"during the last six or seven months".
Molotov, on the other hand, was extremely busy and active. Although he did not go to Laval's extreme of saying "je souhaite la victoire allemande", it was his job to present to the Soviet people the Soviet-German Pact at all its stages in the most favourable light possible.
This does not mean that Molotov crawled and grovelled to the Germans; on the contrary, he had, throughout, been thoroughly hard-headed and businesslike in his dealings with them and was one of the few men not to appear impressed, still less overawed, by Hitler, when he at last met him face-to-face in Berlin on November 12, 1940.
This is borne out by the story of the events leading up to Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940 and his handling of the matter. In June, without asking the Germans'
permission, the Russians had occupied the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina. The Germans then became particularly alarmed by the Russians' proximity to the Rumanian oilfields, a source of oil supremely important to Germany. This started a process which, within a few months, was to end in the complete German subjugation of Rumania, and the virtual occupation of Bulgaria, to be followed by the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece. The German penetration of Rumania had begun, in a more or
less camouflaged form, soon after the Russian occupation of two of Rumania's northern provinces and had coincided with Hitler's "Vienna Award", under which a large part of Transylvania had been handed over to Hungary. What was left of Rumania—now a plain
Fascist dictatorship under Antonescu—was "guaranteed" by Germany and Italy.
[King Carol abdicated and went to Switzerland with Madame Lüpescu, leaving the throne to his young son Michael.]
The Russians took the beginning of this German penetration of the Balkans very badly, and charged the German Government with violating Article III of the Soviet-German
Pact which called for consultation. The Germans retorted that they had not been
consulted about either the Baltic States or Bessarabia-Bukovina. A further complication arose from reports that German troops had been seen in Finland, ostensibly in transit to Northern Norway, and that Germany was selling large quantities of armaments to
Finland. Worse still, at the end of September the Germans informed Molotov that a
military alliance was about to be signed by Germany, Italy and Japan, an alliance which, the Germans claimed, was directed against the United States. Molotov reacted sharply to this piece of news, demanding full information on the treaty, and also pressed the
Germans for more details on their activities in Rumania and Finland. A few days later the Germans informed Molotov that they were sending a "military mission" to Rumania, which produced from him the rejoinder: "How many troops does that represent?"
Relations were becoming severely strained between Berlin and Moscow, and on October
13, Ribbentrop sent a long, wordy and perhaps deliberately vague letter to Stalin,
prophesying the early collapse of England and proposing that Molotov come to Berlin,
"where the Führer could explain personally his views regarding the future moulding of relations between our two countries". He significantly added in an underlined passage that "it appears to be the mission of the Four Powers (the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy and Japan) to adopt a long-range policy ... through the delimitation of their interests on a world scale".
It was obviously necessary for the Russians to try to find out what the Germans were up to next, and the invitation to Berlin was accepted. But there is nothing to show that they were genuinely interested in sharing the British lion's skin—anyway the lion was still alive—or in joining in any German-Italian-Japanese alliance against the United States.
What they were worried about, above all, were the Balkans and Finland.
As we know from the German documents published since the war, Ribbentrop, during his first Berlin meeting with Molotov, harped above all on the imminent collapse of the
British Empire, and suggested that, in the share-out of this Empire, the Russians might be interested in extending their "sphere of influence" to the south, particularly towards the Persian Gulf. Molotov was not impressed, any more than he was by Hitler's harangue, in the afternoon, about a "common drive towards an access to the ocean", implying that the Russians might perhaps be interested in India. Instead, Molotov fired question upon
question at Hitler. "No foreign visitor," Schmidt, Hitler's interpreter later recalled, "had ever spoken to him in this way in my presence." Molotov wanted precise answers to his questions about the New Order in Europe and Asia, and, above all, about German
machinations in Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey—areas in which the Russians
were directly interested. On the pretext that there might soon be a British air-raid, Hitler, completely taken aback by Molotov's manner, broke off the discussion until the next day.
When they met again on the 13th, Molotov once more showed no interest in the share-out of the British Empire, but argued, instead, that the German-Italian guarantee to Rumania was directed against the Soviet Union, and, since the Germans were unwilling to
"revoke" it, Russia would be willing to give a similar guarantee to Bulgaria, a suggestion which Hitler took very badly. Bulgaria, the Führer said, had not asked for such a
guarantee and, in any case, he would have to consult Mussolini on the subject. Again, thoroughly displeased with his troublesome and impertinent visitor, Hitler broke off the talk on the same pretext as on the previous night. He did not attend the gala banquet Molotov gave that night at the Soviet Embassy. This banquet—at which "friendly" toasts were exchanged by Molotov and Ribbentrop—was interrupted by an air-raid warning,
soon to be followed by the drone of planes, and the guests scattered to shelters,
Ribbentrop rushing Molotov to the near-by shelter of the German Foreign Office. While they were there, Ribbentrop pulled out of his pocket the draft of an agreement which, in effect, transformed the Three-Power Pact into a Four-Power Pact; under this, Germany, Italy and Japan recognised the present frontiers of the Soviet Union; while, according to the secret protocols defining each country's "territorial aspirations", the Soviet Union was to expand "in the direction of the Indian Ocean".
Again, the infuriating Molotov was not interested; and kept on returning instead to
questions like Finland, Rumania and Hungary, and German plans for Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey; he also continued to insist on the preservation of
Swedish neutrality.
Ribbentrop, more and more exasperated, declared that Molotov had not answered the fundamental question; which was whether the Soviet Union would "co-operate in the great liquidation of the British Empire". Finally, Molotov could not resist it: "If you are so sure that Britain is finished, then why are we in this shelter? "
[ Stalin was to tell Churchill about this parting shot in August 1942. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. III, p. 586.]
The visit ended inconclusively, and a fortnight passed before Stalin himself took up the ball and unlike Molotov in Berlin showed some interest in joining the Three-Power Pact as a fourth member. He might well have thought that he could not obtain any satisfaction from Hitler by any other means.
His main proposals were that the Germans clear out of Finland; that Russia sign a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria, that she establish a military and naval base within range of the Turkish straits; and that Iran be recognised as a Russian sphere of interest. Stalin must have known that there was but a small chance that Hitler would accept these demands.