The strategic decision to concentrate on the Stalin Line, a line of defences in pre-1939 territory, doubtless made the task of defending the USSR easier. The joint – and very private – agreement with the Germans to literally exterminate the Poles was executed by the NKVD, which had been tripled in size following the discovery of those who would later betray Stalin. Units from the southern SSRs and Siberia conducted most of the ‘slash-and-burn’ missions, units of doubtful loyalty that were considered expandable. Polish resistance was brutal, but succumbed to overwhelming firepower.
In addition, a political decision was made to settle the tensions in the Far East, following the Nomonhan Conflict. The USSR gave up some ground to Japan; Stalin had concluded that it could be recovered when they were ready, and Soviet support for the Chinese – communist or nationalist – was terminated.
Although a massive program into scientific research was forced forward, the USSR lacked the priceless technical data the Germans had amassed, and remained behind on atomic power as well as jet engines and other related areas. The Germans shared some information, mainly concerning submarines and other areas that didn’t threaten the Reich, but it wasn’t always trustworthy. Production-wise, the Soviets forced-forward production of T-34s (and finished the JS-1 design), and – ironically – a knock-off version of an AK-47 that had been captured in the Dutch East Indies by the Japanese and passed on to the Soviets as part of an exchange deal.
One area in which the Soviets had an unsurpassed advantage was in the field of biological weapons. The process was forced forward as fast as it could – ‘accidents’ were covered up despite some exaggerated fears of accidentally exterminating the Russian people – and these were field-tested in Afghanistan in the hopes that the diseases would spread into India. The Soviets also worked on delivery systems, but were forced to rely on the Typhoid Mary principle until rocket systems were ready.
Finally, and with the agreement of the Germans, the Soviets acted to remove foreign threats to themselves. Finland was invaded (with German permission) and the population crushed. Despite the brutality of the Soviet invasion, resistance was fierce and remained in existence for years afterwards. Afghanistan was also invaded on a trumped-up pretext, using programs designed to exterminate the population. This was conducted so well, including biological weapons, that the population was reduced significantly, although in some cases the diseases spread to Soviet troops. As part of long-term geopolitical desires, Iran was invaded, which brought Stalin into confrontation with British forces.
If the Shah had believed in the threat, it might have been possible for the British to mount a defence of Iran. As it was, the Soviet advance was almost unchallenged – the Iranian equipment was badly outdated – and continued until they outran their own logistics. RAF air attacks made a bad situation worse, but the Soviets were always able to move forward, if only at a crawl. Iranian resistance became better coordinated as the Soviets closed in on Tehran, but the flight of the Shah made further resistance seem hopeless. The Turkish declaration of semi-belligerency, a curious legal fiction, unravelled the entire British posture, therefore allowing Stalin’s men to complete their work.
It is curious to note that Stalin never declared war on Britain, despite the clear state of war. Stalin never really understood the forces driving the 2015 Britain, nor that they had no desire to bargain with him, as they were aware of his future broken promises. Despite his alliance with Nazi Germany, nemesis was on the cards…
Japanese Responses to the Transition, 1940
Of the three major Axis powers, the Japanese were in the worst position, although they were never able – with the exception of Admiral Yamamoto and some of his clique – to appreciate the sheer nightmarish position they faced. Their limited recourses, limited materials and a vast overconfidence only served to harm the Japanese position further. Of what seemed like impressive victories in the Pacific, only one of them – the conquest of the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) – was strategic in its nature.
Politically, the Japanese faced a seriously difficult choice. Their position was very dangerous; they dared not show weakness in the Far East for fear of tempting Stalin, while they needed to end the China War and they were dependent on imports from the British and Dutch possessions in the Pacific. (Indeed, the Japanese planned an invasion of the British possessions that would have been launched along with Sealion.) In effect, as the American position hardened when the news of the future became public, the Japanese discovered that they had three choices.
Withdraw from China and effectively demilitarise, although there would be some room for negotiation. This would have the effect of weakening Japan, and of course there was no guarantee that the Americans wouldn’t simply insist on something else, now that they had discovered that blackmail worked. The Japanese might have been willing to step down operations in China – which would have had some support from the Army – but they would not, could not, surrender.
Use their military power to threaten the Dutch and British into trading with them anyway, regardless of the American position. While this was supported by some elements of the Navy, this had the problem – as North Africa had revealed – that the 2015 Britain was so powerful that failing to hold a vast area of the Pacific would only make their doom come quicker. In effect, the blackmail would have only been good for a year at most – and then the British would slap them down.
War. Snatch the British and Dutch territories that would serve as bases for any counterattack, and just incidentally were rich in the resources that Japan needed, and make a counterattack impossible. Like Option 2, it was one that had to be used quickly, before the British position became invincible.
Japanese politics became a great deal more violent as the effects of the Transition rolled on. (The biological attack on China and the occupation of French Indochina took place at this point.) Eventually, the Militarists gained dominance, largely because powerful elements within the Navy and the Bureaucracy might have been willing to negotiate, they wanted something in return; mainly occupation of the Dutch East Indies to prevent later American/British ‘renegotiation’ of the agreement. The Americans were unwilling to compromise for domestic political reasons.
At this point, war became inevitable. The Japanese prepared for war with thoroughness and determination, as well as doing what they could to offset the British technical advances. The eleven free divisions of the army were prepared for their missions, which included the seizing of Singapore and the occupation of the Dutch East Indies. While some elements wanted to include the Americans in the target list, they were shouted down; America in the war would guarantee their defeat. One solution would later become a problem; aware that their radio transmissions would be intercepted with ease, the Japanese gave considerable authority to their local commanders. This would come back to haunt them later.
The Japanese attempted to produce biological weapons and atomic weapons, as well as expanding their gas production. In biological weapons, they were partly successful, weakening Chinese resistance with various diseases that killed thousands of Chinese, before spreading west and south. Although strict sanitation was enforced on the Japanese – and ironically duplicated by the Chinese Communists – some unpleasant diseases spread to the Japanese soldiers, mainly through the Chinese women who had been forced to serve as sex slaves.
Despite heroic attempts, the Japanese attempt to produce a nuclear warhead was doomed to failure from the start. Japan understood some of the theory behind atomic science, but lacked the resources to test them, as well as the equipment to build the systems they would need to create a reactor, let along build and deploy a bomb. While the Germans provided them with considerable theoretical data, they were unwilling to risk shipping the equipment – what little the Germans themselves had – through the guarded North Sea, or over Russia.