circumstances would have fought Nazi Germany wholeheartedly, were precisely the
people who were being told by the Russians—and, more particularly by Dimitrov and the Comintern— that the war against Nazi Germany was an "imperialist" war and so, in consequence, not a "just" war. A different morale of the French Communists might not have made any great difference at the time of the German break-through into France in May 1940, and the French Army would probably have capitulated in any case; but,
undoubtedly, Moscow helped in some degree to weaken French resistance, even though it was obviously in the Russians' interest to strengthen it and to keep Hitler pinned down in France as long as possible.
It was all very well for communist propaganda later to adopt the fashionable Ehrenburg line that France had been "betrayed" by her bourgeoisie, but the morale of the whole nation was low in May-June 1940, including that of the French working-class. The
Soviet-German Pact and the subsequent Russian and Comintern propaganda about the
"imperialist war" had placed the French Communists—whether leaders or rank-and-file
—in a truly tragic dilemma. Many of them strongly suspected that they—and France—
were being sacrificed by Moscow, to whom the survival of the Soviet Union, with the
help of the Soviet-German Pact, was the Number One priority.
[ This tragic dilemma among the French Communists in the face of the. Soviet-German
Pact and the German invasion of France is examined in detail in the author's France, 1940-1955 (London, 1956), pp. 179-202. This chapter was, significantly, omitted from the Russian translation published in Moscow in 1959.]
Whether or not, as is now claimed by communists, certain French Communist leaders
took a firm anti-German lutte à outrance line in the first week in June, the Soviet leaders were very careful at the time to avoid anything that might have caused Hitler the least offence. Nevertheless, there was a significant change in the tone of the Soviet press as the French tragedy developed. At first it was distinctly malevolent towards France and
Britain. Thus in summing up the results of the first five days of the military operations in the West, Pravda wrote in its editorial of May 16:
During these first five days, the German armies have achieved considerable successes.
They have occupied the greater part of Holland, including Rotterdam. The Netherlands Government has already run off (sbezhalo) to England. It had been a long-standing ambition of the Anglo-French bloc to drag Holland and Belgium into its war against
Germany... After the Germans had forestalled Britain and France in Scandinavia, these two countries moved heaven and earth to get Holland and Belgium into the war... So far, the Anglo-French bloc can boast of only one success: it has thrown two more small
countries into the imperialist war; two more nations have now been condemned to
suffering and hunger.
No one will be deceived by the Anglo-French lamentations over the violations of
international law. As soon as the war had spread to Norway, the British grabbed the
Faroe and Lofoten islands—heaven only knows in virtue of what international law. We
now see how great is the responsibility of the Anglo-French imperialists who, by
rejecting Germany's peace offers, set off the Second Imperialist War in Europe.
There was no mention of the ruthless bombing of Rotterdam, and, on the following day, in a review of the military situation describing German successes, there were again the same phrases about the Netherlands Government having "run off" to London, "leaving the army and the country to their fate". On the same day Pravda published a particularly nauseating anti-British article by David Zaslavsky.
But, during the following week, with the Germans crashing on towards Dunkirk, the tone suddenly changed. The reports became much more factual. Every important Churchill
speech was quoted at some length, as was also Reynaud's famous patrie en danger
speech to the Senate on May 21. Significantly, much space was given to the question of American help to Britain and France. On June 5, Churchill's post-Dunkirk speech—"we shall fight on the beaches ... we shall never surrender"—was published under a three-column heading in Pravda. On the same day the paper announced that Molotov had
"raised no objection" to the British Government's appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps as Ambassador to Moscow.
When the resistance of the French army finally collapsed by the middle of June, and
Pétain asked the Germans for an armistice, the Russians seemed suddenly to become
obsessed with one great fear: which was that Britain might make peace with Germany—
for what would happen then? Most significant in this respect was the military survey in Pravda of June 20 by Major-General P. A. Ivanov: "Not only has the French Army been smashed, but France has now lost all her vital industrial centres. This is France's
débâcle.. . Another of Britain's allies has been put out of action, and now Britain is left face to face with Germany and Italy. Yet both sides have mighty economic resources, and therefore they may continue the war for a very long time yet, and it is much too early to try to foretell the outcome of this war.
[ Emphasis added]
It is highly symptomatic that the activity of the British air-force should have been switched from the battle in France to the bombing of economic targets in Germany." And there followed long and detailed accounts of British air-raids on Germany.
[TASS, London, quoting Reuter.]
There was not the slightest suggestion any more that a peace settlement between
Germany and Britain would be a good thing!
Stupefied by Hitler's overwhelming victory over France, Russia now dropped all further pretence of respect for the sovereignty of the Baltic States. Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia were occupied, draconian new labour legislation imposed on Soviet industry, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina occupied—all this was being done within the last fortnight in
June. Already on June 17, Pravda reported that there was "great rejoicing at Kaunas", as the Red Army entered Lithuania, adding significantly that "its Fascist dictator, Smetona"
had "fled to Germany". During the following days, the Soviet press reported similar
"jubilant demonstrations" from Tallinn and Riga. The governments of the Baltic States were accused of plotting against the Soviet Union and Latvia and Estonia, in particular, of having "grossly violated their mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union". This now demanded that "they set up governments which would respect their treaties with the Soviet Union and that they give free access to their territory to Soviet troops, which would guarantee that these treaties would be respected ".
[ Pravda, June 17, 1940.]
It was quick work. On June 18 it was already announced that Mr Paletskis "who had been put in a concentration camp by the [pro-Nazi] Smetona gang in 1939", had become Lithuanian Premier. Similar miraculous changes were to take place in the next few days in Latvia and Estonia. On the very day Pravda published the DNB report from Berlin of
"Hitler's meeting with the French delegation in the Forest of Compiègne" it also described the "jubilant reception given to the Red Army by the Estonian people at Tallinn". Some time later Molotov was to explain the diplomatic background of the Russian invasion of the Baltic States as best he could; but every Russian clearly thought he understood why the Red Army had marched in—while Hitler wasn't looking.