As for the West, from the 1990s onwards there has been an increasing air of defiance in Russia’s foreign policy. As Bobo Lo has put it: ‘the feelings of inferiority that once characterized Russian elite attitudes have given way to a new militancy and, in public at least, aggressive self-confidence’ (2015: xvi). According to Lo, Russian leaders recognize that their ‘actions are often unpopular in the West’. However, ‘for them this matters less than the restoration of national self-respect and strategic independence’ (2015: 203). That said, growing assertiveness is not the same as the intention to enter into all-out confrontation. Russia’s capabilities to use force beyond the CIS region remain limited in any case. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Kremlin would risk using military force in a situation that would almost certainly lead to a war with the United States or with NATO. Such a scenario would not serve its national interests, however defined, because it would threaten the very existence of the regime and the international status Moscow has been trying so hard to protect. For the Baltic States at least this means that the likelihood of a Russian military incursion into their territories is lower than often claimed. In many ways, the idea that Russia is seeking to confront the West militarily contradicts the most important and consistent ambition driving its foreign policy throughout history: the desire for great power recognition. Having great power status for Russia denotes international acknowledgement of its position as an important pole in the international system which, on a par with other great powers, has an equal say in important global decisions of the day. This cannot be achieved in isolation, but only in cooperation with other powerful actors.
Since 2014, fears about ‘hybrid threats’ emanating from Russia and directed against the West, such as ‘information warfare’ or ‘cyber warfare’ have become increasingly prominent. Such fears are not without basis, especially since evidence of attempted Russian interference in the political affairs of various Western countries – most prominently in the US presidential elections in autumn 2016 – has come to light. It is beyond doubt that these measures present a challenge to the countries concerned. Having said this, it is important to disentangle political and military threats in this respect. The tendency to couch these issues in the language of warfare unhelpfully implies that the West is already at war with Russia and that ‘hybrid threats’ could easily turn into military action. As such, Western discourse mirrors recent developments in Russia’s own military doctrine, where outside information influence on the country’s politics and society is presented as a military danger. Given the already tense international situation, Charap’s suggestion that this represents a ‘dangerous misuse of the word “war”’ cannot be repeated often enough (2015/16: 52). Using unnecessarily militarized language to describe various tools for seeking political influence also makes it more difficult to find realistic solutions to the problem. Clearly, a military response or increases to defence budgets are unlikely to yield satisfactory results in such cases.
Realistically, there are limited options available to the West and to the international community to stop Russia’s military revival outright, bar the imposition of sanctions banning the export of defence technology and dual-use equipment into Russia. The US and EU have already put such measures into place following the annexation of Crimea. It will also be difficult, as it has been in the past, to prevent Russia from using military force in certain situations in the future. Any forceful attempt to do so would considerably increase the chances of a global military conflict.
There are choices to be made, then, on deciding how to respond to an increasingly assertive Russia. When it comes to responding to uses of military force, the West can only lead by example in using war as a last resort, within the parameters of international law, and to condemn Russia in the strongest terms when it does not do the same. Moscow’s military actions in Ukraine and Syria have already had serious consequences for the country’s international image, even if it is clear that the country has also achieved recognition through military means. As isolation is not in Moscow’s interest, and Russia continues to seek respect as a great power from the global community, there is some hope that international repercussions and condemnation will be a factor in its future decisions on when and where to use military force.
There are also choices to be made for NATO in deciding on how to alleviate the fears felt by its members that are geographically closest to Russia. These fears have been exacerbated by Moscow’s military posturing and brinkmanship along its western border. Doing nothing is clearly not an option. Even if a convincing case can be made that Russian actions are not driven by ‘revanchist’ intentions, chance and uncertainty make such fears understandable and justified. On the one hand, NATO’s emphasis on unity and resolve and the reinforcement of its position on its eastern flank make a good deal of sense, as do the efforts made by European non-NATO member states to increase military cooperation with the alliance. On the other hand, military deterrence in response to the Kremlin’s actions is a double-edged sword. The major change since 2014 has been not so much the strengthening of Russian military power in relative terms. The more significant change has occurred in international views of its capabilities, which often exaggerate them. The tendency by the West to overestimate Russian capabilities has brought the Kremlin closer to its goal of great power recognition. From this point of view, the effectiveness of deterrence intended to stop military posturing is far from guaranteed. Insofar as it validates to a degree Russia’s status as a powerful global actor, it could even encourage such behaviour, rather than prevent it.
The experience of the Cold War has also taught us what an evermore intense security dilemma can lead to. As Samuel Charap and Timothy Colton noted, tensions between Russia and NATO since 2014 have already had negative repercussions for the security environment in Europe. This is because although ‘the NATO moves are a response to genuine threat perceptions of East Central European allies over Russia’s behaviour since 2014’, Moscow nonetheless ‘sees in them nothing more than a continuation of the long-running process of NATO moving its military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders. In response, Russia has announced a build-up in its Western Military District’ (2017: 161–2). If the trend of uncompromising rhetoric and military posturing on both sides continues, a renewed arms race is a possible outcome. Given Russia’s economic situation and comparative conventional military weakness, the West would probably win such a race yet again. However, it would nonetheless be costly for all states and societies involved and the danger of intended or unintended escalation in the face of spiralling tensions is worth bearing in mind.
Even if the announcement of a ‘New Cold War’ is premature, it is clear that the severity of tensions and depth of political differences since 2014 have made a return to ‘business as usual’ unacceptable not only to the West, but also to Russia. As such, Lo’s assessment of the future appears not entirely unrealistic: ‘Russia-West relations are set on a path of negative continuity: an overall downward trend, punctuated by periodic crises and, more rarely, brief upturns’ (2015: 166). Whether this is the bottom line, or a more optimistic scenario is also possible, will depend not only on Russia. As the book has shown, although the Kremlin’s foreign policy towards the West clearly has become more confrontational in recent years, its view of the West as a potential friend or foe is not all black and white. Moreover, changes in Russia’s relations with the West are not predetermined, but at least in part the product of mutual interaction. As such, the difficult question NATO and the West will have to answer is whether a middle ground between a policy that might lead to another arms race with all the costs and dangers that this involves, and doing nothing, or a weak response that could be interpreted as ‘appeasement’ can be found. With the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s ongoing involvement in, and destabilization of, Donbas in mind, diplomatic efforts to alleviate tensions and prevent spiralling confrontation are problematic for political reasons. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future, because the prospect of Russia returning Crimea to Ukraine is simply unrealistic. At the same time, it is hard to see how the negative continuity in relations can be stopped without the willingness of both sides to communicate. On a bilateral basis, cooperation in areas of common interest has resumed, as the ceasefire in Syria brokered by the US and Russia in conjunction with Jordan in July 2017 demonstrated. Although such initiatives will not solve the bigger political problems dividing the United States and Russia, and have not done so in the past, they nonetheless are a small step towards the normalization of relations.