is, nevertheless, obvious that, at heart, millions of Russians were deeply perplexed by what had happened, after their country had been in the vanguard of the "anti-Fascist struggle" ever since the Nazis had come to power.
[This is also confirmed by the recollections of so competent an observer as Wolfgang Leonhard, whose account is based on firsthand experience at the time within the
Comintern establishment: Child of the Revolution (London, 1957). At the same time, according to Jean Champenois, a leading French correspondent in Moscow, mere was
also widespread chuckling among many Russians about the punishment meted out to
England and France "after all their dirty tricks".]
The mental alibis to which many Russians—whether workers or intellectuals—resorted,
at least during the early stages of the Pact, were that Stalin and Molotov no doubt knew what they were doing; that they had, after all, kept the Soviet Union out of war (here was something corresponding roughly to the "cowardly relief and shame" reaction in the West at the time of Munich); and that the Pact, though distasteful, had been rendered inevitable by the attitude of France, Britain and Poland. Nor was it doubted that Stalin and Molotov must have had a great many reservations about the whole thing.
The reactions to the "deal" with Hitler were to undergo numerous changes during the twenty-two months the Pact was in force; but it seems clear that Stalin and Molotov were fully conscious of the mixed feelings with which the Pact was received in the country.
Throughout the Pact period, the Soviet press, for example, maintained a marked
aloofness vis-à-vis Nazi Germany. There were no favourable comments on any aspects of the Nazi régime at any time, and there was, strictly speaking, no reporting whatsoever on the German scene in the Soviet newspapers, beyond the reproduction of war
communiqués and some official utterances by Hitler, especially when these concerned
Soviet-German relations. Important news items, such as Stalin's toast during Ribbentrop's visit—"Since the German people love their Führer so much, let us drink the Führer's health"—were carefully kept out of the Russian press.
During the week preceding Ribbentrop's visit, Aviation Day had been celebrated on
August 18, and half the front page of Pravda that day was occupied by a drawing showing Stalin and Voroshilov surveying a boundless airfield with thousands of planes on it. "Great and touching is our airmen's love for Comrade Stalin", the editorial wrote, while, on page 2, a famous airman commented rapturously on "Comrade Stalin's
profound knowledge in aviation matters", and recalled some of the outstanding feats of Soviet aviation in recent years and their heroes—Chkalov, Gromov, Grizodubova,
Raskova and Osipenko. The same paper reported, on its foreign news page, "Jewish pogroms in Czechoslovakia" (TASS, Prague), and "Persecution of Poles in Germany"
(TASS, Warsaw).
On August 19, Pravda reported the Aviation Day meeting at Tushino Airfield, attended by a million people: here also was a picture of the Party and Army leaders present at the air display— Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Beria,
Shvernik, Malenkov, Bulganin, Shcherbakov, Shkiriatov, Budienny, Loktionov and
Mikhailov. On August 20 the place of honour was given to a "Letter from Prague", entitled: "The Czech People are Not Defeated." And then, on August 21, there appeared, as we have seen, the famous editorial on the Soviet-German Trade and Credit Agreement, with its significant concluding paragraph, foreshadowing a political rapprochement between the two countries.
But on the following two days—August 22 and 23—there was still nothing of any
importance, except the usual seemingly anti-German news items like these: "Many Poles preparing to flee from Danzig", or "Mass Arrests in Memel. Gestapo arresting not only Poles, but also Lithuanians, Polish Press says."
On August 24 came the bombshell. Big front-page pictures in Pravda showing Molotov, Stalin, Ribbentrop, Gaus, Deputy Secretary of State at the German Foreign Office and its legal adviser, and an interpreter. The editorial on the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact argued along the following lines:
The Pact was consistent with the Soviet Union's policy. "We stand for peace and the consolidation of business relations with all countries." Recalling Rapallo and the Soviet-German Neutrality Agreement of 1926, it said: "Yesterday's agreement
follows in the footsteps of the 1926 agreement, except that it goes still further, since Art. 1 precludes any aggressive actions against the co-signatory either alone or with other Powers, while Art. 2 provides for neutrality in the event of an attack on either signatory by a third power." Art. 3 called for consultation on matters of common interest. Art. 4 was particularly important since it obliged the signatories not to take part in any grouping of Powers which might, directly, or indirectly, be aimed at the other signatory.
The editorial also highly commended Art. 5 providing for the peaceful and friendly
settlement of any disputes and for the creation of commissions in the event of more
serious conflicts, as well as Art. 6 which specified that the Pact was valid for ten years and was automatically renewable for five more years; here was a clear promise of a
lasting peace. The last paragraph concerned ratification "as quickly as possible".
Below the picture of the Kremlin meeting there was this announcement:
At 3.30 p.m. on August 23 a first conversation took place between... V. M. Molotov and the Foreign Minister of Germany, Herr von Ribbentrop. The conversation took
place in the presence of Comrade Stalin and the German Ambassador Count von
der Schulenburg. It lasted about three hours. After an interval the conversation was resumed at 10 p.m. and ended with the signing of the Non-Aggression Agreement of
which the text follows.
Another communiqué concerned the arrival in Moscow, at 1.30 p.m. on August 23, of
"the Foreign Minister of Germany, Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop" and the persons accompanying him, among them Herr Gaus, Baron von Dörnberg, Herr P. Schmidt, Prof.
G. Hoffmann, Herr K. Schnurre, etc. It also gave a long list of the personalities who had gone to the airfield to meet them, among them Deputy Foreign Commissar V. P.
Potemkin; Deputy Commissar for Foreign Trade, M. S. Stepanov; Deputy Commissar of
the Interior, V. N. Merkulov; the Chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, etc. Present were also members of the German Embassy, with Ambassador von der Schulenburg at their
head, as well as the Italian Ambassador and Military Attaché. On the following day
Pravda briefly reported Ribbentrop's departure "at 1.25 p.m. on August 24". The same people who had come to meet him had also gone to see him off.
The editorial that day, however, dealt with nothing more exciting than the State purchases of vegetables.
For the next few days nothing more was said about the Soviet-German Pact and,
surprisingly, there were no reports of any "spontaneous" and "enthusiastic" mass meetings anywhere in Russia approving it. The foreign press reactions, as reported in the Soviet Press, seemed remarkably inconclusive, except for the London Star which was reported to have blamed Chamberlain for what had happened. On August 29, Pravda
quoted H. N. Brailsford, the veteran Labour journalist, as saying something similar.