The prospects and limits of Russia’s military revival
The idea that Russian military power now rivals the West is questionable. The 2008 modernization programme has delivered clear results in equipping the armed forces with capabilities they did not have before. As the Crimea operation showed, advances have been made most notably in the strengthening of permanent readiness and rapid reaction, which were important areas of weakness that have led to problems in the past. Improvements in command, control, joint action and coordination have also been made, as demonstrated in both Crimea and Syria, and during a number of large-scale exercises training for joint combined arms operations. A costly programme of rearmament has modernized available military equipment. Following a hiatus in the delivery and upgrading of military hardware lasting for more than a decade, the armed services’ stocks of weaponry have been comprehensively replenished. The impact of technological renewal on the Russian military’s ability to project power on a global level was demonstrated in Syria. At the same time, the country’s capabilities for expeditionary operations remain limited. It is highly unlikely that it could supply and sustain the scale of forces required for an operation comparable to the US coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that a country’s military power cannot be measured in absolute terms, but only in relation to that of others. Although the Russian military is by far the most superior player in its immediate neighbourhood, and almost always has been, it still has a long way to go to achieve the parity with the West that it desires. In terms of sheer size, the Russian military is no competitor to the world’s other great powers, such as the United States and China. This disparity is exacerbated by the fact that a large part of its strength is still made up of conscripts with little training and experience. For demographic and financial reasons, the Russian military’s current strength of around 800,000 cannot be substantially increased. In terms of the quality of technology available, the Russian military also continues to lag decades behind more advanced countries in areas such as precision weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles and robotics. Owing to problems with the Russian ship-building industry, its maritime power projection capabilities are also limited. The economic downturn has cast serious doubts on the long-term affordability of the rearmament programme, indicating that Russia is continuing its long history of punching above its weight when it comes to its military ambitions.
Much has been made of the success of Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ in Crimea. There are concerns that, even if Moscow’s material military capabilities continue to lag behind the West, it has made up for these shortcomings with innovations in strategic thought. The ‘newness’ and prowess of ‘hybrid warfare’ approaches pursued in Crimea should not be overstated. Russia has a rich history of innovative military thinking, which continued to develop after the end of the Cold War. However, owing to the absence of structured military reforms throughout the 1990s, there was little evidence that this shaped military policy in a systematic manner. Russian military interventions in the CIS region and in Chechnya highlighted that, for much of the post-Soviet era, the Kremlin relied on brute force and numerical superiority, exposing the shortcomings of its capabilities compared to those of the West. The operation in Crimea showed that military modernization had led to improvements in the ability of military planners to adjust tactics to suit the specific circumstances of an operation. In Crimea, the tactics chosen suited the ends to be achieved, unlike in previous operations, when poor strategy was made up for with overwhelming firepower. However, as far as Russian military thinking goes, the conclusions to be drawn from Crimea should not be overstated. As is the case for all wars and conflicts, context is key to strategy. What works in one case cannot easily be repeated elsewhere, where the circumstances are different. Moreover, the focus on ‘hybrid warfare’ does not adequately reflect other developments in Russian military thinking and ambitions, as the Syria operation in the form of a conventional air campaign has demonstrated. Russian military modernization aims for full-spectrum capabilities, including competitiveness in the technological realm. The importance afforded by Russian strategists to advanced technology in modern warfare dates back to the 1970s. This idea was also at the heart of the 2008 modernization programme. The ambitions of the recent military revival can only be achieved if the expensive and increasingly unaffordable rearmament programme is delivered.
Outlook and options for Russia’s neighbours and the West
In spite of the caveats offered in this book, the Kremlin’s growing assertiveness and the resulting international tensions nonetheless present difficult challenges to its neighbours and to the West. With the annexation of Crimea, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use military force for territorial gain for the first time in post-Cold War history. This has led to understandable fears about what Moscow’s future intentions might be, especially amongst its closest neighbours. Russia’s operations in Ukraine and in Syria have also led to tensions with the West that are incomparable in scale and scope to other crisis situations in the post-Soviet past. Russia’s economic problems since 2008 have slowed down the pace of military modernization, but the process is ongoing and its achievements are unlikely to be reversed.
Although this book has argued that there is little evidence of a fundamental turnaround in the ambitions driving Moscow’s foreign policy, it is impossible to determine for certain what its intentions are and how the readiness to use military force will develop in the future. It is also clear that intentions can change, sometimes rapidly and in unpredictable ways. Concerns, especially by Russia’s neighbouring states, are therefore justified. Moscow’s preparedness to use force to uphold its dominant position in what it perceives as its sphere of influence has been a constant feature since the early 1990s. As demonstrated by the war in Georgia in 2008 and especially by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia is ready to defend this position, even if it involves blatant violations of international law and leads to serious international condemnation. There is little reason to believe that Russia’s vision vis-à-vis the CIS region will change in the immediate future. The continuation of the use of force in this region is therefore likely in situations where Moscow sees its interests threatened there. Likely scenarios are popular uprisings that could bring into power a regime unfriendly to Russia, or a deteriorating security situation, such as the spreading of religiously motivated extremism and terrorism in Central Asia.