The direct connection between the invasion of the Baltic States on the one hand, and the fall of France on the other, was so embarrassingly obvious that, on June 23, the Soviet Government found it necessary to publish this extraordinary statement—denying that it was "dissatisfied with the German successes in the West":
In connection with the entry of Soviet troops into the Baltic States there are
persistent rumours in the Western press about 100 or 150 Soviet divisions being
concentrated on the German frontier. This is supposed to arise from the
dissatisfaction felt in the Soviet Union over Germany's military successes in the West, and to point to a deterioration of Soviet-German relations.
TASS is authorised to state that this is totally untrue. There are only eighteen to twenty Soviet divisions in the Baltic countries, and they are not concentrated on the German border, but are scattered throughout the Baltic countries.
No "pressure" on Germany is intended and the military measures taken have only one aim: which is to safeguard the mutual aid between the Soviet Union and these countries.
As for Soviet-German relations, the TASS statement went out of its way to say that the occupation of the Baltic States—or Germany's victory in the West, for that matter—could not in any way affect them, though it was careful not to say whether, or not, the Baltic States had been occupied with German consent. "There is a deliberate attempt" (the TASS statement went on) "to cast a shadow on Soviet-German relations. In all this there is nothing but wishful thinking on the part of certain British, American, Swedish and Japanese gentlemen... They seem to be incapable of grasping the obvious fact that the good-neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and Germany cannot be disturbed
by rumours and cheap propaganda, since these relations are based not on temporary
motives of an ad hoc {konyunkturnyi) character, but on the fundamental State interests of the USSR and Germany."
So far so good; but six days later it was announced that "the Soviet-Rumanian conflict over Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina" had been "satisfactorily settled". Whereupon the Soviet press proceeded to report the "jubilant" reception given by the population of these two areas to the Red Army.
[According to the Russian post-war History, the Russians had become increasingly worried, especially since May 1940, by Rumania's "growing subservience" to Germany; both Tatarescu and King Carol, who had, for a time, tried to sit on the fence, were now beginning to lean heavily over to the German side. It was on June 26 that the Soviet Government presented what was in effect an ultimatum to the Rumanian Government
demanding an "immediate solution" of the question concerning the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. It also demanded the transfer to the Soviet Union of Northern
Bukovina which was ethnically Ukrainian. An additional argument concerning Northern
Bukovina was that "in November 1918 the People's Assembly (veche) of Bukovina had, reflecting the will of the people, decided in favour of joining Soviet Ukraine".
Davidescu, the Rumanian Ambassador in Moscow, declared, on the following day, his
government's "readiness" to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government; but the latter demanded a "Clear and precise" answer. This came almost immediately, and on June 28 the Red Army began to move into the two areas.
On June 23 Germany had been informed of the Soviet demands on Rumania, "but had to declare that she was not interested in the question of Bessarabia". As the History says:
"While the Battle of France was going on, it was particularly undesirable for the Germans to complicate their relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Germans feared that, in the event of a Soviet-Rumanian conflict, Rumania might lose her oilwells, while
Germany was extremely anxious that these should remain intact".
For hard-boiled "realism" the Russian conduct in this case was hard to beat. The History adds that, "with the best will in the world", Britain was unable at the time to "interfere in Soviet-Rumanian relations", since she was wholly tied up by the war in the West.
(IVOVSS, I, p. 281). Rumania joined the Axis in November 1940.]
*
During the few days separating the occupation of the Baltic States and of Bessarabia-Bukovina, a number of other significant things happened. On June 25 it was announced that diplomatic relations had been established between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Milan Gabrilovic was appointed Ambassador to Moscow and V. A. Plotnikov
Ambassador to Belgrade.
But that was not all. On the following day came a real bombshell of another kind—the ukase of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet placing Soviet industry virtually on a war footing. The eight-hour working-day was now introduced, and the full six-day working-week; more important still, workers and employees were now tied to their particular
enterprise or office, and there could no longer be any migration of labour. The ukase also provided for the most rigid disciplinary measures against absenteeism and similar
offences.
Needless to say, countless "spontaneous" meetings of workers were reported from all over the country, all approving the ukase, the purpose of which, according to all the speakers at these meetings, was to increase the military might of the Soviet Union. The fall of France was having its immediate repercussions inside Russia.
Speaking at a plenary session of the Soviet Trade Union Federation on June 25, N. M.
Shveraik said: "We are living in a capitalist encirclement and the war is raging over great areas. It is our good fortune not to be in the war, but we must be prepared for all
emergencies. We must do all we can to be many times stronger than we are; we must in every way and at any moment be ready to face every possible ordeal."
After the fall of France, it was only too clear to everybody that there was only one country from which these "ordeals" could now come. It was certainly not England, and not even Japan. And Shvernik went on: "Comrades, as Comrade Stalin has taught us, the most dangerous thing in the world is to be caught unawares. To be caught unawares
means falling a victim to the unexpected. Today the international situation demands from us that we strengthen the defence of our country and the might of our armed forces day after day."
During that historic week, the coverage of events in the West showed a slight, if only very slight, pro-British bias. Churchill's speeches saying Britain would fight till final victory, were duly reported, and, as early as June 21, there was a first mention in the Russian press of de Gaulle and his refusal to surrender to the Germans. On the other hand, Pétain was reported as calling for the termination of the war between Germany and Britain; and the Soviet press also published the Franco-German armistice terms, and the report of the German High Command on the French campaign: 27,000 Germans killed,
18,000 missing, 111,000 wounded. Prisoners taken: 1,900,000, including five army
commanders.
The fact that German losses were only about half of what had been the Russian losses in the "little" Finnish War cannot have passed unobserved. The secret hope that Germany would have found herself greatly weakened by her war in the West had been dashed to
the ground. Now, for the first time, the Russians heard names bandied about which,
before long, were to acquire so ominous a ring: Rundstedt, Kleist, Guderian.
For all that, the pretence that relations with Germany were good had still to be kept up.