Mikhaleva: What do think about the radio reporting in those days?
Kucher: Of course, those days were ideally suited for the radio. Moscow Echo was superb, unique. I tuned in as often as I could. They did an excellent job.
Mikhaleva: My own impression is that, for the most part, in the country as a whole, people reacted rather impassively, with indifference. Only a small number took an active part in the events. The rest appeared indifferent. What do you think? What caused this attitude?
Kucher: I explain it by the fact that people had been lied to so much and for such a long time that they simply could not understand what was going on. Only now, perhaps, are they capable of more or less sober analysis. Indeed, only now is it beginning to sink in what would have happened had the putschists won. Finally, the events developed so fast that people simply did not have the time to make judgments, to form an opinion. They could not appreciate the enormity of what had happened, that the entire social system had changed.
Mikhaleva: And you yourself, did you understand that the putsch meant the end of communism, that communism would come to an end in these three days, that the whole system would collapse? Did you really think that on, say, Wednesday the 21 st?
Kucher: No, of course not. I’ll be frank with you—I could not foresee the rapidity with which the events actually unfolded. And I was very surprised that things moved so fast. But I knew, I sensed it with my whole body, that if the junta took the upper hand, democracy in Russia would be doomed. But I did not understand that this huge machine, this enormous edifice, had such spindly legs, was so easy to knock down. As we wrote in that first issue of the joint newspaper after the putsch, democracy had won because a free people and a free press took their stand together. It turned out that people’s inner mood, inner feeling, was so much opposed to the CPSU and its system, so much opposed to all they stood for, that the collapse of communism did not take that much effort. But it is true there wasn’t any exuberant reaction on the part of the people in those three days. They did not respond in one big outburst, with fireworks and so forth, but slowly and in different ways. They have been responding ever since. It takes time to absorb freedom, to become comfortable with it—that’s my opinion.
Mikhaleva: What about now? If a putsch were to happen now, would it succeed?
Kucher: I know there is talk like that and some regret that the putsch failed. But let us look at those who came to defend the White House. They were younger people, for the most part. The veterans of the CPSU, the Komsomol, the war veterans did not man the barricades. Young people came, and there were many young women. It was a very good-looking crowd, good faces…. Perhaps, for the young people, it was an opportunity to put themselves to a test as a social force. And of course, in defending the White House, these people did not have any specific political or social program in mind, they did not think that, for example, we must take strong measures to stabilize the ruble, to carry out a radical land reform and so forth. Those were not the slogans that moved them in those three days. What did they feel? My sense is that people simply could not stand the idea of having those Party martinets remain in power. Nobody wanted all those Lukianovs, Ryzhkovs, all those monsters, those Party bosses to continue governing the country.
Mikhaleva: What was Gorbachev’s role in all of this, in your opinion? I know it is a complex question, but I would like your own personal opinion.
Kucher: In my reporting, I once came across an interesting document—I have written about it in my newspaper. It was a transcript of Lukianov’s talk with a delegation of Russia’s deputies. It was not intended for publication. Among them were Silaev and a few other members of the government. In this talk, Lukianov used threats, saying that if Russia continued to refuse to abide by the Union laws, there would be unpleasant consequences. He spoke with authority, as one of the key members of the Union government; he spoke as the master of the situation. And in that conversation, he said that Gorbachev was aware of the measures that might be undertaken against Russia’s government. Later on, he changed his tune. But the transcript prompted me to write a note to Lukianov. Then, some military people have told me that they intercepted Gorbachev’s communications with the Kremlin on the eve of the coup. I asked them if I could listen to the tape. They promised to give it to me, but I never received it. When I reminded them of the promise sometime later, they told me that they had lost it. It is hard to say what actually transpired. However, during the putsch, many in the White House were saying that Gorbachev knew about the plans to stage a coup.
Mikhaleva: Tell me more about what people were thinking about Gorbachev in the White House in those days?
Kucher: People associated with the apparat of the Council of Ministers—I emphasize, the apparat—tried hard to raise suspicions about Gorbachev; some in the military did too. Again I emphasize that these were the officials of the apparat, not elected officials; they were officials who are no longer there. They tried to present Gorbachev as a virtual accomplice of the putschists, if not the actual leader. Those people, I would say, were simply scoundrels. As to the elected officials of the Supreme Soviet, the democratic leadership, they had a clear position: “What happened to the President? If he is sick, give us the opinion of medical experts. Tell us where he is. Give us precise and clear information. Demand to speak to the President.” Those were two distinct attitudes. It was clear that one segment, the apparat, wanted to count him with the traitors, to implicate him, to compromise him. Indeed, how else can one interpret that incident when I was told that they had the tape of an intercepted communication and then was told that the tape had been lost? Why did they approach a reporter with this sort of information? It’s a question, isn’t it? Perhaps someday I will name that person. Moreover, that person said to me: “We’ll use the tape when the time is right.”
So, to sum up what I think about Gorbachev, I believe that he could not have been among those who were prepared to use violence and terror against their own people. That is my personal conviction. As to the rest, I have no idea. When they talked to Gorbachev previously about the necessity to introduce a state of emergency, he may have said something to them that they interpreted as tacit approval. He could have meant one thing and they understood it in their own way. Perhaps there is some truth to those who say that his equivocations were so ambiguous that one could interpret them any way one wished. And surely he had doubts about his course, about his methods; surely, he considered all sorts of options in trying to find a way out of an impossible situation, agonized over them. But I do not believe that he was capable of those methods, of that role, of that massive lie. It is unthinkable for me. Of course, there are also some people now who want to present the putsch as a kind of comic opera. But the danger was real. And it wasn’t just the tanks that posed this danger, not the immediate threat of violence. The question was the course the country would take: toward democracy or toward partocracy. That was the fork in the road.