’s overall military strength and are not representative of the Russian armed forces at large (House of Commons Defence Committee 2014a). A large proportion of this strength continues to be made up of poorly trained conscripts. Russia still has a long way to go to achieve the quantity and quality of fighting force it aspires to.