In the meanwhile, the war went on. In the aftermath of operations Protea and Daisy, two key changes were observed in SWAPO’s operational status. In terms of the local insurgency, it had been the pattern in the past for small groups, operating as much as possible under the South African radar, to enter the country under the platoon-level command of experienced cadres. It was noticed now that far larger groups of nominally trained fighters were making an appearance in the field, with a more thinly spread command element. This was interpreted as evidence that many better trained and experienced members of PLAN had been removed from the scene by intense South African attrition. Secondly, it was becoming clear that SWAPO front-line manpower was increasingly being diverted away from activities on the border to help the MPLA deal with UNITA incursions, indicating, if nothing else, the extent to which UNITA had grown in reach capacity.
The latter point was extremely important in view of the gradual evolution of the Border War. UNITA would grow to occupy an increasingly important role both in terms of its alliance with South Africa and the extent to which this in the months and years to follow would draw South Africa deeper into the Angolan civil war proper.
In the meanwhile, the first major action of 1982 was Operation Super, a somewhat routine affair that grew out of a Special Force reconnaissance insertion into the southern Namibe Province of Angola in order to follow up on intelligence suggesting considerable SWAPO vehicle traffic in the area. The Recces alerted a SWAPO detachment to their presence by laying a vehicle landmine that detonated under the wheels of a passing armoured personnel-carrier. No SWAPO members were injured in the explosion but a follow-up was begun that quickly compromised the Recces, who called in reinforcements from the hard-fighting 32 Battalion. Thereafter, a brisk firefight was fought with the aid of a SAAF Alouette gunship fitted with a 20mm cannon. Once the dust had settled, 21 SWAPO guerrillas were dead, six were captured and one had escaped.
Interrogation of the captured guerrillas revealed a large and previously unknown SWAPO concentration in the rugged Cambêno Valley southeast of the Iona National Park. On 13 March 1982, a mobile Fire Force of 45 men of 32 Battalion, transported in a flotilla of SAAF Puma helicopters supported by Alouette gunships, set off across the dry expanse of the Kaokoveld toward a temporary base established in the Marienflüss Valley, with logistics supplied by a DC-3 Dakota.[18]
The infantrymen were dropped by Puma and succeeded in taking the camp in an action that extended over eight hours, supported continuously by Alouette gunships. The fight resulted in the deaths of 201 SWAPO members to the loss of three men of 32 Battalion. A new prospective infiltration route was also comprehensively shut down. Captain Ellis, who had coordinated the air assault from above, and Sergeant Stephen Coetzee were both awarded the Honoris Crux for their actions that day. Three members of 32 Battalion were similarly decorated.
1982 was a year of mixed fortunes for the SAAF. On 1 June an Impala Mk II, piloted by Major Gene Kotze, was successfully brought down by enemy anti-aircraft fire while diving to attack a SWAPO target inside Angola. The aircraft crashed, killing the pilot instantly. Then, two months later, on 9 August, a fully loaded Puma was brought down near Cassinga by either a direct hit from a ground-fired RPG-7 rocket or a 23mm AAA – reports on the matter differ – killing pilot Captain John Twaddle, co-pilot Lieutenant Chris Petersen, technician Sergeant Grobler and all 12 paratroopers on board.
Matters were put right, however, when 3 Squadron’s Major Johan Rankin, this time flying with Captain Cobus Toerien as his wingman, successfully brought down another Angolan MiG-21 in aerial combat. On this occasion the F1CZs were tasked to escort an extremely vulnerable and very valuable Canberra on a small-area photo-reconnaissance mission over the Cahama area for the purpose of updating intelligence. At 11h20 the two fighters rendezvoused with the Canberra and, under positive radar control, the three-ship formation set a course for Cahama. Very quickly, however, radar fighter-control picked up approaching enemy aircraft and ordered the Canberra back while instructing the two fighters to climb to 30,000 feet and accelerate to Mach 0.95, the limiting speed for external fuel tanks. This positioned the opposing formations nose-to-nose, 12 nautical miles apart and closing at twice the speed of sound.
Major Rankin observed two MiG-21s on the same level as him, some five nautical miles distant, flashing past on his starboard side. The two F1 pilots shed their drop tanks, went into afterburner and commenced a hard right-hand turn in pursuit. Moments before the two formations crossed, the MiGs fired their missiles but they had no chance then of guiding correctly. In the meanwhile, the F1s completed their 180-degree turn as the MiGs were turning smoothly to the right, preserving their supersonic speed. Radar confirmed that they were inching ahead of the F1s and out of firing range. Unable to close, Rankin switched his intercept radar onto transmit in the hope that the MiG radar warning receiver would alert their pilots and force them to turn into the F1s. This was indeed what happened, whether as a result of the radar warning or simply because they were still focused on intercepting the Canberra, will never be known, but the sudden change of vector allowed the F1s to cut the corner and close the range.
18
Fire Force is an airborne assault concept pioneered in the region by the Rhodesian security forces and further developed by South Africa. Its model application involves a highly mobile response force equipped with helicopters and supported by paratroops on permanent standby to respond to intelligence provided either by pseudo or covert reconnaissance missions within an active area.