the Führer refrained from his habitual attack on the Bolshevik menace. A shrewd
observer like Robert Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin, had at once
considered this omission as very significant, and, in his dispatches to the Quai d'Orsay, had quoted authoritative German sources in support of his assessment. Gafencu also
looked upon this Hitler speech of April 28 as a starting point: "Facing the failure of his Western policy, the Führer already contemplated an about-turn in his Eastern policy.
Such a change ... would obviously find support among the German General Staff... as
well as in German economic circles."
[ G. Gafencu, op. cit., p. 175.]
This was written in 1945 and since then there have been a variety of data to show that the matter was not as simple as that. We know, for instance, that it took Hitler a very long time to get used to the idea of a pact with Moscow, and that Ribbentrop, in particular, became enthusiastic about it some time before the Führer did. But none the less, it is probable that, already in April, after the British guarantee to Poland, he kept the
possibility of an agreement with Moscow up his sleeve.
Although there is evidence to show that there were earlier contacts, the Soviet History now claims that it was the Germans who made the first tentative approach to Russia on May 30, 1939, while the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks "were already in full swing".
[ IVOVSS, vol. I, p. 174.]
On that day Weizsäcker, the permanent head of the German Foreign Office, told G. A.
Astakhov, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Berlin, that "there was a possibility of improving Soviet-German relations". He pointed out that, in renouncing the Carpathian Ukraine—which had been handed over to Hungary in the partition of Czechoslovakia—
Germany had eliminated a casus belli with the Soviet Union. And he went on to say: "If the Soviet Government wishes to discuss an improvement in Soviet-German relations,
then it should know that such a possibility now exists. If, however, the Soviet Union wants to persist, together with Britain and France, in its policy of encircling Germany, then Germany is ready to meet the challenge."
The Soviet History reports that, at this stage, the Russians merely replied that the future of Soviet-German relations depended primarily on the Germans themselves, in itself a curious way of "rejecting" their advances. And then, on August 3, according to the Soviet History:
Ribbentrop told G. A. Astakhov that there were no insoluble problems between the
USSR and Germany "in the whole area between the Baltic and the Black Sea. All questions could be solved if the Soviet Government accepted these premises."
Ribbentrop made no secret of the fact that Germany had been conducting secret
negotiations with Britain and France, but declared that "it would be easier for the Germans to talk to the Russians, despite all ideological differences, than with the British and the French". Having said that, Ribbentrop then resorted to threats.
"If," he said, "you have other solutions in mind, if you think, for instance, that the best way of settling your problems with us is to invite an Anglo-French military
mission to Moscow, then that's your business. For our own part, we don't mind all the screaming against us in the so-called West-European democracies. We are
sufficiently strong to treat all this kind of thing with ridicule and contempt. There isn't a war which we couldn't win."
[IVOVSS, vol. I, p. 174, quoting Archives of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR
(Arkhiv MO SSSR).]
Ribbentrop then proposed that Germany and the Soviet Union sign a secret protocol
dividing into spheres of interest the whole area between the Black Sea and the Baltic.
"Unwilling to enter into such an agreement with Germany, and still hoping for a successful conclusion of the military talks with Britain and France, the Soviet
Government informed Berlin on August 7 that it considered the German proposal
unsuitable, and rejected the idea of the secret protocol."
[ Ibid., quoting Soviet Foreign Policy Archives (AVP SSSR).]
In his dispatch of August 8, Astakhov expressed the view that the Germans would
not observe seriously, or for any length of time, any obligations they might enter into under such an arrangement. "But I believe that, on a short-term basis, they would like to come to some kind of agreement with us along the lines suggested, and so to neutralise us... What would happen next would be determined not by any
obligations entered into by the Germans, but by the new international situation that would be created."
[IVOVSS, vol. I, pp. 174-5, quoting Soviet Foreign Policy Archives (AVP SSSR).]
We need not here deal in detail with the familiar story of how the Nazi leaders,
determined to strike at Poland, were growing more and more impatient at Moscow's
reluctance to commit itself, and with the frantic "very urgent" telegrams that were being exchanged between Ribbentrop and the German Embassy in Moscow, or with how, in the
end, in reply to Hitler's telegram, Stalin gave his assent to the pressing proposal that Ribbentrop arrive in Moscow "on August 22 or, at the very latest, on August 23 ". What is new is the way in which this whole episode is now handled by the Russians:
By the middle of August, the German leaders had become acutely worried. The German
Embassy in Moscow was getting frantic wires asking what was happening about the
Military Missions. Before these talks had started, Schulenburg [the German Ambassador]
asked the Italian Ambassador, Rossi, to find out from Grzybowski, the Polish
Ambassador, whether Poland would accept Soviet military aid. Schulenburg then
promptly informed Berlin of the Polish Ambassador's reply: On no account would Poland allow Soviet troops to enter or even to cross Polish territory, or let the Russians use Polish airfields. At the same time Schulenburg was instructed by Weizsäcker to tell the Soviet Government that if it preferred an alliance with England, Russia would be left face-to-face with Germany. By choosing instead an understanding with Germany, the
Soviet Union would have her security guaranteed.
[ IVOVSS, vol. I, p. 175, quoting DGFP, series D, vol. VII, p. 13.]
Similar tempting promises were made to Astakhov, who reported:
The Germans are obviously worried by our negotiations with the British and
French military. They have become unsparing in their arguments and promises to
avert an agreement. I consider that they are today ready to make the kind of
declarations and gestures which would have been inconceivable six months ago.
[Ibid., quoting AVP SSSR (Soviet Foreign Policy Archives).]
On August 15, Schulenburg told Molotov:
At present they [the British and French] are again trying to push the Soviet Union into a war against Germany. This policy had very bad consequences for Russia in
1914. It is in the interests of both Germany and Russia to avoid a mutual massacre for the benefit of the Western democracies.
[ IVOVSS, ibid., quoting Soviet Ministry of Defence Archives.]
Schulenburg then proposed to Russia a non-aggression pact, complete with a protocol on the respective spheres of interest. Again the Soviet Government " declined ", and Schulenburg, much discouraged, reported to Berlin that the Soviet Government took