This in turn led to a great deal of nervous discussion in Pretoria that UNITA might now be sufficiently fledged to abandon its links with South Africa altogether which, of course, no matter how buoyant Savimbi might have been about his military prospects, was extremely unlikely. Since the ignominious collapse of Operation Second Congress, another bout of Angolan rearming and tactical re-evaluation had seen a massive increase in FAPLA’s offensive capacity. It the words of war historian Willem Steenkamp:
Fresh supplies of weapons and equipment were flowing into Angola on a daily basis: tanks, guns, armoured fighting vehicles, radars, fighters and fighter-bombers, helicopter gunships, air-defence rockets – some of the items so modern that Western evaluation experts had never laid hands on them. The Soviet Union was like a martial cornucopia, showering Angola with a king’s ransom in military hardware (…the equivalent of R2 billions’ worth between mid-1986 and mid-1987).
A handful of foreign correspondents were also allowed to glimpse preparations underway, each describing scenes of Soviet aerial transports shuttling in to various air facilities in Angola and disgorging an unending weight of military equipment. Notwithstanding Savimbi’s US-supplied Stinger missiles and much rhetorical support from his regional allies, only South Africa had the capacity and inclination to provide the sort of fighting assets to counter the sheer weight of armaments that would face UNITA in the event of another major FAPLA offensive.
In fact, it became quite clear as 1987 progressed that preparations for a second major push against the UNITA strongholds of Mavinga and Jamba were indeed underway. Much of the incoming equipment and matériel arriving in the country was being channelled down and stockpiled at Menongue, before being moved on to Cuito Cuanavale along with significant troop concentrations. In addition, the planning and command capabilities of FAPLA had been greatly enhanced by a large number of – estimates suggest over 1,000 – Soviet advisers, including the high-ranking appointee General Konstantin Shaganovitch.
Shaganovitch appears to have arrived on the scene in an effort to divert the possibility of another grandiose Angolan defeat. To date, the Soviets had invested an astronomical amount of money in the outcome of the Angolan civil war, far more than could simply be written off, and despite his general policy of rapprochement with the West, Gorbachev agreed to throw good money after bad and underwrite another massive Angolan military operation to dislodge and finally destroy UNITA. However, in order to limit as much as possible the debilitating incompetence of the Angolans, Shaganovitch was appointed supreme commander of all MPLA forces, although reports vary on the extent to which he had any direct command over the large Cuban force in the country.
In August 1987, FAPLA commenced Operação Saludando Octubre, or Operation Greeting October, with the launch of four (some sources claim five) brigades, including the armoured 47th Brigade, from Cuito Cuanavale, moving south directly toward Mavinga. Savimbi lodged an immediate plea for South African assistance which was not particularly welcome at a highly sensitive political juncture. Cabinet approval was eventually given, however, but only once the Angolan 47th Brigade had crossed the Lomba River, a point no more than 20 kilometres north of Mavinga from where it clearly posed a threat to both Mavinga and Jamba.
With customary political indifference to practical military capacity, the SADF was blithely instructed to halt the FAPLA offensive and buttress UNITA’s power base with the proviso that no manpower or equipment must be lost and that South African involvement must be both secret and plausibly deniable. The reply was made that this was manifestly impossible; casualties would be sustained and, moreover, if there was to be any hope of success, G5 howitzers and tanks would be required.
This was a moment of profound decision for South Africa. All things considered – bearing in mind not only the ongoing political exchanges surrounding the implementation of Resolution 435, an expanding internal protest movement and the tightening arms embargo that affected the precious SAAF fighter fleet more than anything – this was a lot to ask. The last time the SADF, then the UDF, had deployed tanks in battle was during the drive north through Italy in the closing phases of the Second World War.
UNITA, however, was clearly crumbling against the determined FAPLA advance and the stakes were high. Authority was given for 32 Battalion with enhanced armour and artillery support – although without G5s or tanks – to be deployed to Mavinga in an operation codenamed Modular.
In the meanwhile, an extraordinarily daring Special Force reconnaissance operation, Operation Coolidge, was undertaken to destroy the vital road bridge over the Cuito River, immediately east of Cuito Cuanavale, which was vital for the movement south of the heavy FAPLA armoured brigades and other motorized units and, perhaps interestingly and more devastatingly still, logistical resupply and support once the main armoured brigades had already crossed the river heading south.
On the night of 25/26 August a combat swimming team comprising 12 operators equipped with collapsible Klepper canoes was dropped by SAAF Pumas 70 kilometres upriver of Cuito Cuanavale from where, by a combination of swimming and paddling, they made their way downriver to the site of the Cuito River Bridge . The group was compromised as soon as they approached the target but, nonetheless, laid their charges under hostile fire before retreating farther downriver while being pursued from the bank and fired at. Moreover, as if all this was not enough, a crocodile attack resulted in a dreadful life-and-death struggle for one member who survived by displaying almost unimaginable cool in what must have been terrifying circumstances, stabbing the creature with his fighting knife until he was released.
Thereafter survival became a matter of keeping ahead of the enemy in a desperate chase through flat and uniform savannah bushveld with the enemy close on their heels. Four SAAF Pumas aborted the first pick-up due to thunderstorms, returning the next day, despite manifold risks from Angolan attack helicopters and MiGs, to retrieve the exhausted and injured commandos who were safely, if only narrowly, returned to base. Twelve of the Recce commandos involved in the operation were awarded the Honoris Crux. The Cuito River Bridge, however, was not destroyed but it was severely damaged and was for some time largely unserviceable for heavy traffic. From that point onward helicopter cargo lifts were required to shuttle supplies across the river.
The SAAF, meanwhile, applied itself through photo reconnaissance to gathering as comprehensive a picture of enemy composition and magnitude as possible. For this work Mirage R2Zs were used. It was established that the Angolans were mobile and widely dispersed, comprising tanks, armoured cars and a variety of missile and radar assets. There was little that could be done to influence matters until the two main columns arrived at the Lomba River. The Lomba was close to its headwaters at that point which allowed the 47th Brigade to move around and approach the main bridge crossing from the southern bank with a view to covering the impending crossing by the 59th and 21st brigades. This had the effect of concentrating the various brigade elements on a two-kilometre-wide and softly constituted floodplain which also hindered movement, offering the opportunity for skilful South African gunnery to isolate and begin to deal with the concentration. Air reconnaissance for target selection was provided in large part by a detachment of SAAF RPV (remotely piloted vehicles) aircraft which performed excellent service in identifying targets despite the dense summer foliage. Angolans quickly learned to hate these little aircraft and targeted them with particular malice. Three were brought down by surface-to-air fire, as was a manned Bosbok that was also on an artillery-spotting mission, killing the pilot and artillery officer on board.