Although Saddam Hussein had been defeated in the First Gulf War, the internal uprising the Western allies hoped would topple him afterwards came to nothing, and he remained in power. Some US leaders regarded him as ‘unfinished business’, and believed his regime was attempting to acquire nuclear and chemical ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’, leading to a second invasion of Iraq by a US-led coalition in 2003. The British contribution to the campaign, -- Operation Telic – saw 46,000 British troops involved, again forming the largest contingent after that of the United States.
The ground campaign was preceded by a heavy air offensive, which significantly degraded Iraqi forces, and coalition troops gained control of the country in three weeks of fighting. The coalition had expended little effort on planning what would happen after the invasion, however, apparently believing that a democratic civil society would arise more or less spontaneously after Iraq was ‘liberated’. This proved extremely optimistic and after a short ‘honeymoon period’, various political and religious factions began a struggle for power, attacking both each other and coalition forces.
British forces were largely based in Basra and Al ‘Amārah, in the south of the country. Initially, they patrolled wearing berets and undertook ‘Hearts & Minds’ infrastructure projects to improve life for the local population. By 2004 the situation had deteriorated, however, partly due to the rise of the ‘Mahdi Army’, led by the Islamist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, which attacked British forces at every opportunity. This post-invasion phase, often termed ‘the Iraqi insurgency’, was characterized by urban patrolling on foot and in vehicles. Infantry weapons such as the SA80 system saw heavy use, although ambushes using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs became more common in the later phases. British forces handed back control of Basra to the Iraqi authorities in 2007, though some troops remained in supporting roles until 2009. A total of 179 British personnel were killed in Iraq between 2003 and 2009.
After the Iraqi Army was swiftly defeated in 2003, British troops took over the city of Basra and the surrounding area. They initially patrolled in soft hats in an effort to win ‘hearts and minds’ but rapidly found themselves dealing with a simmering insurgency. Since vehicles such as the Warrior IFV were both too big and too ‘aggressive looking’, the lightly armoured ‘Snatch’ Land Rover – developed for service in Northern Ireland – was often used for urban patrolling, but it was found to offer insufficient protection, particularly against roadside bombs.
These troops wear early versions of Osprey body armour, with rigid plates that offered increased protection over earlier armour but at the cost of increased weight. Ammunition pouches and other equipment such as Camelbak water bladders could be attached directly to the armour, removing the need for separate webbing. Two soldiers of this four-man infantry brick are armed with L85A2 IWs, while a third has an L108A1 Minimi LMG, newly issued for Operation Telic to provide a better automatic-fire capability. The fourth and final soldier carries an L86A2 LSW, which was retained to provide additional supporting fire and to allow accurate shooting at longer ranges.
Fire could come from any direction in an urban setting, including the upper windows of apartment blocks, so the infantry have deployed to cover all directions while the ‘top cover’ man on the Snatch Land Rover maintains a constant visual search of his surroundings. The vertical wire-cutter bar at the front of the vehicle was very necessary, as cables were sometimes strung across streets to decapitate anyone standing in the top hatch.
Many soldiers had concerns at the start of the campaign about how the L85A2 IW might perform, despite the Heckler & Koch upgrade. Colonel Tim Collins of 1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment – better known for the eve-of-battle speech he gave to his men – commented in the run-up to the war: ‘I was still concerned about the number of stoppages we were getting with our weapons and the only solution seemed to be lots more oil on the working parts, which is exactly the opposite of what you would expect in sandy conditions’ (Collins 2005: 125). In fact, the L85A2 performed surprisingly well, albeit at the cost of requiring very rigorous cleaning and maintenance, and there were few major problems with reliability. The LSW did less well, however, since its problems of magazine (rather than belt) feed and lack of a quick-change barrel still limited the weight of fire it could put down and hampered its sustained-fire performance. The MoD had purchased another 700 Minimi LMGs in the run up to the war, and these had effectively taken over the squad automatic weapon role which the LSW had originally been designed to fulfil. Even so, the MoD put a brave face on things, stressing once more that the Minimis had been purchased to ‘supplement’ rather than ‘replace’ the LSW, which remained on issue to each four-man infantry brick as a second automatic weapon or ‘heavy rifle’, its longer barrel and bipod enabling accurate shooting at longer range.
In 2006, the British Government agreed to increase British troop numbers in Afghanistan – Operation Herrick – despite Army concerns about overstretch as a result of beginning operations in Afghanistan while significant numbers of troops were still committed in Iraq. The British were to take over security in Helmand province, which was seen as a relatively ‘quiet’ area. The Defence Secretary, John Reid, even expressed a hope that the British force would be able to complete its mission ‘without firing one shot’. In fact, it quickly became obvious that Helmand had been peaceful to date only because the Taliban’s dominance of the area had not previously been challenged, and the British forces (based around 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment’s battle group) found themselves in heavy combat almost immediately.