By the end of the year, just one flotsam of truth was visible above this ocean of obfuscation when Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos published a remark to the effect that, notwithstanding whatever else might take place, some Cuban troops would need to remain in Angola, even after Namibian independence. He stated: “Angola cannot make concessions which amount to suicide for its national integrity and socio-political development.” This gave final truth to the fact that Cuban intervention, where once it had been aimed at protecting Angola from the predations of South Africa, was now even more vital to keep in check the ambitions of Jonas Savimbi and UNITA, without which the MPLA government would have little real chance of survival.
UNITA had also become the principal South African preoccupation of the war, with most SAAF activity during 1984 and 1985 focused on providing logistical assistance in one form or another to Savimbi’s forces in recognition of the vital role the movement was playing in securing the key southeast quarter of Angola closest to South West Africa. An example of the kind of work that the SAAF was now undertaking on behalf of UNITA was Operation Magneto, staged between 23 August and 10 September, to assist UNITA in the large-scale transport of troops to airfields at Gago Couthino and Cazombo in an attempt to thwart a major Angolan effort to retake the Cazombo Enclave which at that time lay under UNITA control. SAAF MAOTs were positioned at each airfield to control flying operations, all of which were undertaken by Pumas or elements of the C-130/C-160 fleet, flying collectively 220 hours on delivery flights and 30 hours of helicopter support. All flights were undertaken at night because of the risk of MiG interception.
Then, in a replay of the parody of the ‘Grand Old Duke of York’, Operation Wallpaper, staged between 11 September and 8 October, extracted large numbers of UNITA personnel from Cazombo once the situation there had become untenable and FAPLA successfully occupied the enclave, with the SAAF returning the UNITA troops to the Mavinga area in order to counter a southeasterly thrust of the Angolan advance toward Savimbi’s powerbase and centre of operations at Jamba.[25]
In both operations SAAF crews found themselves dealing with very primitive conditions, with the SAAF MAOT using a portable VHF radio for air-traffic control on extremely basic runway conditions and with runway lights being provided by burning tin cans filled with sand and primed with kerosene. Aircraft engines were kept running throughout loading and unloading in order to minimize the risk of failures and the disastrous potential of aircraft standing on unprotected runways in broad daylight as sitting ducks for patrolling MiGs.
These flights were sustained and successful despite extreme operational pressure. Night flying ensured invisibility while a narrow radar gap that existed in regionally located systems allowed the South African aircraft, for the most part, to slip in and out of the region undetected by enemy or friendly air-space surveillance.[26]
Parallel to Operation Wallpaper, Operation Weldmesh was authorized as it became clear that the Angolan advance against Mavinga/Jamba – codename Second Congress by the Angolans – heavily supported by a fleet of Angolan MiGs, Soviet-made Mi-25 helicopter gunships/troop transports and Mi-17 transport helicopters, was threatening to overrun Mavinga. This would have led to a rapid collapse of UNITA’s dominance in the vital Cuando Cubango Province, adjacent to the Caprivi Strip and South Africa’s effective Eastern Front.
Weldmesh involved a major aerial bombardment by Canberra, Buccaneer, Mirage and Impala fighter-bombers which devastated the FAPLA brigades, forcing them back toward Cuito Cuanavale. These were in addition to heavy and accurate artillery bombardment from an SADF ground force deployed to counter the weight of armour used by Angolan government forces. A number of SADF members were on attachment to UNITA as advisers, while Recce and 32 Battalion teams were active in reconnaissance and ambush roles.
This combined SADF intervention broke the back of the Angolan advance, allowing UNITA to immediately launch into harassing attacks on the retreating forces. The interception of Angolan radio communications indicated that FAPLA had requested helicopter assistance for the removal of casualties back to their medical centres, flights that were later ascertained to have been used instead to evacuate Soviet military personnel. This presented the SAAF with something of an opportunity. The Soviets were the brains behind much of the planning and execution of Second Congress and their removal, or at least the removal of as many as possible, would seriously impact the conduct of the operation.
It was established that the Angolan helicopters were operating out of Menongue and for the most part well below SAAF radar cover. A ground-reconnaissance team from 32 Battalion was inserted into the area to monitor the movement of helicopter traffic in and out of the base. While Mirage F1CZ fighters were deployed to AFB Rundu to provide close air support to the reconnaissance team should it be needed, it was decided to use Impalas to intercept the Angolan helicopters once information had been received that they were airborne in the operational zone.
Several missions were aborted either before or after takeoff when it was established that the timing of the flight was not optimum. The first successful strike took place late in the afternoon of 27 September when two Mi-25 attack helicopters were observed taking off and heading toward the war zone. Both were shot down by SAAF Impalas.
Two days later the 32 Battalion ground team observed the departure of a second helicopter formation comprising two Mi-8/-17 transport helicopters, escorted by two Mi-24 gunships. Once again the Impalas were scrambled and all four helicopters were brought down. Two MiG-23 fighters were observed flying at about 200 feet above the debris of the stricken helicopters but no hostile action was attempted. No further helicopter resupply, rescue and evacuation were attempted by the Angolans.
CHAPTER TEN:
CUITO CUANAVALE: THE LAST MILITARY CHAPTER
Throughout the 1980s UNITA continued to extend and consolidate its control over an ever-widening swath of territory, reaching northward along the eastern flank of Angola toward the border with Zaire, eventually leading to speculation that Savimbi might be planning to move his main headquarters from Jamba in the southeast to an unspecified location closer to the Zairean border. It was here, in fact, that the United States had begun refurbishing a long-established airbase located outside the southern Zairean town of Kamina as an alternative supply route to the now dangerously attenuated Mavinga line of aerial communication used by UNITA to receive South African support.[27]
25
Jamba, Cuando Cubango Province (distinct from Jamba in Huíla Province) is situated in the southeastern corner of Angola, more or less equidistant between Rundu and Katima Mulilo in Nambia and therefore very close to the centre of South African operations.
26
By 1984, the regional coverage by Soviet-supplied radar systems located in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola fairly comprehensively blanketed the region in overlapping spheres. However, between Cuito Cuanavale in Angola and Mulobezi in Zambia a narrow gap of coverage existed that allowed SAAF aircraft to slip behind enemy lines more or less at will. In order for that gap to be closed it was necessary for the town of Mavinga to be liberated from UNITA control, which in large part was why the battle for that town was so consistent and so hard-fought.
27
The CIA and South Africa seldom, if ever, overlapped in their support of UNITA. To quote southern African military historian Peter Stiff from his exhaustive study of South African reconnaissance operations,