Nicholas was a blunt soldier incapable of comprehending his brother's sentimental sympathy with liberalism. The Decembrists' abortive attempt at revolution and the Polish insurrection of 1831, which he crushed with great severity, confirmed him in his conviction that Russia must be ruled with a strong hand. That conviction he put into practice with extreme rigour during the thirty years, of his reign (1825-55), endeavouring by every means at his disposal to prevent revolutionary ideas from germinating spontaneously among his subjects and from being imported from abroad. For this purpose he created a very severe press-censorship and an expensive system of passports, which made it more difficult for Russians to visit foreign countries. It would be unjust, however, to say that he was the determined enemy of all progress. Progress was to be made in certain directions and in a certain way. Not only was the army to be well drilled and the fleet to be carefully equipped, but railways were to be constructed, river-navigation was to be facilitated, manufacturing industry was to be developed, commerce was to be encouraged, the administration was to be improved, the laws were to be codified and the tribunals were to be reorganized. All this was to be done, however, under the strict supervision and guidance of the autocratic power, with as little aid as possible from private initiative and with no control whatever of public opinion, because influential public opinion is apt to produce insubordination. When the results proved unsatisfactory, remedies were sought in increased administrative supervision, draconian legislation and severe punishment, and no attempt was made to get out of the vicious circle. In the last months of his life, under the influence of a great national disaster, the conscientious, persistent autocrat began to suspect that his system was a mistake, but he still clung to it obstinately. “My successor,” he is reported to have said on his death-bed, “may do as he pleases, but I cannot change!”
This steadfast faith in autocratic methods and the exaggerated fear of revolutionary principles were shown in foreign as well as in home affairs. Like Alexander in the last period of his reign, Nicholas considered himself the supreme guardian of European order, and was ever on the watch to oppose revolution in all its forms. Hence he was generally in strained relations with France, especially in the time of Louis Philippe, who became king not by the grace of God but by the will of the people. During the revolutionary ferment of 1848-49 he urged the Prussian king to refuse the imperial crown, co-operated with the Austrian emperor in suppressing the Hungarian insurrection, and compelled the Prussians to withdraw their support from the insurgents in Schleswig-Holstein. Unfortunately for the peace of the world his habitual policy of maintaining the existing state of things was frequently obscured and disturbed by his desire to maintain and increase his own and his country's prestige, influence and territory. By the Persian War, which broke out in 1826, in consequence of frontier disputes, he annexed the provinces of Erivan and Nakhichevan, and during the whole of his reign the conquest of the Caucasus was systematically carried on. With regard also to the Ottoman empire his policy cannot be said to have been strictly conservative. As protector
Nicholas I. and the Ottoman empire.
of the Orthodox Christians he espoused the cause of the rayahs in Greece, Servia and Rumania. Under a threat of war he obtained in 1826 the Convention of Akerman, by which the autonomy of Moldavia, Walachia and Servia was confirmed, free passage of the straits was secured for merchant ships and disputed territory on the Asiatic frontier was annexed, and in July 1827 he signed with England and France the treaty of London for the solution of the Greek question by the mediation of the Powers. As the sultan rejected the mediation, his fleet was destroyed by the combined squadrons of the three Powers at Navarino; and as this “untoward event” did not suffice to overcome his resistance, a Russian army crossed the Danube and after two hard-fought campaigns advanced to Adrianople. Here, on the 14th of September 1829, was signed a treaty by which the Porte ceded to Russia the islands at the mouth of the Danube and several districts on the Asiatic frontier, granted full liberty to Russian navigation and commerce in the Black Sea, and guaranteed the autonomous rights previously accorded to Moldavia, Walachia and Servia. By the 10th article of the treaty, moreover, Turkey acceded to the protocol of the 22nd of March 1829, by which the Powers had agreed to the erection of Greece into a tributary principality. This attempt of Russia to secure the sole prestige of liberating Greece was, however, frustrated by the action of the other Powers in putting forward the principle of the independence of the new Greek state, with a further extension of frontiers.
The result of the war was to make Russia supreme at Constantinople; and before long an opportunity of further increasing her influence was created by Mehemet Ali, the ambitious pasha of Egypt, who in November 1831 began a war with his sovereign in Syria, gained a series of victories over the Turkish forces in Asia Minor and threatened Constantinople. Sultan Madmud II. after appealing in vain to Great Britain for active assistance turned in despair to Russia. Nicholas immediately sent his Black Sea fleet into the Bosphorus, landed on the Asiatic shore a force of 10,000 men, and advanced another large force towards the Turkish frontier in Bessarabia. Under pressure from
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833.
England and France the Egyptians retreated and the Russian forces were withdrawn, but the tsar had meanwhile (July 8, 1833) concluded with the sultan the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which constituted ostensibly a defensive and offensive alliance between the two Powers and established virtually a Russian protectorate over Turkey. In a secret article of the treaty the sultan undertook in the event of a casus foederis arising, and in consideration of being relieved of his obligations under the articles of the public treaty, to close the Dardanelles to the warships of all nations “ au besoin ,” which meant in effect that in the event of Russia being threatened with an attack from the Mediterranean he would close the Dardanelles against the invader. England and France protested energetically and the treaty remained a dead letter, but the question came up again in 1840, after Mahmud's renewed attempt to crush Mehemet Ali had ended in the utter defeat of the Turks by Ibrahim at Nezib (June 24, 1839). This time Mehemet Ali was supported by the French government, which aimed at establishing predominant influence in Egypt, but he was successfully opposed by a coalition of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, which checkmated the aggressive designs of France by the convention of London (July 15, 1840) (see Mehemet Ali and Turkey ). In this way the development of Russian policy with regard to Turkey was checked for some years, but the project of confirming and extending the Russian protectorate over the Orthodox Christians was revived in 1852,