Perceived threats to sovereignty also factored into the Kremlin’s decision. When it comes to developments in Ukraine, long-held Russian concerns over the West’s perceived interference in the domestic affairs of states in order to expand its influence stoked anxieties in the Kremlin over the stability of its own regime. Owing to Ukraine’s close geographical proximity, the dramatic political changes in the country were uncomfortably close to home. Moreover, Putin was still reeling from the memory of extensive street protests following the State Duma elections in 2011 (Allison 2014: 1289–90; Charap and Darden 2014: 10). As such, as Allison argued, the annexation of Crimea, which dramatically improved Putin’s approval ratings, also served to ‘harness[ing] populism for domestic regime consolidation’ (2014: 1291–3).
Russia’s use of military force in Ukraine did not denote a ‘paradigm shift’, but a continuation of drivers that had long been evident in Russian foreign policy. There is still the question whether further territorial expansion is likely. The annexation of Crimea raised fears that neighbouring countries with large Russian-speaking minorities, such as the Baltic States, were particularly threatened. This is because claims about the need to protect ‘ethnic Russians, Russian citizens, Russian compatriots, Russian-speakers’ were a central plank in official justifications for Moscow’s actions in Ukraine (Allison 2014: 1282). Several analysts have since pointed out that, as was the case in Georgia in 2008, the protection of Russians was not a reason for the operation, but a rhetorical device, in this case to garner support amongst domestic audiences (Allison 2014: 1296; Biersack and O’Lear 2014: 252–3). In spite of expectations in spring 2014 that the annexation of further Ukrainian territories inhabited by a Russian-speaking majority was likely, this never materialized. This was not for lack of opportunity or capabilities. As discussed in chapter 1, imperialist expansion historically has been a perilous undertaking, especially if it involved the inclusion of resistant populations. As a result of the Chechen wars, Russia is painfully aware of the costs of suppressing a drawn-out insurgency. This would be a likely requirement in most areas other than Crimea, and especially in the Baltic States. From this point of view, further territorial expansion appears at least fairly unlikely. In eastern Ukraine, Russian hostilities have resulted in a ‘simmering’ conflict that will in all probability turn into a ‘frozen’ variant over time. This offers Moscow an important lever of influence and control over Ukraine. It is likely that, in the Kremlin’s eyes, the value of such a lever vastly outweighs the benefits of adding further territory and populations to an already vast state (Bukkvoll 2016a: 276; Pifer 2017).
Russian airstrikes in Syria, 2015
Russia’s intervention in the Syrian civil war came as a surprise to the West, because it was the first time the country launched a sizeable and unilateral out-of-area operation. Although the airstrikes were not directed against Western forces already active in the country, the operations have been interpreted by many as an act of aggressive confrontation aimed against the West. As Angela Stent put it, Moscow’s ‘unanticipated military foray into Syria has transformed the civil war there into a proxy US–Russian conflict and has raised the stakes in the ongoing standoff between Moscow and Washington’ (2016: 106). A contextualized assessment of Russia’s decision to intervene in Syria shows that such an explanation reflects a one-sided understanding of why the Kremlin intervened.
Moscow’s decision to use force in support of Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime was determined by a specific confluence of factors. The choice of Syria as the locale of Russia’s first military foray beyond the former Soviet region was not accidental. Historical ties raised Russia’s stakes in having a say in the outcome of the ongoing war. Relations with Syria date back to the Soviet era and Moscow maintains some material and strategic interests in the country. These include a minor naval facility in Tartus, an eavesdropping station and revenue income as Syria’s major arms supplier. Although none of these interests are significant enough to merit a costly military intervention, the strategic value of Syria was enhanced, because it represented the last bastion of Russian influence in the Middle East (Allison 2013b: 800–7). Although the Kremlin’s affinity with Assad himself should not be overstated as a reason for the intervention (Katz 2013: 38), the fact that Syria regarded Russia as an ally played a role. At the time of growing international isolation in the aftermath of Crimea, being petitioned for assistance by the Assad regime reaffirmed to Russia its importance as a global power.
Insecurity – globally, regionally and domestically – caused by the growing influence of radical Islamic groups in the Syrian war was another factor in Russia’s decision to render military support to Assad. Moscow had long expressed concerns over the increasing prominence of such groups, including Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, in the opposition forces fighting the incumbent regime. Referring to developments in Iraq and Libya, where externally driven regime change had led to lawlessness and the spread of religious extremism, the Kremlin saw the continuation of Assad’s rule as the best option to suppress such groups and to return stability to the country (Putin 2013). In Russia’s eyes, the spread of extremist forces was not only a threat to the stability of Syria itself, but also to the entire Middle East. Moreover, the international reach of groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State meant that there was the potential for a significant increase in terrorist activities in areas far beyond the region, including in Central Asia and, ultimately, in Russia itself (Averre and Davies 2015: 820–1).
International status concerns also influenced Russia’s decision to resort to military force, as the Kremlin increasingly felt that it was being sidelined by the West in multilateral efforts to resolve the crisis. External military intervention in Syria, first by a number of Western states and then by Russia, was preceded by efforts to solve the crisis through diplomacy. From 2011 until 2013, Moscow repeatedly asserted that it had no intention to enter the war in Syria and also called on the US to refrain from military action (Katz 2013). Like in the run-up to the Kosovo War, Russia insisted that the UN was the best forum for dealing with the regime in question, so major powers in the Security Council could steer the efforts to find a lasting solution that was acceptable to all. In the event, Russia blocked any initiative that involved the forceful weakening of Assad’s rule or that made his departure from power a condition. As the humanitarian crisis in Syria gathered pace, and some Western leaders became more vocal in calling for Assad to go, the chances of solving the crisis through the UN became ever more remote (Allison 2013b). When the US launched airstrikes, the Kremlin saw this as a failure of multilateralism and as yet more evidence of the West’s refusal to give it an equal voice in the solution of international problems. In Kosovo, Russia was not in a position to protect its ally from NATO forces and emerged from the conflict feeling humiliated. By 2015, Russia had recovered the strength required to stand up against the West. In this sense, Russia’s decision to prop up the Assad regime, targeting moderate opposition groups in addition to extremist elements, had as much to do, as Charap put it, ‘with anxieties about the implications of US power than it does with Syria itself’ (2013: 37). Military intervention allowed Russia to demonstrate that it now had the capabilities to challenge what it saw as the West’s monopoly on the use of force on a global level. It also sent a message to the rest of the world that the country’s backing was yet again ‘something truly worth having’ (Matthews 2016). As such, the war in Syria brought Russia closer to its goal of great power recognition (Knight 2015).