Normand had carefully prepared a "Let's Go" message, a masterwork of diplomatic language, politely requesting Washington to "relook" the issue.
"Bullshit," said Schwarzkopf. He ripped up the paper and began writing his own message. It began with the words "Bungling bureaucrats in Washington," and then got really nasty.
"What do you think about that?" the CINC asked, handing it back to Normand.
"If you'll sign it, I—"
"It's signed," Schwarzkopf broke in.
The PSYOP tactical campaign aimed at Iraqi troops suddenly hit the fast track. The campaign took off with the start of the air war a few weeks later.
MUCH of the DESERT SHIELD/STORM PSYOP mission was aimed simply at countering the propaganda Saddam was spreading. The PSYOP warriors were trying to set the record straight. Arab countries were a vital part of President Bush's carefully constructed coalition, and so it was vital that their citizens, and in fact the Islamic world in general, know the truth about why the coalition was fighting Saddam.
Cairo is the Arab media center, the Arab "Hollywood." The highly regarded Radio Cairo is there, many Arab and international news organizations have offices in the city, and Arab intellectuals tend to congregate there. If you want to get the word out to the Arab world — and to the entire Islamic world — you want to work through these facilities. At the same time, Egypt was an ally in the coalition. Government officials as well as media members were receptive to American-inspired suggestions and information.
Normand sent Devlin to Cairo at the end of October.
Here are Devlin's thoughts on the experience:
"The extensive Iraqi propaganda machine required countering with factual information that Saddam was in every way a despicable human being — a horrific leader who did not care about his people, an unjust Muslim, a terrible neighbor, an untrustworthy Arab and Muslim, and a liar in everything he said." The PSYOP operation, therefore, aimed to point out these truths and strip him of support from the Islamic world and elsewhere, while eliciting increased Islamic and world support for the coalition forces. With strong backing by the American ambassador, who provided entry to the Egyptian government and military, and by American embassy officials, Devlin organized a cooperative effort out of Cairo to counter the continuous Iraqi propaganda.
"Because the invasion was literally a television news event, it was important to point out to the entire world exactly what a brutal dictator he was. But we wanted to point out specifically to the Islamic world that Saddam had attacked his Islamic brothers without justification, or the support of the rest of the Islamic world.
"According to Islamic law, you can be a bad Muslim and an evil man who does not follow the law. But then you can have a change of heart and convert to a follower of the law. Once you have done that, you can proclaim the right to call a Jihad." Saddam claimed he was a good Muslim in calling for a justified Jihad. "But also according to Islamic law, Muslims don't attack other Muslims. So Saddam's claim had this fundamental flaw."
Both the Arab world and the Islamic world as a whole had to pay attention to this truth, but it obviously could not come directly from Americans.
"We wanted to get word out to the Islamic world that noted Islamic clerics faulted his reasoning and justification, according to the Koran and Islamic law. Our goal was not to get them to say what we wanted; we wanted them to say, print, and transmit what they were already saying as Islamic experts, recognized as such by the Islamic world: Saddam's claims were not true, according to Islamic custom and law."
This message went out: Devlin's team and their Egyptian colleagues found ways to insert it into plays, radio and TV shows, soap operas, and magazines and newspapers. Islamic conferences held for world Islamic leaders condemned Saddam. The end result was a chorus of voices in all media denouncing Saddam from recognized Islamic sources.
"I never told them what to write. The suggestion would be that an article (or program, or conference, etc.) stating their beliefs would be useful. They would take it from there. One result was a book, written very quickly, by a noted Islamic scholar.
"Effective PSYOP is not always preparing the message; it is extremely effective when already available materials, programming, or information are properly directed."
Another aspect of the PSYOP war saw the 4th Group working like a political campaign's media advisers, suggesting talking points for U.S. officials and others who would counter Saddam's propaganda. "We suggested four or five information points every few days for leaders of the United States, Egypt, and other allies, such as Great Britain, to use in public interviews, press conferences, and statements. This showed that the coalition force really spoke with one mind. Every day, ideas would float back and forth between governments and leaders. From these, we'd take four or five points for all to use.
"It was magic to watch all of this unfold. Following agreement on the points by the leaders, and their dissemination through the Ambassador and the CINC, we would watch them come back through the media over the course of a week."
Very few people outside of military circles are aware of PSYOP campaigns. And even the military…
"You have to be satisfied with accomplishment, because you sure as hell don't get any recognition," Devlin concludes.
By the time the war got under way, Colonel Layton Dunbar had taken over as the 4th Psychological Group's commander. The unit's efforts varied:
In December, stickers began appearing on buildings in Kuwait City encouraging resistance to Saddam — a PSYOP project. two days after the first bombs fell in the air war, PSYOP troops — predominantly members of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard — launched the Voice of the Gulf, a radio program broadcast on both AM and FM bands from three ground stations and an airborne EC-130. Subtle PSYOP appeals played in rotation with music and news programs.
B-52s can carry a very large load of bombs, and when the load hits, it wastes a lot of territory and makes lots of noise. In other words, B-52s are not only strategic and tactical weapons, they are psychological weapons. Ground troops who have seen what they can do are not eager to repeat the experience — or be subjected to it.
Six Iraqi military units were targeted for treatment that combined PSYOP leaflets with B-52 strikes. The operations unfurled over several days. On day one, leaflets were dropped on the unit, warning that it would come under B-52 attack at a specific time. The soldiers were urged to flee. At the specified moment, the B-52s would arrive with their loads of bombs. Afterward, a fresh round of leaflets would arrive, reminding them of the strike and warning that a new one would soon follow. Neighboring units nearby would receive their own warnings. Mass defections often followed. Or as Carl Stiner put it, "They ran like hell."
The Air Force was at first reluctant to sign on to this approach (who warns the people they're going to bomb?), but they eventually became big boosters. These operations conveyed a sense of overwhelming superior force, while filling the enemy with dread.
You don't have to kill the enemy to win a war. It's enough that the enemy does not choose to fight.
Later, the Air Force adopted a PSYOP campaign that targeted SAM sites, warning them that they would be bombed if they turned on their radars. "It kept bad guys from shooting at Air Force aircraft," Normand comments. "So they turned out to be among our strongest proponents."
One feature of PSYOP leaflets was the positive portrayal of Iraqi soldiers. As a unit historian pointed out later: "I Ie was always portrayed as a decent, brave fellow who had been misled by his leaders, but who would be received by the coalition forces with the dignity he deserved." Coalition soldiers were depicted in unthreatening ways.