For NATO as an alliance, which has to reconcile the divergent political priorities of its members, the resumption of official cooperation with Russia has been especially problematic. Moreover, as was the case in the past, its open-door policy and the potential for further enlargement will always make its relationship with Russia difficult. Having said this, even when it comes to NATO, the Kremlin’s views of the alliance are not as black and white as they appear today. Russia–West relations have ‘survived’ two rounds of eastward enlargement in the past, without this leading to the brink of war or even the Kremlin’s refusal of ongoing cooperation. Russia’s concerns about eastward enlargement resonated throughout the post-Cold War years. However, in 1999, it was not the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO, but the new strategic doctrine NATO had adopted, followed by Operation Allied Force, which led Russia to freeze relations with the alliance. Although Russia expressed opposition to the Baltic States joining NATO, it continued its cooperation with the alliance also in 2004. The NATO–Russia Council (NRC) had been established in 2002 and relations had also improved based on the common interest in fighting international terrorism. Against this background, Putin stated in 2005, even when relations with the US in particular had soured as a result of the 2003 war in Iraq, that ‘the choice made in favour of dialogue and co-operation with NATO was the right one and has proved fruitful… In just a very short time we have taken a gigantic step from past confrontation to working together and from mutual accusations and stereotypes to creating modern instruments for co-operation such as the NRC’ (quoted in Forsberg and Herd 2015: 47). Both rounds of NATO enlargement had been preceded by diplomatic efforts by the alliance to keep Russia ‘on side’. As such, this shows that future NATO enlargement need not necessarily lead to aggressive Russian action.
By 2017, all practical cooperation under the NRC remained suspended, with only a handful of meetings for ‘political dialogue’ having taken place since 2014. Whether pragmatic cooperation on matters of mutual interest should be resumed, as they were after the temporary suspension following the war in Georgia in 2008, is a difficult decision. On the one hand, for political reasons, official military cooperation with Russia after it annexed Crimea would be viewed as highly contentious, because it would imply that the Kremlin can get away even with flagrant violations of international law. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Russia will continue to matter to NATO and to the West ‘whether it is a partner, or, as seems more likely, a competitor’, as Monaghan noted. ‘New’ security challenges transcending the borders of nation states, such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, will be difficult to resolve without Russia’s involvement, because of its influence and location (2016: xi). Moreover, although practical cooperation in certain areas will not lead to the solution of the bigger political differences between NATO and the West – a fact that has been obvious not only since 2014 – it ultimately might be necessary as the better alternative to escalating confrontation.
Arguably, the danger of tensions spiralling out of control is the biggest challenge to international security resulting from Russia’s military revival. Although the West takes no blame for the Kremlin’s aggressive behaviour or violations of international law, it bears some responsibility for how the subsequent tensions are managed. Russia will not go away, whether as a threat or as a partner, as noted above. As such, another attempt at creating the conditions required for a stable relationship, no matter how challenging, seems preferable to the acceptance that containment is the only option left. In the words of the former British ambassador to the Soviet Union, Rodric Braithwaite (2014), any attempt to alleviate tensions in East–West relations ‘would involve much eating of words on all sides… It will be very hard to achieve. It may already be too late. But the alternatives are liable to be far worse’.
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