Finally, matters that are “restricted” are not secret but they are subject to state censorship on the basis that disclosure “can cause harm to the Soviet state.”
A side-by-side comparison (Table 1.2) highlights these and other differences. First, what was secrecy for? For Americans, the sole legitimate purpose was to protect national security (row 1 of the table). From Truman onward, it was explicit:
Information ... shall not be classified under these regulations unless it requires protective safeguarding in the interest of the security of the United States.
These words were clearly intended to stop the use of secrecy to protect bureaucratic or other interests unrelated to national security.
| table 1.2. Abnormal norms? Soviet versus American norms of secrecy in the Cold War | ||
|---|---|---|
| USA | USSR | |
| 1. National security the sole criterion | Yes | No |
| 2. Value placed on “informed citizenry” | Yes | No |
| 3. Norms of secrecy made public | Yes | No |
| 4. Contestable in public forums | Yes | No |
| 5. Existence of a secret cannot be secret | Yes (1953 to 1978) | No |
| 6. Strictures against overclassification | Yes | Yes |
| 7. Presumption of ultimate disclosure | Yes | No |
| 8. Citizen may request declassification | Yes (from 1966) | No |
| 9. Scale of classification activity disclosed | Yes (from 1979) | No |
| 10. Vetting before clearance for secret work | Yes | Yes |
| 11. Clearance authority is civilian employer | Yes | No |
| 12. Subject denied clearance may appeal | Yes | No |
| Sources: See the text. | ||
On this issue Soviet rules diverged. Only the “top secret” classification covered disclosures threatening the interests of the state (with “state security” taking the place of “national security” in the American lexicon). In the Soviet context, matters that put the interests of a particular agency or facility at risk could then be classified “secret” despite the absence of a threat to the state as a whole. Thus, Soviet secrecy was not limited to protecting national security (or state security in the broadest sense); it could also be invoked to protect the interests of any government organization and its assets.
The scope to misuse American secrecy for private or strictly bureaucratic purposes was further restricted by an order of the Carter administration (EO no. 12065, 1978), which made it illegal to classify information with the intention “to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency, or to restrain competition.” The practical force of this provision was (and remains) limited, however, in so far as evidence of crimes or abuses may still be concealed under US secrecy as long as covering up the crime was not the motive behind the original classification.[68] By contrast, Soviet secrecy was deliberately exploited to cover up the party leaders’ complicity in great crimes, such as mass killings, carried out with no higher purpose in mind.
If a degree of secrecy was necessary, was it a necessary evil, limited by the citizens’ interest in open government? American norms (Table 1.2, row 2) acknowledged the value of an “informed citizenry” for democracy and accountability. Eisenhower’s EO no. 10501 (1953) opened with the words: “Whereas it is essential that the citizens of the United States be informed concerning the activities of their government.” With minor variation, similar words have appeared in every version since. But the idea that government information has civic value did not exist for Soviet citizens.
While the American public was expected to put up with a certain amount of secrecy, it was kept fully informed of the rules by which secrecy worked (Table 1.2, row 3). These were set out and revised in executive orders published by each incoming presidential administration starting from Franklin D. Roosevelt (EO no. 8381, 1940). Because they were published, the principles could be debated in the US media and Congress, and their application challenged (not always with success) in the courts (Table 1.2, row 4).
By contrast the Soviet regime of secrecy was itself a secret, and the rules of classification and document handling were strictly censored, so that they remained entirely outside of public discussion and were never debated or challenged in public.
To what extent was secrecy on either side reflexive, in the sense of covering itself (Table 1.2, row 5)? This question can be asked at two levels, the level of the system (or regime) and the level of particular secrets. At the system level, the contrast is clear: Soviet secrecy was reflexive while American secrecy was not. At the level of detail, Soviet secrecy was reflexive again: any reference to the existence of classified information, even if it did not disclose any of that information, was just as secret as the information that was classified. This had important practical implications (detailed in Chapter 3).
It is an open question whether US secrecy norms were reflexive at the level of detail. From Eisenhower (EO no. 10501,1953) through Nixon (EO no. 11652, 1972), the American rules contained the instruction: “Material containing references to classified materials, which references do not reveal classified information, shall not be classified.” From Carter (EO no. 12065 !978) onward, the limitation was removed. Whether that made any practical difference is unclear. But on the Soviet side, we will see, it was not even a question: the existence of a secret was always secret.
A risk on both sides was overclassification, that is, turning restricted or confidential items into secrets or secrets into top secrets, whether motivated by excessive caution or private concealment. What kind of limits were placed on overclassification (Table 1.2, row 6)? On the American side, strictures were issued against overclassification from Truman onward (EO no. 10290,1951). Despite these, effective limits proved elusive. On the Soviet side (Chapter 3 will show), KGB officials did occasionally complain about the burdens of undue secrecy. There is no sign of support for such complaints from higher levels.
Was secrecy intended to be forever (Table 1.2, row 7)? Truman (EO no. 10290, 1951) allowed the option of classifying a document for a set time, after which declassification would be automatic. His successors varied the idea in small ways. The general rule of the Cold War era became that American secrecy should generally be time limited, but the limit could be extended for as long as necessary.[69]
Other measures forced American officials to give practical attention to declassification. The Freedom of Information Act (1966) entitled private citizens to seek disclosure of government information (although the government could still refuse it) (Table 1.2, row 8). The annual reports of the Information Security Oversight Office (established in 1979) disclosed the scale of aggregate classification and declassification activity across US government departments (Table 1.2, row 9).
68
As discussed by Steven Aftergood in “Trump Jr: Declassify Everything!,” FAS Secrecy Blog, December 6, 2020, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2020/12/declassify-everything/.
69
See also Quist, Security Classification of Information, vol. 1, 72. Once the Cold War came to an end, the Clinton rules (EO no. 12958,1995) for the first time required the opening of all classified documentation after twenty-five years unless specifically exempted, but exemptions were many and broad. The Obama rules (EO no. 13526, 2009) added: “No information may remain classified indefinitely.” Time limits on classification have had practical consequences. These rules were still in force in the winter of 2020. Personnel shortages arising from the COVID- 19 pandemic of that year left officials of many US agencies scrambling to complete their review of documents coming up for otherwise automatic declassification, as discussed by Steven Aftergood in “2020 Declassification Deadline Remains in Force,” FAS Secrecy Blog, December 6,2020, https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2o2o/12/ declass-deadline-2020/.