The real reason is this: the majority of the non-aggressive states, and in the first place Britain and France, have given up the policy of collective security, and have changed over, instead, to a policy of non-intervention, to a position of "neutrality".
On the face of it, this non-intervention policy may be described as follows: "Let every country defend itself against aggressors any way it can or likes; it's got
nothing to do with us, and we shall go on trading with both the aggressors and their victims." But in actual practice non-intervention means connivance in aggression, and encouragement to the aggressors to turn their aggression into a world war...
There is a clear desire there to let the aggressors do their dirty and criminal work—
to let Japan become involved in war with China or, better still, with the Soviet
Union, or to let Germany get bogged down in European affairs, and to get involved in a war against the Soviet Union... And not until all the belligerents have
thoroughly exhausted each other will the non-aggressive powers come forward—of
course "in the interests of peace"—with their own proposals, and dictate their terms to the powers that have frittered away their strength in making war on each other.
A nice and cheap way of doing things!
Was there not a hint that if "they" could play at this game of the fresh-and-bright neutrals dictating their terms to the exhausted belligerents, then why should not "we" play it, too?
Britain and France, Stalin went on to say, had clearly encouraged Nazi Germany to attack the Soviet Union:
They abandoned Austria, despite the obligations to protect her independence; they abandoned the Sudentenland, and threw Czecho-Slovakia to the wolves; in doing so, they broke every conceivable obligation; but after that, their press started its noisy campaign of lies about "the weakness of the Russian Army", the "breakdown of the Russian Air Force", the "disorders" in the Soviet Union... They kept on urging the Germans to go farther and farther east: "You just start a war against the
Bolsheviks, and all will be well."
He then referred to "all the hullabaloo in the French, British and American press about a German invasion of Soviet Ukraine":
They screamed, till they were hoarse, that since Germany was now in control of the so-called Carpathian Ukraine [The eastern tip of Czechoslovakia, also known as Ruthenia.], with about 700,000 people, the Germans would, not later than the spring of 1939, annex to it the Soviet Ukraine with a population of over thirty millions. It really looks as if the purpose of all this highly suspect screaming was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere, and provoke a conflict
between us and Germany without any obvious reasons. There may, of course, be
some lunatics in Germany who are thinking of marrying off the elephant (I mean
Soviet Ukraine) to the gnat—the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. But let them have
no doubt about it: if there are such lunatics, there are quite enough strait-jackets waiting for them here (stormy applause). .. It is significant that some politicians and newspapermen in Europe and the USA should now be expressing their great
disappointment because the Germans, instead of moving farther east, have now
turned to the west, and are demanding colonies. One would think that parts of
Czechoslovakia were given to them as advance payment for starting a war against
the Soviet Union; and now the Germans are refusing to refund the money and are
telling them to go to hell... I can only say that this dangerous game started by the supporters of the non-intervention policy may end very badly for them.
In any case, Munich had brought no lasting peace. The world today was full of alarm and uncertainty; the post-war order had been blown sky-high; international law and treaties and agreements counted for very little. All disarmament plans had been buried.
Everybody now was arming feverishly, not least the non-intervention states. "Nobody believes any longer in those unctuous speeches about the concessions made to the
aggressors at Munich having started a new era of peace. Even the British and French
signatories of the Munich agreement don't believe a word of it. They are arming as much as the others are."
And Stalin added that, while doing her utmost to pursue a policy of peace, the Soviet Union could not look on impassively while 500 million people were already involved in war; and she had undertaken the task of greatly strengthening the military preparedness of the Red Army and the Red Navy.
Throughout, Stalin recalled, the Soviet Union had pursued a policy of peace. She had joined the League of Nations in 1934, hoping that, despite its weakness, the League could still act as a brake on aggression; in 1935 she had signed a mutual assistance pact with France, and another one with Czechoslovakia; a mutual assistance pact had also been
signed in 1937 with Mongolia, and in 1938 a non-aggression pact with China. The Soviet Union wanted peace; she wanted peace and business relations with all countries, so long as these did not impinge on her interests; she stood for peaceful, close and good-neighbourly relations with all her immediate neighbours, so long as these did not try, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the integrity of her borders; she stood for the support of nations which had become the victims of aggression and were struggling for their independence; she did not fear the aggressors' threats, and would strike with double strength any warmongers who might try to violate Soviet territory. (Long stormy
applause.)
The tasks of the Party in foreign policy were:
1) To pursue the policy of peace and of the consolidation of business relations with all countries;
2) To observe the greatest caution and not to allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by war provocateurs, who were in the habit of getting others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;
3) To strengthen in every way the military might of the Red Army and Navy;
4) To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the workers of all
countries, workers in whose interest it was to maintain peace and friendship among peoples.
On the face of it, in view of what Stalin said of the complete breakdown of "international law" and international treaties, his speech suggested that, in this international jungle, the Soviet Union would be wise to remain in splendid isolation; but in his precise wording he evidently took some trouble not to slam the door in the face of the French and British statesmen. The possibility of a late deal with the West could perhaps still be read into the reference to the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact. On the other hand he had dwelt far more on the perfidiousness of the "non-aggressor" nations than on that of the
"aggressors", and he had almost gone so far as to congratulate Germany on her wisdom in not having invaded the Ukraine, as "the West" had allegedly urged her to do!
Not without significance were also Stalin's references to Russia's "immediate
neighbours". Had not some suspect negotiations been going on between Germany and some of Russia's "immediate neighbours"? Had Nazi diplomacy not been active in the Baltic states? Had not Beck raised the "question" of the Ukraine with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on January 7, only to be told by the Führer that he no longer regarded the Ukraine as topical.