treaty obligations very seriously and expected the same attitude from its co-signatories.
[This does not tally with the German version, which says that Molotov first mentioned a non-aggression pact on August 15. The date is important. It was four days after the
arrival of the Drax Mission about whose "seriousness" the Russians were now very doubtful. See W. R. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London, 1960), p. 521.]
By now the Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks had, indeed, reached a deadlock, both on
"numerical reciprocity" and, more immediately, on the Polish issue; and when, on August 20, Hitler sent his famous telegram to Stalin asking him to receive Ribbentrop "on Tuesday, August 22 or, at the latest, on Wednesday, August 23 ", and saying that Ribbentrop would arrive with full powers for signing the non-aggression pact, "as well as the protocol", Stalin agreed.
It should, however, be remembered that, apart from the political soundings undertaken by the Germans in both Berlin and Moscow, there were also the trade negotiations which ran parallel with the political soundings, and had, of course, some bearing on them. Indeed, it was by announcing the Trade Agreement with Germany on August 21 that the Soviet
Government prepared the ground for the much more spectacular and, to many, almost
unbelievable announcement that was to come three days later. But the wording of the
Pravda editorial of August 21 accompanying the announcement of the Trade Agreement was significant enough to anyone who could read between the lines—and, in this case, it did not even require outstanding political acumen to do so.
Shirer is probably quite right in saying that it was on August 19 that Stalin made his choice, unless it was on the 20th, after the receipt of Hitler's personal telegram.
The best conclusion this writer can come to is that, as of August 14, when
Voroshilov demanded "an unequivocal answer" on the question of allowing Soviet troops to meet the Germans in Poland, the Kremlin still had an open mind as to
which side to join... At any rate, Stalin does not seem to have made his final decision until the afternoon of August 19.
[ Shirer, op. cit., p. 535.]
On the 19th, the Soviet press was, on the face of it, still violently anti-Nazi. It made it quite apparent that a German attack on Poland was now almost certainly a matter of days.
Thus, Pravda of August 19 still published a TASS message from Warsaw under the heading: "GERMAN PROVOCATIONS IN DANZIG", and a TASS message from
Berlin, under the heading: "ANTI-POLISH CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY":
The Völkischer Beobachter today prominently displayed comments in the Italian press to the effect that the tension between Germany and Poland "can no longer be settled by a mere settlement of the Danzig question". All German papers are trying to present Poland as an "aggressor", and as the creator of "an intolerable situation". Britain and France are being attacked with special violence. In its editorial, the Völkischer Beobachter says: "The problem of Danzig and the Corridor are ripe for a German solution." The papers are openly threatening war. "Every day that's wasted." says the Völkischer Beobachter, "increases the danger of war."
By the 21st, the emphasis in the TASS reports from Berlin had slightly shifted, but only slightly; the main suggestion was still that a German attack on Poland was imminent; but now it was also suggested that Poland would be crushed within a very short time:
Berlin, August 20. The threats against Poland today are even more violent. All the papers are screaming about the "Polish terror against Germans", and about "the crowding of Polish prisons by Germans". At the same time the German newspapers are writing about
"the military weakness of Poland" and her incapacity to withstand a German blow.
It was not, however, this seemingly routine story which attracted the reader's attention that day, but the front-page editorial on the Soviet-German Trade and Credit Agreement.
It started from afar, as it were:
Even only a few years ago, Germany held first place in the Soviet Union's trade
turnover. In 1931 Soviet-German trade amounted to 1,100 million marks. In view of the strained political relations, there was a marked decline in this trade. Until 1935, Germany was still first in the Soviet Union's foreign trade, but by 1938 she was
down to fifth place, after Britain, the USA, Belgium and Holland. This loss of the Soviet market must have worried both German business circles and the German
Government. That is why, since the beginning of last year, negotiations were
conducted between the two countries, with certain intervals, on trade and credit
questions with a view to enlarging Soviet-German trade. Despite difficulties that arose in these negotiations in view of the tense political atmosphere, there was a marked improvement in recent months. Thanks to the desire of both sides to
improve commercial relations between the two countries, all matters of dispute have now been settled...
The editorial went on to say that a trade and credit agreement had been signed in Berlin on August 19 by Comrade Babarin, of the Soviet Trade Delegation, and Herr Schnurre. It was a satisfactory agreement: under it, Germany granted the USSR a credit of 200
million marks for purchases to be made in Germany during the next two years—mostly
machine tools and other industrial equipment. The Soviet Union would supply, during the same period, "various commodities" for 180 million marks. The great advantage of the German credit was that it was in the nature of a financial loan, and the Soviet Union could pay German firms in cash. The annual interest rate on this loan was five percent, which was cheaper than the interest on previous loans. Also, the loan would not be
repayable for seven and a half years.
This suggestion of peaceful German-Soviet trade relations for over seven years to come was sufficiently startling at a moment when the Germans were about to invade Poland.
But the conclusion of the article was even more startling: "This agreement should greatly stimulate trade between the USSR and Germany, and should become a turning point in the economic relations between the two countries. The new trade and credit agreement between the USSR and Germany, though born in an atmosphere of strained political
relations, is designed to clear this atmosphere. It can become an important step towards a further improvement in not only the economic relations but also the political relations between the USSR and Germany."
[Emphasis added.]
Clearly, the die was about to be cast. What also contributed to Stalin's decision to sign up with Germany was the situation in the Far East. In August 1939 the fierce battle of
Halkin Gol was being fought against the Japanese, and the Russians were afraid of
becoming involved in a two-front war—against Germany in Europe and against Japan in
Asia. A pact with Germany would almost automatically end the war with Japan, Hitler's ally.
Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow and the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23 came almost as a complete surprise to the Russian public, and if nobody openly declared himself deeply shocked and scandalised, it was simply because it was
"not done"—especially after the Purge years—to be openly shocked or scandalised by anything with which Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov were directly associated. It