On 4 September, 3 Squadron was deployed to AFB Rundu for air-defence duties. At that time the Angolans were flying MiG-23s that could outpace the virtually obsolete but nonetheless irreplaceable SAAF Mirage fleet in straight-line flight. The Angolans also enjoyed superior visibility with the South African radar only able to detect aircraft in the combat area above 24,000 feet thanks to the limits of the radar horizon. The Angolans, on the other hand, with radar emplacements at Cuito Cuanavale and Menongue, enoyed coverage from the ground upward. In some respects, this was like the cliché of taking a knife to a gunfight, but in other respects not. The signature advantage that South African service personnel had enjoyed both on the ground and in the air had been superior leadership, support and training which had succeeded in giving both services a significant edge, and with that in mind, the 3 Squadron pilots waiting patiently in cockpit readiness were supremely confident and anxious to join that elite club of one – Commandant Johan Rankin being the only member thus far – by bagging a MiG. A number of scrambles were ordered but thanks to the distances involved the enemy MiGs had each time left the combat zone by the time the F1s were in position.
On 10 September, however, three pairs of Mirage F1CZs were again scrambled and a short while later Captain Anton van Rensburg indicated that he had visual contact with two MiG-23s. Seconds later, he achieved firing parameters and launched two Matra 550 missiles that both exploded prematurely, allowing both MiGs to slip away and speed back toward Menongue.
In the meanwhile, 1 Squadron arrived at AFB Grootfontein in preparation for the opening sortie of the air operation which was scheduled to kick off on 16 September. By then, South African artillery on the southern bank of the Lomba River had already been modestly successful in knocking out a number of tanks and generally inhibiting, although not halting, the Angolan advance. The air operation was opened with a combined strike against the 47th Brigade, delivering 100 locally modified Mk 82 (250kg) pre-fragmentation bombs. Johan Rankin narrowly avoided a multiple missile launch and then, taking stock after a tight evasive manoeuvre, found his tail stirring up the dust of a dry shona as he pulled maximum Gs in order to recover before hitting the ground.
Less fortunate was Captain Arthur Piercy who sustained a MiG-23 missile strike in the tail section during a brief dogfight on 27 September. His F1CZ sustained severe damage but thanks to skilled piloting he was able to bring the aircraft in to AFB Rundu. There, however, a lack of hydraulic pressure and a missing drag ’chute caused the Mirage to overshoot the runway which in turn caused the ejection seat to fire and, with insufficient height for the parachute to be effective, Piercy sustained severe and permanent damage to his lower back. This incident curbed the earlier confidence felt among the Mirage pilots and occasioned a pause in Bellombra operations while its implications were digested. Lord:
Operation Bellombra was planned to curb this newfound aggression. The idea was to scramble pairs of Mirages to designated low-level holding points whenever MiGs were in the air. Our radar controllers would watch the MiGs and, if they came into the area of one of the holding points, they would give the Mirages a radar vector and time to pitch-up. Our aircraft would accelerate to 600 knots-plus before pitching-up. The idea was to climb to 4,000 feet below the targets. Airborne radar was only switched on during the pitch to give the enemy minimum warning before missile launch was achieved. When our aircraft were detected by Dayton radar they would be vectored onto the bogeys.
It was now clear that the enemy now enjoyed a significant technological advantage in the air which could not be countered thanks to the ongoing arms embargo. This left only a re-examination and improvement of tactics to fall back on, after which a certain amount of ad hoc local training was undertaken, but without live fire it remained somewhat theoretical.
Photo reconnaissance and routine ground attacks went on, with the two enemy brigades – the 47th and 21st – eventually breaking. A key battle was fought on 3 October between a mobile SADF force comprising the battle-hardened 61 Mechanized Battalion supported by artillery which, despite having no tanks, took offensive action and almost completely destroyed the FAPLA 47th Brigade, killing some 250 enemy troops. After several weeks of heavy combined airstrikes by Buccaneers, Canberras, Mirages and Impalas, the 3 October battle was a turning point in the offensive, after which the Angolan advance lost all momentum. The muchvaunted 47th Brigade more or less ceased to exist, leaving behind a landscape strewn with stricken armour rendered useless, as much as anything, by the sustained and accurate air delivery of air-bursting pre-fragmented bombs that perforated engines, tyres and radiators, with even serviceable vehicles and tanks eventually being abandoned.
Analysis of the offensive, however, has tended to reveal the dominating role played on the battlefield by South African artillery, in particular using the domestically developed and produced G5 howitzer. The G5, with a range of 40 kilometres, was responsible for much of the damage inflicted on the enemy, hampering the tactical and logistical movement, immobilizing brigades in preparation for SADF mechanized units and UNITA infantry, and later being largely responsible for rendering the allimportant airfield at Cuito Cuanavale inoperable. It is also worth noting that the Lomba River battles saw the first operational use of the Olifant main tank.
In the aftermath of the carnage on the Lomba River, the enemy brigades began a long but largely orderly withdrawal back toward Cuito Cuanavale. The Soviets had withdrawn their advisers, leaving FAPLA without senior leadership, and thus the threat to Mavinga and Jamba had been comprehensively neutralized. South African personnel were returned back across the Lomba River on 7 October since, for the time being at least, success had been achieved.
This was not the end of it, however. As Operation Modular wound down, Operation Hooper commenced, the aim of which was to inflict maximum casualties on the retreating FAPLA forces after they had been halted.
Two retreating brigades – the 16th and the 21st – had by then been deployed at the source of the Chambinga River, with the 59th Brigade and a tactical group positioned between the Vimpulo and Mianei rivers. Although each had been damaged, they still represented a viable offensive force, and the immediate priority in the aftermath of the withdrawal from the Lomba River was to prevent them from regrouping for another thrust against Mavinga. In order to pre-empt a second offensive in 1988, it was decided, therefore, that the entire Angolan presence east of the Cuito River must be removed.