CHAPTER FIVE:
THE SAAF IN RHODESIA
Early in 1979 12 Squadron SAAF was given the opportunity to take part in an interesting cooperation with the Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) in the bombing of a ZIPRA base located some 1,000 kilometres from the Rhodesian border.[11]
This attack, codenamed Operation Vanity, was launched as a reprisal against the shooting down of an Air Rhodesia scheduled flight between Kariba and Salisbury with the loss of 59 passengers. This was the second such incident, the first occurring in September 1978 and resulting in the death of all but 18 passengers, ten of whom were later gunned down by a ZIPRA response team. White Rhodesia, needless to say, was outraged at both these incidences, neither of which, incidentally, registered any meaningful international protest. This tended to further impress upon the white populations of both Rhodesia and South Africa the profound public opinion shift that had taken place in the few short decades since each had fought alongside the rest of the British family in two world wars.
The target was the Angolan railway town of Vila Luso located in central Angola. This was a highly ambitious attack requiring more long-range bomber capacity than the hard-pressed Rhodesians had available at the time. A request was made to the SAAF for the loan of three Canberras which took to the air from AFB Waterkloof on the evening of 25 February 1979, arriving at Victoria Falls a few hours later to a brief illumination of the airport lights before a strictly enforced blackout resumed. For the remainder of the evening a sortie plan was established before the crews turned in, in readiness for an early start.
The South African aircraft had already been armed with the standard alpha-bomb load of six mesh hoppers each containing 50 bombs. The Rhodesian aircraft were similarly primed with the addition of a payload of 1,000lb bombs, one of which, incidentally, failed to disengage from the aircraft and required making safe before being carefully removed on a bed of foam mattresses.
The strike leader for the operation was Squadron Leader Chris Dixon, a man famed for his calm and aplomb in the delivery of his famous ‘Green Leader’ speech to Zambian air traffic control during the Rhodesian attack on the Freedom Camp complex of Westlands Farm outside Lusaka in October 1978. Dixon had circled Lusaka Airport during the raid, warning air traffic control that any hostile action by the Zambian Air Force would be dealt with by the Rhodesians, even delaying the landing of a scheduled Kenya Airways flight until the operation was complete. No attempt was made by the Zambians to interfere and air traffic control complied with the Rhodesian request. During start-up Dixon’s aircraft developed a radio fault and so lead was temporarily passed to Flight Lieutenant Ted Brent and his navigator Jim Russell. It is interesting to note the observation of Brigadier-General Dick Lord who recorded the episode in his book From Fledgling to Eagle: The South African Air Force during the Border War:
Later that day, when Green Leader and his formation arrived at Fylde [airfield], the problem with Chris Dixon’s radio was clearly identified. A length of electric wire had been duct-taped from the cockpit, through the crew’s entrance door and along the fuselage to the radio bay at the back of the bomb bay, to replace a broken wire in one of the looms. Desperate measures by a desperate air force!
This was no doubt true but, despite it, the operation proceeded virtually without a hitch. Green Leader rejoined the formation over the Zambian town of Mongu on the Zambezi River and some 370 kilometres en route to the target. From there the formation climbed to 39,000 feet, accompanied by two RhAF Hunters armed with Sidewinder missiles as top cover, and continued on to the target. Shortly before arrival, the formation descended below cloud cover, entering a storm which cleared only minutes before the target came into view. “Bomb doors,” came the calm order from Green Leader as the formation arrived overhead, smoothly flying through clear weather with very little activity evident on the ground and no incoming anti-aircraft fire. Bombs were successfully deployed, after which the formation smoothly turned in the direction of home and disappeared over the southern horizon, having encountered neither obstacle nor opposition from start to finish.
Initially, it had appeared as if the camp might have been deserted but an examination of film footage recorded by the South Africans’ Vinten F95 camera revealed chaotic scenes on the ground in the midst of the drop that later concurred with the estimated death toll of a rather modest 160 killed and 500 wounded.
A pleasing epilogue to a highly successful raid was the shooting down of two Zambian Air Force Macchi aircraft by ZIPRA forces in a fit of the jitters.
For the next month or so the 12 Squadron Canberra fleet saw considerable action in support of a sequence of SADF raids into southern and central Angola from Owamboland and Caprivi, dealing with a number of known or suspected SWAPO bases. Operations Rekstok and Saffran included aerial bombardments of a number of targets in Angola and Zambia along with photoreconnaissance flights by Mirage III RZs.
During the course of March 1979 a series of aerial raids was launched against targets inside Angola by Canberra bombers attacking targets in Muongo on 8 March in east–central Angola, followed later on the same day by Canberra attacks delivered against Vila Franca and Capindi, both east of the rail port of Lobito. The following day, 9 March, it was the turn of Henhombe, followed by Huambango, Henhombe again and Oshono. Attacks continued a few days later, on 14 March, this time targeting a large ANC training facility at Nova Catengue, situated some 40 kilometres south of Lobito, followed later on the same day by an attack against the settlement of Ediva, less that 100 kilometres into Angola in the southwest.
This incident has remained a curiosity in the history of the Border War. Immediately after the bomb release over Ediva, an aircraft piloted by Lieutenant Wally Marais was noticed to still have its bomb-bay doors open. Radio calls failed to elicit a response from either member of the crew. A companion aircraft manoeuvred close in and, although noticing no outward signs of damage to the aircraft, was able to determine that the pilot was slumped over the controls.
The stricken Canberra climbed slowly to 2,000 feet while decreasing speed, then, banking gently to port, decreased speed to about 200 knots before pitching violently upward, stalling and then plunging into the ground.
An intensive air search undertaken by two Mirage FICZs failed to locate the wreckage or to establish the cause of the crash or the fate of the crew. The moment that news of the loss of the Canberra became general the Angolans were quick to claim credit. Communiqués declared that six SAAF aircraft had been shot down during repeated bombing raids between 6 and 15 March, during which 132 tons of bombs had been dropped, killing 12 people and wounding thirty. The SADF made no effort to correct this misinformation other than to issue, through a spokesman, the comment that the Angolan communiqué contained “…certain delectable unthruths”.[12] One such untruth must surely have been the death toll which would most certainly have exceeded a mere 12 fatalities.
Toward the end of 1979, meanwhile, the SAAF found itself frequently in the air over Zambia and Mozambique in support of Rhodesian cross-border raids. This was a critical year in the bitter and bloody war being fought north of the Limpopo as the beleaguered and depleted Rhodesian security forces increasingly sought to gain negotiation leverage by the relentless pummelling of guerrilla rear bases in Zambia and Mozambique and, moreover, to make the point to both host countries that aiding the enemies of Rhodesia would come at a mighty and unsustainable cost.
11
ZIPRA, or the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, was the armed wing of ZAPU, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union, one of two armed factions attempting the overthrow of white rule in Rhodesia.
12
Steenkamp, Willem.