This was Operation Packer, the last of three operations collectively defined as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.
For the SAAF, meanwhile, 1987 closed on an interesting note, with the target being the still-standing bridge over the Cuito River, and a rather ground-breaking attempt to bring it down once and for all, making use of a technology that had been present in the South African arsenal for some time and which had been exhaustively tested but never deployed.
The Raptor 1 (H2) glide bomb was a modular system that consisted of the ‘glide bomb’ itself, a communications pod, usually mounted on the starboard wing opposing the missile mounted on the port wing. Prior to the advent of GPS-assisted inertial navigation, this system utilized a television link between the bomb and the controlling aircraft – this could either be the aircraft delivering the bomb, in which case it would be controlled by the navigator or by a second aircraft not associated with the actual attack. In both instances the weapon was guided to its target using a left-hand joystick in the cockpit, with internal power being supplied to the missile by a generator driven by an impeller located at the rear. The weapon’s flight was recorded by means of a video tape recorder mounted in the communications pod. For the purposes of debrief this included the weapon’s audio and the crew’s intercom conversations as well as the visual sequence filmed from the camera located in the nose of the missile.
The system was adapted for use either by Buccaneers or Impalas, and later Cheetahs, although on the first deployment of the weapon against the Cuito River Bridge on 12 December 1987, during Operation Modular/Hooper, it was Buccaneer 414 crewed by pilot Major Pikkie Siebrits and Captain Neil Napier that carried the system. This attack was not completely successful and nor was a follow-up attack carried out on 3 January 1988, although on this run the bridge was damaged sufficiently to further inhibit its practical use.
By late December, meanwhile, FAPLA had begun to attempt to buttress and reinforce its position in and around Cuito Cuanavale, a somewhat more substantial town than was usually found in the region. It was located on the west bank of the Cuito River, a meandering stream with an extensive floodplain and a scattering of pools and small ox-bow lakes. The dropping of the bridge inhibited movement east and then south which, in the short term at least, reduced the risk of a renewed offensive originating from the town, but it did not interfere with logistical and resupply communications stretching back toward Menongue. It was decided, therefore, that interdiction airstrikes would be launched based on intelligence gathered by ground-force reconnaissance teams infiltrated into the area, at great risk to themselves it might added, who then passed back information on the movement of road convoys.
There was considerable reservation expressed by the SAAF during the planning of these operations, bearing in mind that the new theatre of operations which was considerably farther north than the Lomba River, added an addition fuel-capacity advantage to the defending MiGs operating from Menongue, while at the same time handing additional disadvantage to the SAAF Mirages and other aircraft that, with the added flight time needed to get over their targets, were then severely limited in their operational time, perhaps just a few minutes, to complete a mission and deal with any unexpected eventualities. As Brigadier-General Dick Lord put it:
The SAAF objections to the plan were based on geography and physical science, not a reluctance to fight. Operation Moduler had been fought alongside the Lomba River. On a map it can be seen that the battleground is almost equidistant between Rundu and Menongue. Opposing fighters had to fly approximately the same distance to reach the combat area; therefore, combat fuel allowances for both opponents were similar.[28]
With the battle arena now shifting to an area of high ground east of Cuito Cuanavale, the advantage was yielded almost entirely to the enemy which, alongside basic equipment disparities, certainly gave the Angolans the edge. Fuel differentials, moreover, were simply part of this. Angolan MiGs, with two minutes’ flight time from Menongue, were able to fly in clean configuration while the SAAF Mirages, with additional outboard tanks as well as underwing stores, flew into combat in dirty configuration.[29] Angolan and Cuban pilots enjoyed radar cover while the South Africans flew in blind.
In addition, the increase in numbers and sophistication of enemy aircraft also tilted the battlefield against the South Africans, offering the enemy a brief and solitary opportunity to enjoy superiority in the air. Despite all this, the enemy still consistently lost battles, thanks in large part to superior SAAF airmanship, meticulous planning and exhaustive training.
Low-level flight and navigation tended to characterize operations throughout the various phases of the offensive, with a low-level toss-bomb (vergooi) delivery profile being used. This tactic involved pitching the aircraft up around four nautical miles from the objective and literally ‘tossing’ the bombs toward the target. This was perfected with the use of finely tuned on-board computer systems and weapons specifically designed for the prevailing military situation in Angola.
The interdiction operations flown against the huge road convoys moving between Menongue and Cuito Cuanavale usually took place at last light or at dawn during that happy moment before enemy aircraft could expect to be encountered and while sufficient light was still available. These were consistent and ongoing operations, the details for which were usually handed over the night before, requiring pilots to undertake pre-flight planning late into the evening, waking then in the early hours to take to the air and head north. The year-end hazard of the ‘big rains’ also complicated and hampered operations, with the only advantage being that in thick cloud and low visibility the danger from anti-aircraft defences on the ground was minimal.
It was not enemy MiGs, however, nor AAA that posed the greatest practical danger, but the ubiquitous Strela SAM-7. During this concluding seven months of the war a total of 683 Mirage combat sorties were flown, delivering nearly 4,000 bombs and it is estimated that during this period more than 100 surface-to-air missiles were launched against them.[30]
Offensive operations paused briefly as 1988 dawned for the prosaic reason that the South African national service changeover required new intakes of conscripted troops to replace those completing their national service at the front, who were in turn heading back to civilian life in South Africa. Matters resumed soon afterward, however, when tragic proof was given of the vulnerability of SAAF aircraft to Angolan air defences when F1AZ 245, the only Mirage F1 to be brought down in combat, was shot down near Cuito Cuanavale during a vergooi mission against a significant road convoy moving on the Menongue–Cuito Cuanavale road.
The incident occurred during the early afternoon of 20 February when a four-ship formation took off to follow up on information passed back by a 32 Battalion reconnaissance team. The same area had seen a number of sorties flown and enemy anti-aircraft defences were on high alert. After releasing his bombs, Major Edward Every was hit at low altitude and crashed shortly afterward. Because no emergency calls had been picked up or any activity registered from the pilot’s PELBA beacon it was assumed that Every had been killed.
28
Lord, Brig-Gen Dick.
29
The clean/dirty configuration in aviation parlance implies a minimum of drag experienced with undercarriage lifted, no outboard tanks and no underwing armaments: clean configuration. Conversely, with various accoutrements attached to an aircraft when fully loaded, with weapons and fuel tanks included, increased drag in flight, inhibiting manoeuvrability and implying disadvantage: dirty configuration.