“What about a ground operation?”
“The intel’s not strong enough to green light a JSOC retrieval mission,” Culler said. Avery sensed where this was going. “I need proof that there’s HEU onsite.”
Overnight, while Avery slept on an undersized cot at Bagram, the members of the Sideshow unit, after thoroughly sanitizing the safe house and leaving nothing behind, left Dayrabot in two separate vehicles, travelling south on the A384 highway into Afghanistan. They entered the country through an unmanned border crossing. Five miles into Afghanistan, they were met by a US Army MH-60 Black Hawk helicopter. The team boarded the Black Hawk with their gear and was off the ground en route to Bagram three minutes later. Culler was on hand to personally meet them when the Black Hawk deposited them at Camp Cunningham at 10:23 AM.
Given Avery’s current condition, Culler and Poacher agreed to be charitable and allow him additional time to sleep before they held the briefing session. They’d give him until noon, if he wasn’t already up by that time. Culler wouldn’t receive the latest satellite data until later that day anyway, and in the meantime, the TCIDC factory remained under constant surveillance by Predator drones and KH-13 reconnaissance satellites, so they could afford to wait. Unlike Avery, though, the members of Sideshow were rested and ready for their next mission.
Avery was awake by eleven, still feeling drowsy and fatigued after ten hours of uninterrupted sleep, and the pain was more evident, as if it was just now fully registering with his nerves after his body was finally allowed to relax and slow down after the adrenaline hangover.
They conducted the briefing in a secure, cipher-lock compartmental information facility; Culler, Avery, the four Sideshow members, and an army officer dressed in digital fatigues with a Special Forces patch who Culler introduced as Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Arkin from Joint Special Operations Command. Culler didn’t immediately explain what component of JSOC Arkin represented or why he was in attendance, and Arkin barely said a word. Instead he listened intently with the others as Culler conducted the briefing and fielded questions.
By now, Culler possessed additional satellite intelligence, including FORTE data from the Department of Energy (DOE) and electronic and signals intelligence intercepts from NSA.
Over the past twelve hours, Culler had coordinated with DOE and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the agency that designs, builds, and operates the satellites utilized by American intelligence agencies, to re-task the FORTE platform over Gorno-Badakhshan Province. There are only two FORTE satellites, and they are nearly always in use over high priority targets in China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and Russia. Diverting FORTE on short notice is a Big Deal, and Culler had called in a few favors and now owed a couple, too. Fortunately, this particular satellite had already been in the region, scheduled to make a sweep over India’s Boron enrichment plant, where CIA had gotten reports of increased production activity. Instead, the satellite passed over Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Province.
Fast Onboard Recording of Transient Event is a $35 million Department of Energy-operated satellite launched into low Earth orbit in 1997. Its suite of optical sensors and RF instruments detects radioactive emissions and heat signatures associated with nuclear weapons development and testing, capable of seeing through dense cloud coverage and penetrating up to fifteen feet underground. FORTE had been the first asset to detect and analyze the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests in the 1990s.
HEU is difficult to detect. The Department of Homeland Security and DOE spent billions of dollars on detection gear and sensors that failed to reliably detect large quantities of HEU at American ports and airports. But FORTE’s scans detected significant levels of alpha emissions radiating from the TCIDC plant. The small diameter of the emissions’ source core, and the fact that it was located directly within the plant, all but eliminated the possibility of a natural, previously unknown natural uranium deposit. It had all the readings consistent with emissions that were the result of man-made processes.
NSA’s Magnum SigInt satellites likewise picked up an increase in signals and communications traffic from the Gorno-Badakhshan site to locations in Minsk, including a GlobeEx office, and Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province. Meanwhile, CIA’s continued UAV coverage of the TCIDC facility revealed another nugget.
“Aleksander Litvin arrived at the facility four hours ago,” Culler said. “The Counter Proliferation Center reported, and Ukrainian intelligence confirmed, that he left Minsk for Dushanbe overnight on a private jet, shortly after the incident at Dushanbe International. From there, he flew directly to the factory aboard a GlobeEx Transport Ka-226 helicopter. He’s not the only VIP. The Predators spotted Mullah Arzad’s arrival a short while later, along with someone we’ve since identified as Ali Masood Jafari, one of the missing Pakistani nuclear scientists and one-time apprentice to AQ Khan.”
Avery exchanged looks with Poacher. They both thought the same thing. If Litvin and Arzad were here, would Cramer make an appearance, too? Culler caught the exchange but didn’t answer the unstated question.
“So what happens next?” Poacher asked.
“I’ve received authorization from D/CIA to launch a three phase operation, codenamed CRIMSON RETRIEVAL,” Culler said. If the director of CIA authorized the op, then that meant the president’s national security adviser had given him the green light to do so, at least tentatively.“First, Sideshow will conduct eyes-on-the-ground reconnaissance of the target to pave the way for the JSOC retrieval mission of the nuclear material. Then F-16s will level this place flat to eliminate the weapons development infrastructure. Rules of engagement are clear: anyone who stands in the way of your securing the HEU is considered a threat and is to be neutralized.”
It sounded simple and straight forward enough, but Avery knew from experience that these things rarely went as smoothly as anticipated by the mission planners and coordinators in their distant office suites and ops centers. From Avery’s perspective, he saw a small unit infiltrating hostile territory, with limited back-up, and going up against a larger, highly trained enemy force, with a number of variables that could go wrong at every phase of the operation.
Next, Culler addressed Poacher directly, something that wasn’t lost on Avery. “Your team will provide vital firsthand intelligence of the target and ascertain enemy force strength and disposition, and locations of the uranium and the HUMINT asset being detained here.”
Culler now regarded Aleksa Denisova as an asset of sorts, although she would ardently argue against the label. But whatever she was, Avery felt responsible for her — she was there, in danger, because of him, and she had provided valuable intelligence that brought them to this point. The Ranger mentality of leaving no one behind was deeply ingrained into his psyche, just as the Sideshow team shared the same mindset. Bringing Aleksa out was just as critical to them as retrieving and accounting for all of the HEU canisters.
Culler had told Avery he’d help Aleksa get settled in the West and establish a new identity for her, since it wouldn’t be safe for her to return to Russia after this. That made him feel better, but he doubted Aleksa would take Culler up on that. She was too stubborn and principled, and would never accept help from the CIA. She also wouldn’t run and hide because of a gangster’s threats.