In the meanwhile, the war went on. The pattern of attrition aimed at preventing PLAN build-ups within striking distance of the cut-line and the running to ground and liquidation of those units that had succeeded in penetrating the country had gradually begun to take the sting out of SWAPO.
In addition, South Africa had become more deeply involved in supporting UNITA which had emerged from a point of virtual extinction in the late 1970s to a robust guerrilla organization with expanded relations with both the US and South Africa. Many of the key actions and operations that would define the 1980s on the battlefield were undertaken in cooperation with, or in support of, UNITA.
CHAPTER SIX:
OPERATIONS PROTEA AND DAISY, AND A TURNING OF THE TIDE
In an effort to shield itself from the unrelenting attentions of the SADF, PLAN had adopted the rather sensible strategy of nestling itself under the wing of FAPLA in the hope and understanding that South Africa, bearing in mind the ongoing political process and the general hue and cry that accompanied any overtly aggressive action, would baulk at mounting any direct action against the constituted armed forces of Angola. Several key SWAPO bases and command-and-control structures were therefore co-located alongside brigade-strength Angolan positions centred on the two southern Angolan towns of Xangongo and Ongiva. Both these were reasonably substantial towns, the latter located closer to the South West African border, no more than 50 kilometres from the Oshikango border post and within reasonably easy striking distance of SWAPO’s designated ‘North-western Front’, the populous Owamboland native-autonomous area where SWAPO enjoyed most of its grassroot support, and the adjacent and considerably more remote Kaokoland, both located in SADF Sector 10 operational area. Surrounding both was a number of satellite camps and radar installations, all increasingly fortified by heavy weapons and strong anti-aircraft installations.
All this obviously presented a tempting target to the SADF which continued to exhaust manpower and equipment dealing piecemeal with an escalating SWAPO insurgency in the central border regions. In addition to this, such an obvious military buildup so close to the border, particularly in the matter of radar and anti-aircraft capability, represented an unacceptable level of threat to both border security and local air superiority.
As the South Africans pondered this rather brazen conventional build-up, a broader strategy began to evolve of clearing a buffer zone a minimum of 50 kilometres deep inside Angola, but practically speaking much deeper than this in places, to drive both FAPLA and PLAN north and away from a situation of being able to directly threaten South West Africa. This buffer zone would be known as the Shallow Area and could be justified as legal in the face of the inevitable hue and cry that would follow based on international laws which prohibit host countries, in this case Angola, from allowing surrogate organizations to launch hostile insurgencies from their territories into those of international neighbours.
Planning for Operation Protea began early in 1981. The objective would be to deal with the current military threat using a classic combined air and ground assault on two key installations, Xangongo and Ongiva, with further and very heavy air attention applied against various other related targets in order to knock out local radar coverage and the associated anti-aircraft emplacements. The main attack force would consist of two mechanized armoured fighting groups, task forces Alpha and Bravo. TF Alpha, equipped with armoured cars, artillery, Ratel and Buffel armoured personnel-carriers, would handle the main assaults against Xangongo and Ongiva while TF Bravo would range farther afield in a search of known or suspected SWAPO training and logistics bases. Attached to each fighting group would be SAAF MAOTs, or mobile air operations teams, charged with liaison and advising on air support as the attack progressed.[14]
The air operation was to have a somewhat broader objective. Separately codenamed Operation Konyn, the SAAF was tasked, in addition to providing close air support to ground forces engaged in Operation Protea, with the disruption and destruction of Angolan air force and SWAPO air-defence systems in the central theatre by means of airstrikes targeting specifically the radar installations at two points, Chibemba and Cahama, both situated northwest of Xangongo. This was in addition to the usual interdiction, paratroop deployment, Telstar, casevac, air reconnaissance and target-spotting activities required in an operation of this size. In fact, the air operation would be the largest mounted by the SAAF since the Second World War, requiring a significant allocation of assets for the duration.
Operation Protea was scheduled to begin on 24 August 1981 but the SAAF were in the air several days prior to this, undertaking the usual interdiction missions alongside routine road- and photoreconnaissance missions to update current intelligence prior to the launch. The first aircraft earmarked for the operation began to arrive at their border bases on 21 August. Clearly, there would be too many aircraft in operation to be deployed from a single facility, which required the Canberras of 12 Squadron, the Buccaneers of 24 Squadron and the Mirage F1AZs of 1 Squadron to be deployed to AFB Grootfontein, while the fighters of 2 and 3 squadrons and all the Impala light-attack jet aircraft were deployed to AFB Ondangwa. Various orientation exercises were undertaken in the days leading up to the operation, in particular for the attack aircraft which would be confronting established anti-aircraft artillery and shoulder-fired SA-7 Strela surface-to-air missiles.
On August 23, the day prior to the launch of the ground operation, air operations began in earnest. A four-ship Buccaneer strike was initiated against the radar installations at Cahama, using AS-30 guided missiles, which opened what would be a comprehensive and sustained mauling of these two key targets throughout the operation.[15] The Buccaneers were followed by a Canberra/F1CZ configuration in two waves, launching longdelay and contact-fused 250kg and 450kg bombs with little or no responding AAA ground fire.
At more or less the same time the Buccaneers went to work on the Chibemba installations, registering an SA-7 launch that detonated at 18,500 feet but did not compromise any of the attacking aircraft. Again, this was followed by composite waves of Canberra and Mirage aircraft using a level-bombing delivery technique to unload the same payload as upon Cahama. However, a release error resulted in the bulk of this ordnance being scattered about the surrounding bush. Later the same afternoon, a 16-ship Mirage F1 force revisited the target, recording a second SA-7 launch that, once again, missed its target. As the day closed and evening arrived, the attacks continued with additional Canberra and Buccaneer runs to further reinforce the pummelling of the two key targets. At 20h30, well after dark, the day’s activity was rounded off by a close air support mission flown by two Impalas in aid of a company of 31 Battalion pinned down by an aggressive SWAPO/FAPLA force.
14
MAOTs were SAAF teams usually comprising an OC (pilot), an operations officer, an intelligence officer, a radio operator and one or two clerks. Teams and equipment were typically airlifted into a tactical HQ co-located with the army or police or in a mobile situation as part of a motorized column as part of the command HQ. The MAOT acted as an advisory to a field commander regarding close air support as operations progressed, interpreting highly dynamic conditions on the ground into practical air support operations. (See appendix for a firsthand account of an MAOT on Operation
15
The AS-30 was a short-to-medium-range air-to-ground missile that used MCLOS (manual command to line of sight) guidance. This required the pilot or gunner to steer the missile to target through a UHF radio link with the missile and typically a left-handed joystick, using a magnesium flare at the base of the missile as a visual reference. Pinpoint accuracy was marginal and a high level of concentration was required for effective targeting.