The continuing shortcomings in defence-industrial capabilities present an obstacle to the longer-term modernization of Russian military power for two reasons. First, the procurement of legacy systems in larger numbers as such will do little to help the armed forces overcome some major problems that were evident in the past. Clearly, shortages of tanks, armoured vehicles, submarines or combat aircraft per se were not primarily to blame for operational failures in Chechnya and in Georgia in 2008. Instead, it was a lack of advanced technologies required to create modern C4ISR[3] capabilities that impeded intelligence gathering, target identification and communications. This led not least to an excess of combat deaths and civilian fatalities. As discussed in chapter 5, the availability of sophisticated high-tech equipment is not a panacea and far from always strategically and operationally decisive. However, it can act as a force multiplier that shortens conflicts in certain circumstances and contains the intensity of destructive force having to be used, thus reducing casualties on both sides. In a conventional, state-on-state warfare scenario today, it is certainly clear that the technologically superior side will have a distinct advantage over a less ‘modern’ opponent.
The second obstacle to long-term modernization is the Russian defence industry’s inability to deliver consistently across all categories of weapons systems. This means that the country’s global power projection capabilities remain limited in certain areas. This is true in particular for naval power. The Russian navy had received the largest share of funding from the State Armament Programme 2011–20. This was because it was understood that of all branches of service it was in greatest need of modernization. As mentioned above, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the country had no real operational navy to speak of. As only a limited number of ballistic-missile submarines and small coastal vessels were kept fully operational, the navy’s role was reduced to just nuclear deterrence and coastal protection, depriving it of any genuine maritime power projection capability (Renz and Thornton 2012: 49). Naval power was not required during the small wars dominating the Russian armed forces’ activities during the 1990s and its relevance for low-intensity missions is generally low. However, the ability to project power on the seas is an intrinsic requirement for a global military power. In spite of making the modernization of the navy a priority, this is where the State Armament Programme encountered the most serious problems (Cooper 2016: 49).
Deliveries under the State Armament Programme 2011–20 were restricted primarily to updated submarines and coastal vessels. Thus, the country is still at some remove from achieving the ambition of a ‘blue water’ navy. Ongoing difficulties, moreover, with the delivery of new and upgraded strategic bombers and transport aircraft to the air force also pose a further constraint on Russian global power projection capabilities. The lack especially of transport aircraft in sufficient numbers reduces the logistics’ capacity required to deploy and sustain troops in the event of extensive out-of-area operations (Connolly and Sendstad 2016).
When the State Armament Programme 2011–20 was first introduced, Russia sought to make up for the defence industry’s lack of expertise in certain high-tech areas with Western imports. Sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, however, have closed its access to these markets for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the defence industry’s reliance on other CIS states is a serious issue. The breakdown of deliveries from Ukrainian defence companies seriously exacerbated problems in the production of various weapons systems (Cooper 2016). Measures to counter the impact of Western and Ukrainian sanctions by producing the required technologies domestically have already been implemented. Although ‘import substitution’ has become a buzz phrase in Russian political rhetoric, it is far from a quick-fix solution to ongoing limitations in defence-industrial capabilities. Import dependency is very high in many vital areas, including microelectronics, advanced production equipment and information technology. For example, up to 95 per cent of all electronic components on Russian ships are reportedly foreign-made (Connolly and Hanson 2016: 17). Developing high-tech industries able to replace these imports with domestic products will require decisive efforts towards the diversification of economic activity and a high level of investment. In spite of all the rhetoric on ‘economic sovereignty’ and import substitution, Moscow’s already chronically low levels of economic investment have decreased further in recent years. And, having to prioritize areas of spending during the continuing economic recession has meant, as Richard Connolly and Philip Hanson found, that ‘spending on the military and social welfare has proven more resilient than that on areas essential to Russia’s plans for high-tech industrial development’. The latter has thus been subject to heavy cuts (2016: 19). Ironically, this means that any decision to protect or to increase military expenditure in this time of ongoing economic stagnation will impede the modernization of the Russian armed forces in the longer term.
Conclusion
For almost two decades after the end of the Cold War, Russia struggled to transform what was left of the former Soviet military into one fit for the twenty-first century. This had serious implications not only for Moscow’s ability to use armed force efficiently in various small wars and insurgencies that erupted across the former Soviet region throughout the 1990s; it also cast doubts on the country’s ability to defend itself against a multitude of potential geopolitical threats and contributed to the loss of its status as a great power in the eyes of the world. By the end of Yeltsin’s time in office, the lack of systematic reforms had left the country with a military that was widely seen as ‘impoverished, demoralized and largely ineffective’ and ‘woefully inadequate to address the country’s security threats’ (Golts and Putnam 2004: 121; Barany 2005: 33). The failure to reform the armed forces for so long was, though, not due to a lack of recognition that such reforms were necessary or desirable. Central elements of the 2008 modernization programme had already been discussed during previous, failed attempts at reform. Moreover, Moscow’s ambitions to maintain a military that could project power on a global level date back to the early 1990s. It was a combination of political and financial factors that prevented these ambitions from becoming reality.
The situation changed when Putin came to power and made the military reform agenda a priority. Aided by a steadily improving economic situation, the armed forces have undergone a remarkable turnaround in less than a decade. Structural and organizational reforms announced in 2008 were pushed through with unprecedented determination and followed up with a costly programme of rearmament. The annexation of Crimea and the air campaign in Syria demonstrated that the military had made considerable advances – in terms of tactical art, operational skills and equipment – in overcoming some of the shortcomings that led to limited outcomes in previous interventions. The performance of its troops in Crimea and Syria not only did much to restore the country’s pride in its military, but it also revolutionized its image internationally and led to fears of a militarily resurgent Russia.
3
Command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.