The Soviet Engineer forces had received good quantities of bridging gear, explosives and associated engineer equipment, and were probably the nearest to full strength of the military arms of the Red Army
Some new weaponry reached units in the west. SKS carbines made an appearance in numbers, but not enough to supplant the standard Mosin. The promising weapon was issued out to regiments all in one go, although, for some reason, this process started amongst the reserves and rear-line troops first, depriving most of the frontline units of an excellent weapon.
A new infantry weapon, one with great promise, had not yet entered production, as teething problems remained unsolved. However, the AK47 was being made a priority and facilities were already earmarked for its mass production.
The relative lull in hostilities should have given the ground forces time to recuperate, but Allied air and partisan attacks continued to play havoc with the system, although the latter were much decreased in effectiveness and frequency.
T54’s, rushed through the approval process, were churned out as quickly as possible, and, although many were lost en route to the front, enough arrived to fully equip a few units. The vehicle had the potential to be a class above pretty much anything that the Allies could field, but production issues, quality control, and basic errors caused their new crews many headaches.
IS-III and IS-IV production picked up the pace but both types were not particularly numerous amongst frontline units, and for some reason, pre-delivery losses amongst these tanks were higher, well over 50% being lost in transit.
Numerous obsolete tanks, mostly the old 76mm equipped T-34’s, were either field or main workshop converted to mobile AA guns, in an effort to counter the Allied air superiority. Tables of equipment were changed to provide increased AA protection across the spectrum of Soviet units, particularly adding more mobile AA defence to ground formations.
A factory production T-34m46 model with a 100mm weapon was produced in significant numbers, but suffered from lack of proper development, the turret size restrictions and ammunition size alone reducing its effectiveness.
Soviet production of a direct copy of the Panzerfaust placed a good quantity of the effective tank-killer in the infantry’s hands, although there were occasionally some issues over the quality of explosive and with a lack of detonation, which made them unreliable at first.
A copy of the Rheinbote long-range artillery rocket was being tested, the Soviet version ramped up to carry an effective warhead.
So, in summary, the Red Army was less numerous and possessed less hardware in February 1946 than when it rolled across the battle line in August 1945. It had lost a lot of experienced soldiers on its way to the Rhine, and replacements of everything from men to machines arrived in dribs and drabs at the front.
New weapons that could give their soldiers an edge were arriving slowly.
The artillery arm was a shadow of its former self, and was increasing hampered by serious supply issues, as was all of the Red Army.
One simple crucial problem was oil, more specifically fuel. The absence of sufficient quantities of it, or the absence of quality stocks, afflicted every arm of service.
Even the most ‘bull at a gate’ Soviet Generals understood that their machine was broken and no longer the all-conquering force it had once been.
None the less, driven by both professional pride and political pressure from Moscow, the Red Army developed plans to renew the offensive in the spring of ‘46.
Perhaps some of the political will in Moscow derived from claims made by the scientists working on the USSR and Japan’s joint enterprise, Project Raduga.
After its spectacular success with the sneak attacks of 6th August, the Air Force had done extremely well, but the capacity of the Allied air arm to absorb its losses, recover, and reinforce had been hugely underestimated.
Soviet control of the air was brief, if it ever happened at all, and it was only a matter of weeks before the growing Allies established relative control of the European skies.
Again, there was serious misinterpretation of the capabilities of the aircraft that they opposed, and Soviet pilots found themselves at a technical disadvantage across the board.
Before winter set in, the Red Air Force had been totally dismantled as an effective unit, rarely flying across No Man’s land, and generally used solely to respond in defence of Allied incursions.
Specifically, the greatest defect in Soviet thinking, accompanied by a gap in Red Air Force capability, was in the inability to meaningfully intercept the large formations of bomber aircraft that roamed across Soviet-held Europe. Despite a one-off savaging handed out to the RAF night bomber force, and that achieved mainly by flak it should be noted, the remaining interceptors proved unable to prevent attacking formations from reaching their targets, exposing the logistics and infrastructure networks to great harm.
Even pressing every single captured heavy AA weapon into service proved little inconvenience to the Allied swarm.
During the air battles over the southern Baltic, the Allied trap had removed whole regiments of aircraft from the Soviet inventory, as well as savaging elements of the Baltic Fleet.
Soviet pilot training programmes were accelerated, and new aircraft types were pushed forward as quickly as possible, but it would be some time before the Red Air Force had any hope of meeting their opponents on equal terms, if ever.
Surprisingly, morale amongst the pilots of Soviet Aviation remained high in the face of extreme adversity and heavy casualties.
In summary, the Red Air Force had been crippled by its efforts to support the Red Army and would, for the foreseeable future, only achieve air superiority by concentrating large numbers of its remaining aircraft in one operation, leaving other areas exposed and defenceless.
There was next to no thought given to developing a heavy bomber that could hit back at their enemy.
Standards of pilot training inevitably lowered but there was no shortage of personnel wanting the opportunity to fly in defence of the Rodina.
Slowly, aircraft of worth would arrive but, in the interim, those that flew would be always outnumbered and mainly outclassed.
In the initial stages of the new war, the Red Navy’s submarine force had enjoyed an incredible run of good fortune and luck, sinking some important Allied naval and merchant assets. In particular, the type XXI U-Boats, captured from the Germans, had been ultra-effective.
The Allies had been slow to effectively respond, which enhanced the Soviet rewards, but they slowly started to sink the Atlantic submarine force.
By late-November, the Red Navy’s serious assets were all lost or interned in various neutral ports on the Atlantic seaboard.
The Soviets considered the Baltic their sea, and rose to the challenge of the trap set by the Allies. Hand in hand with their Aviation colleagues, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet lost heavily in the deception operation in the Southern Baltic. This reduced the Baltic Fleet to defensive duties, with the exception of a few submarines still functioning.
Given the needs of the Army and Air Force, Soviet thinking did not encompass reinforcing the fleets, except for modest efforts to replicate the German process of building the type XXI submarine in separate sections in different locations.
It would be no surprise that the morale of the Baltic Fleet was extremely low as 1945 moved into 1946.
In summary, the Baltic Fleet was a spent force, barely capable of policing its own shoreline, its only ability to take the fight properly to the Allies lying with its remaining submarines, who would have to operate under effective Allied airborne coverage, and against the once again effective anti-submarine groups of the Royal and United States navies.