Russian military thinkers advanced a variety of ideas on future war and warfare throughout the 1990s, and these ideas have influenced military policy to various degrees. The recent focus in the West on Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ reflects a one-sided view of these developments. Although the growing emphasis on non-military tools is an important change in Russian strategic thought, it is important not to take this change out of context, as this could lead to a skewed understanding of Russian military capabilities and ambitions. As Dave Johnson has aptly observed, and as is also evident in the direction of military modernization discussed in chapter 2, Russia continues to rely ‘on at least the leveraging, and potential employment, of full-spectrum conventional, unconventional and nuclear capabilities’ (2015: 2). Or as Bartles concluded, ‘Russia is experimenting with some rather unconventional means to counter hostile indirect and asymmetric methods, but Russia also sees conventional military forces as being of the utmost importance’ (2016: 36). Russian military thinking is developing as lessons are learned from past operations and adjustments are made to the changing security environment. ‘Hybrid warfare’, which is discussed as a concept in more detail below, does not adequately reflect the essence of contemporary Russian military thinking. As Thomas warned in 2016, ‘it is doubtful that this progression will stop here, since new forms and methods are under development every month from lessons learned in Syria, in Ukraine, and in dealing with the Arctic. Putting Russia’s military thought in a specific box… is a mistake, as it is evolving and changing over time’ (2016: 555).
Developments in Russian official military doctrine 1993–2014
Developments in official Russian military doctrine, a document that is updated and published every few years, are an indicator of continuity and change in Moscow’s views on war and strategy. Although Russian military doctrine focuses on the political-strategic level of war and is not a set of guidelines for tactical and operational military action as in the West, variations in threat perceptions and elaborations of possible responses serve as a useful gauge of strategic views and priorities (De Haas 2011: 3). As demonstrated in the overview of Russian military doctrines since 1993 below, the need to maintain and develop strong, conventional war-fighting capabilities has been emphasized since the early 1990s. Different versions of the doctrine also show a growing recognition that the development of skills required for dealing with lower-intensity missions are important. Although the latest military doctrine adopted in 2014 included the threat of outside information influence over the population as a military threat and thus reflected the increasing importance attached to non-military tools, there is little evidence in official military doctrine that ‘hybrid warfare’ has become the focal point of Russian strategy.
Russian military doctrines were updated in 1993, 2000, 2010 and 2014. The doctrines’ respective focus was adjusted to reflect changes in the international security environment and in response to events perceived as significant to Russia’s national security and interests. However, all doctrines show a substantial degree of continuity in threat perceptions and strategic priorities. The 1993 document was the first military doctrine adopted by the Russian Federation and supplanted the last Soviet military doctrine, on the basis of which the country’s armed forces still officially operated. As it was issued at a time of relatively low tension with the West in the immediate post-Cold War period, it reflected a positive view of international relations at the time. This quickly changed and grew increasingly pessimistic in subsequent versions. The threat of internal armed conflict was prioritized as a military danger in the 1993 doctrine, because secessionist tendencies were the most immediate challenge to Russian statehood and the threat of inter-state warfare had diminished. All subsequent doctrines demonstrated a growing awareness of changing international security priorities that also pertained to Russia. ‘New’ challenges to Russian security and stability in the form of extremism, ethnic strife and religiously motivated terrorism, both within the country and in its neighbourhood or perceived sphere of influence, took an increasingly important place.
At the same time, ‘traditional’ threat perceptions arising from growing tensions with the West and NATO eastward enlargement in particular have been a constant feature in all versions of the military doctrine. The encroachment of NATO into what Russia perceives as its legitimate sphere of influence in the former Soviet region has been a particular concern from the early post-Soviet years. The 1993 doctrine already referred to ‘the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of Russian security interests’ as a potential military danger (The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 1993: section 2, paragraph 1). This concern was reiterated in the 2000 doctrine (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2000: section 1, paragraph 5). The 2010 and 2014 doctrines, in a reflection of deteriorating relations with the West following the Kosovo War and the annexation of Crimea, explicitly named NATO expansion and the movement of NATO military infrastructure closer to Russia’s border as the top main external military danger to Russian security (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010: section 2, paragraph 8; The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2014: section 2, paragraph 12).
The importance of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent was also emphasized in all doctrines. The 2000 doctrine introduced the provision that nuclear weapons could be used in response to a conventional aggression, ‘in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation’ (section 1, paragraph 8). This point was reiterated in both subsequent versions, which specified that the country reserved the right to use nuclear weapons if conventional aggression by an external actor threatened ‘the very existence of the state’ (2010, section 2, paragraph 16; 2014, section 3, paragraph 27). All doctrines have consistently emphasized the desire to strengthen the armed forces’ conventional capabilities and non-nuclear deterrence. The ongoing inclusion of the provision that nuclear weapons can be used against conventional aggression in certain circumstances in the 2014 doctrine indicates that serious doubts about Russia’s comparative conventional military power persist.
The concurrent emphasis in Russian military doctrine on ‘small wars’ and ‘traditional’ inter-state warfare was often regarded by observers as an inconsistency in military thinking that was partially to blame for the failure of reforms up until 2008. In the view of authors critical of this perceived inconsistency, successful reforms and modernization required the unambiguous choice of the former over the latter. As Margarete Klein argued, in the post-Cold War security environment, Russia needed troops that were ‘more flexible and professional and, therefore, combat-ready for scenarios like local conflicts and asymmetrical warfare’. This could not be achieved, though, as long as Russia hung on to ‘the old concept of a mass-mobilization army’ (2012: 43). In fact, this perceived ‘inconsistency’ was not an oversight, but a reflection of the threat perceptions driving developments in Russian military doctrine. Unlike in the West, where defence establishments and strategists prioritized counterinsurgency doctrine and increasingly considered large-scale inter-state warfare a thing of the past, in Russia the ‘traditional Western threat’, as Trenin and Malashenko have put it, had returned to the centre of strategic thinking already as early as the mid-1990s (2004: 104). Small wars and insurgencies were never seen in Russia as the only scenarios its armed forces had to be prepared for.
In the run-up to the publication of the 2014 military doctrine, there were concerns that its focus would be revised significantly in view of growing tensions with the West. Some feared that it might introduce the concept of nuclear pre-emption or name specific countries as its enemies for the first time. In the event, this did not happen. The portrayal of NATO eastward enlargement as a major military threat had already been evident in the 2010 doctrine and was merely carried over. The 2014 version dropped its reference to cooperation with NATO as a means to reinforcing collective security, now only mentioning the alliance as a potential partner for ‘equitable dialogue’ (section 3, paragraph 21).