This was a risky proposition by any estimation and for any number of reasons, key among them being the distance involved and the potential for a military and political disaster if things turned conspicuously awry. Complicating matters was the fact that a substantial force of tanks and mechanized infantry belonging to FAPLA and supported by an undetermined number of Cubans was stationed at Techamutete, just 16 kilometres to the south. In addition, it was quite conceivable that the Angolan MiG-21s, known to be in operation, might attempt to intervene.
This, however, was precisely the sort of work that the SAAF Mirage squadrons were itching to get a grip on, and in fact 2 Squadron, the erstwhile Flying Cheetahs of the Korean War, and equipped with Mirage IIIs, had been training intensively for several months in anticipation of a call to the border.
The assault on Cassinga was scheduled for 4 May 1978. The main SAAF attack force would consist of Canberra bombers and 24 Squadron Blackburn Buccaneers which would deliver the first payload of ordnance to soften up the target before the arrival of the C-130s and C-160s of 28 Squadron carrying the paratroops, followed by helicopter uplift. Helicopters would operate and refuel from an established HAA, or helicopter administration area, known more commonly as a HAG, for the Afrikaans helikopter administrasie gebeid, which would be established a safe distance from the scene of the action. Top cover would be provided by the Mirage IIIs of 2 Squadron.
At 08h00 on 4 May, four laden Canberras appeared over the ramshackle but heavily fortified settlement of Cassinga onto which was voided a blanket of anti-personnel alpha bombs, followed by the pinpoint delivery of eight hard-hitting 1,000lb bombs by a flight of five Buccaneers.[10] The initial air attack achieved absolute surprise and was so effective that enemy defensive reaction was temporarily paralyzed. This was fortunate for two reasons. Firstly, the question of anti-aircraft artillery remained an open one, answered somewhat later when it was established that in fact Cassinga was well provided for in this regard; these, however, thanks to the shock of the first assault, where not brought to bear in any meaningful way against the vulnerable bomber and transport fleet. In the second instance, it gave South African paratroops an opportunity to regroup after a potentially disastrous off-target drop which resulted in many paratroopers needing to ford a river before going into action.
One of the four Mirage IIIs armed for air combat and supplying top cover for the operation was summoned to provide close air support against an enemy position firing heavily on advancing troops. The exact position could not be located, however, and fearing a friendly fire incident the attack was aborted. By 14h00 the ground action was largely over with most key objectives attained. At least 600 SWAPO personnel, but possibly as many as 1,000, lay dead, with many more captured and a great deal of intelligence material, although admittedly not as much as hoped, gathered. Soon afterward the helicopter extraction, utilizing 13 Pumas and six Super Felons from 19 Squadron, began. It was at that moment that the anticipated Cuban/FAPLA armoured column was spotted moving cautiously toward Cassinga from the south.
The Mirage IIIs that had earlier returned to AFB Ondangwa were immediately scrambled to offer fighter assistance. (A further two Mirage IIIs had been involved in attacks on other camps supported by the main base at Cassinga and located around Chetequera.)
Back on the scene the two pilots – Commandant Ollie Holmes and Major Gerrie Radloff – spotted the convoy with the lead vehicles by then only a few kilometres south of the town. Holmes led and launched into an immediate high-angle strafing attack on the vanguard of the convoy, noticing as he did that three vehicles had already passed a bend in the road and had slipped out of his line of sight. These he delegated to Radloff who dealt with them promptly and effectively.
A brief orbit confirmed that the convoy had been halted and, reaching critical fuel levels, the two Mirage IIIs set a return course for AFB Ondangwa.
No sooner had they left the scene than the helicopter force loading men, equipment and casualties came under threat from two enemy tanks that appeared unexpectedly very close to the scene. The tanks were repeatedly attacked by a Buccaneer piloted by Captain Dries Marais who, even after exhausting his ammunition, buzzed the targets at low level to deflect them from the frantic activity underway around the helicopters. With moments to spare the last helicopter lifted into the air and made for home.
The SADF suffered three killed and eleven wounded while helicopter pilot Major John Church of 19 Squadron was awarded the Honoris Crux, a coveted South African military decoration, for his actions during the tense last few moment of the operation.
At its conclusion, Operation Reindeer was judged an unqualified success. Whatever other strategic objectives in terms of prospective captures may or may not have been achieved, PLAN had suffered a devastating setback to its operational capacity. However, while the tactical victory went to the SADF and the SAAF, the propaganda victory was wholly won by SWAPO. As was frequently the case in relation to both Rhodesian and South African external raids, claims that targeted facilities were innocent refugee camps occupied by women and children were consistently made, rather too consistently for it always to be true, but nonetheless no more than was ever required for it to be believed and reported internationally. There was little truth in these claims, although the villagization of larger and even smaller guerrilla camps tended to lead to an inevitable body count of women and children. Cassinga was no different and South Africa was vilified in the face of gales of moral outrage emanating from various international forums.
Be that as it may, international isolation was by then a fait accompli anyway and efforts underway internationally to begin the process of a negotiated settlement of the South West African issue were not in any way enhanced by what had taken place. SWAPO president Sam Nujoma had already made clear his intention of intensifying the armed struggle which the South Africans responded to in kind.
By the end of 1978, a landmark year for all involved, the allimportant United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 – that proposing a ceasefire and United Nations-supervised elections in South African-controlled South West Africa – had been tabled and passed. This introduced the exhaustive on-again-off-again negotiation process that would accompany the war through its many chapters, and which would only succeed in winning South African approval in 1988 on the eve of the Eastern bloc collapse.
10
The alpha bomb was a Rhodesian Air Force innovation conceived and developed by Group Captain Peter Petter-Bowyer. It was a spherical bouncing bomb with a delayed detonation allowing for the airburst of multiple fragments over a wide area. The system was configured for deployment from Rhodesian Canberra bombers and was adopted and improved upon for similar use in the South African-operated Canberras.