It appears that, not unlike the FSKN, the FSNG was created from scratch to deal with a ‘new’ security challenge. However, on this occasion this was not a transnational threat requiring international cooperation, such as drug crime or terrorism. Instead, it reflected the distinctly ‘domestic’ concern over perceived threats to internal order and regime stability. These issues had already been flagged up as a major worry in the military doctrine issued in 2014 as discussed in more detail in chapter 5, and as also pointed out by Kramnik and Bogdanov (2016). For the first time in post-Soviet history, this military doctrine referred to information activities in the section on ‘domestic military dangers’. Emphasizing the perceived threat of ‘information influence over the population… aimed at undermining spiritual and patriotic traditions’, the 2014 doctrine demonstrated the leadership’s anxiety over social stability and fear of outside interference in Russia’s domestic affairs (Sinovets and Renz 2015: 2). As such, the creation of the FSNG supports the argument that concerns over internal security and regime stability are an important element in Russia’s military revival.
In addition to the institutions outlined above, there are a number of other Russian ministries and services that are generally regarded as component parts of the country’s security apparatus. The Federal Guard Service (FSO) is an offshoot of the Soviet KGB. Its major missions are to protect the president and other Russian high-ranking officials, as well as buildings and strategically important infrastructure. When the Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) was disbanded in 2003, the bulk of its personnel and assets were transferred to the FSO. A new service within the FSO, the Service for Special Communications and Information (SSSI) was created and made responsible for the organization, development, maintenance and security of special communications of all state bodies conducting signals intelligence collection, analysis, and exploitation (similar to the functions of British GCHQ and the US National Security Agency) (Renz 2005: 575). The FSO’s activities are often conducted in close cooperation with the FSB, the foreign intelligence service SVR and the MVD (Gamov 2000). The FSO has a clear military element as it has under its command a brigade and two regiments, including the prestigious Presidential Guards Regiment. With the exception of the latter, which is still staffed in part by conscripts, its personnel are serving on a professional basis. The overall numerical strength of the FSO is estimated at around 30,000 personnel. This includes around 8,000–9,000 military personnel on protection duty (Nikolsky 2013c). Although the FSO and its activities rarely attract public attention these days, this was not always the case. The service was highly visible and controversial during the first part of the 1990s, when the head of the Presidential Protection Service (SBP), which existed as a separate service from 1993 until 1996, was headed by Aleksandr Korzhakev, a close ally and confidante of Yeltsin (Renz 2005: 576).
The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is another successor organization of the Soviet KGB. It is the direct successor of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate. Its functions are similar to those of its foreign counterparts, for example the CIA or the British MI6. The service is fairly technically minded with intelligence gathering being its central role. The SVR primarily conducts human intelligence operations, though it also maintains a cyber warfare capability about which very little is known. It is also tasked with contributing to counter-terrorism activities and the fight against organized crime in cooperation with other Russian force structures (the FSB in particular) and with relevant foreign counterparts. Owing to the nature of the SVR’s activities, information on the service’s establishment strength is classified. This has previously been estimated at 10,000–15,000 personnel, including around 300–500 special assignment forces in charge of guarding Russian diplomatic missions and Russian officials visiting zones of conflict (Bennett 2000c; Mukhin 2000; Nikolsky 2014).
The Ministry of Justice (Miniust) is one of Russia’s less obvious force structures. It is regarded as such, because it is responsible for the agency dealing with the administration of Russia’s penal system, the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (FSIN). Miniust was given responsibility for this service in 1998 in response to a request by the Council of Europe requesting Russia to conform more to European prison rules as a condition of Russia’s membership in the Council (Renz 2005: 569). Previously, the prison service had been run by the MVD. The FSIN is in charge of a large number of uniformed prison service personnel and also of militarized special assignment units subordinated to its regional branches. The task of their around 4,000 troops is to deal with riots at prisons, escaped prisoners and protecting FSIN officers on dangerous missions (Nikolsky 2014). They were also involved in the Chechen conflict, where they cooperated with the regular armed forces and MVD troops in the liberation of populated areas and the organization of checkpoints (Renz 2005: 570). Other institutions often included in the range of force structures because of the specificity of their tasks, the position they take in the system of executive power, or because they have under their command special assignment units or military servicemen, are the following: the State Courier Service, the Federal Customs Service, the Main Directorate for Special Programmes under the President, and the Presidential Directorate for Administrative Affairs (Renz 2005; Taylor 2007; Vendil Pallin 2007). Due to their small sizes and the specificity of their tasks, little is known about these structures and they have not been involved in public political controversies.[4]
Post-Soviet era change and transformation of the Russian force structures: drivers and problems
During the early post-Soviet years, a number of force structures were prioritized over the regular armed forces when it came to funding and reform efforts. As Brian Taylor noted, given the situation in Chechnya, the growing danger of terrorism and increasing levels of organized crime, ‘this focus made sense’ (2007: 12). The existence of well-maintained and effective force structures, such as, for example, the MChS and its civil defence troops, was essential during the 1990s, as these could make up for some of the regular armed forces’ shortcomings. The existence of force structures specializing in emerging security challenges also arguably made it easier for Russia to establish multilateral and international security cooperation in certain areas. For example, Russian cooperation with NATO involving regular troops always remained embryonic not least due to diverging geopolitical interests and continued mutual mistrust regarding the other’s priorities and intentions, as discussed in more detail in the next chapter. In contrast, as discussed above, MChS’s integration with NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning did not encounter such problems (Renz 2007). The involvement of Russian regular armed forces in efforts to tackle the opium business in Afghanistan would have been unthinkable. Within the framework of the FSKN, albeit on a very small scale, such cooperation was possible. These examples suggest that when cooperation is based on shared interests and not overshadowed by political concerns, multilateral military cooperation between Russia and Western states and institutions can be achieved.
4
All of the force structures discussed in this chapter have websites offering various degrees of information. These can be accessed via the Russian government internet portal, www.gov.ru. The official website of the National Guards of the Russian Federation can be found at www.rosgvard.ru.