Such a vast organizational and operational effort inevitably leaves traces that should have been apparent to our intelligence agencies — but weren't.
Many other reasons will eventually be given for the failure; these will all be examined in congressional hearings, and fixes will be made — unfortunately too late. They'll be closing the barn door after the horse has already bolted.
Fundamental to our vulnerability is our current lack of what is called HUMINT (human intelligence). We have had that deficiency for years. IIUMINT is necessary to penetrate clandestine religious-based terrorist organizations.
Overhead systems (satellites) can't do that job. Neither will the hiring of agents from other countries bring a quick fix.
Unfortunately, it takes years to train operatives and to establish an effective I IUMINT intelligence capability — and we are way behind the time curve in this war.
WILL THERE BE MORE ATTACKS?
As long as fanatical groups and the forces of darkness continue to exist, we are vulnerable to attack. The real question is: Will we be able to prevent it?
As 1 said before, the attack of September 11 could have been even worse. Terrorist organizations have become much more sophisticated and may soon have access to weapons of mass destruction — if they don't have them already — not to mention chemical and biological warfare. As always (like Mao's guerrillas), they will attempt to maximize fear and terror by hitting us where we are most vulnerable, and at a time and place of their choosing. We face an enemy like we have never faced before, who does not operate on a linear battlefield, his forces in mass. It is called "asymmetrical warfare" — assaults on our weaknesses rather than on our strengths.
So, yes, even after we have spent billions improving our security, there will most likely be another attack, but in another form — if for no other reason than to show us they can still do it.
1 doubt that we will ever eliminate terrorism. It will be with us as long as there arc men who dream of bringing down a nation. But we can climinate the leaders and the resources it takes to sustain them and their operations. Hopefully, too, as with Noriega, we can eliminate the places where they lay their heads. But this will take a lot of time.
RESOLVE, ACTION, AND JUSTICE
What must we do?
First, I believe that President Bush's strategy for combating terrorism — the application of all available national options concurrently — is right on the mark.
Second, I would recommend one more arrow in the Presidents long-range quiver (and I'm sure it is being considered at the national level), and that is a PSYOPs campaign. The goal is not to change the minds of terrorists — which is probably impossible — but to deny them the population they need for their support and recruits. We must — to use an old phrase — win their "hearts and minds." Far too many in the Islamic world look up to the new terrorists as heroes and saviors. We have to bring the truth to these people, and to all the peoples of Islam that these men represent a perversion of Islam and not its highest expression; and in the meantime we have to show them by our actions that we respect them and their faith. But this job could take years, or decades.
In the near term, we must clean out all the terrorist cells and sympathizers in the United States. We must also improve our security systems and procedures. As the President has indicated, unilateral action by the United States will not solve this problem. We must build a strong multinational coalition that will cooperate in every way possible, and this coalition must include the modern Arab nations. We must have the help of other governments' intelligence services. We must stand behind the President and not become complacent.
Success will be a long, drawn-out process. Victory will be ambiguous; and there will be few victory parades. We will lose good people in the struggle, but we must not weaken in our resolve.
Our strength is in our unity and in that resolve. For both our sake and our children's sake, we must be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to win this war. We have invested too much in the defense of our freedoms to be cowed by such as bin Laden.
WHEN WILL WE STRIKE? WHEN WILL WE GO GET HIM?
In the time that has passed since the tragic September strike, I have been asked both of these questions hundreds of times — by all kinds of people, from ordinary citizens to those in the media. My usual answer has been "We will strike when it is to our advantage, and when we are ready. But it is just not 'him' we will be after; we are after the leadership and infrastructures of terrorist organizations around the world."
At the beginning of this book, our Authors' Note indicated that concerns for the safety of operational forces and their families, as well as security concerns, would prevent me from discussing some matters in which readers will legitimately be interested. That restraint applies now more than ever.
The national media, for example, has announced that U.S. and British Special Operations forces have already been inserted in Afghanistan. 1 cannot confirm the truth of this report, but if special operations forces are there, the announcement most certainly increased the risk associated with their mission.
I can say, therefore — without revealing details of how special operations forces will be used in the war against terrorism-that they will most certainly be involved. This has already been announced by our national command authorities. Because of their cultural orientation and language capabilities, and their unique skills, which span the entire spectrum of warfare, they will most certainly play a key role. All other forces will surely bring important capabilities into the mix, but it is the versatility of special operations forces that will make them the forces of choice at the point of the spear.
When Special Operations forces are committed to the campaign, we can also expect that they will conduct actions related to all their assigned mission areas of responsibility: Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Countcrprolifcration, Coalition Support, and Combat Search and Rescue — specifically choosing and tailoring each applicable capability for the most effective mission accomplishment.
It can also be expected that most SOF operations will be covert-meaning that the American public will rarely hear of them. In far-reaching operations like these, media reports could not only mean increased risk for the forces involved, but affect political and tactical options for future operations. Information will therefore be released only by the National Command Authority, and only after coordinating with coalition partners.
It is common knowledge that Special Operations forces played unique roles in our operations a few years ago in Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, and Somalia, and contributed greatly to them. They will most certainly draw on these experiences. But there are major differences.
In Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, the recognized governments of Panama and Kuwait supported our actions. We knew the enemy, we had selected the targets in advance, and we had rehearsed the operations to the extent necessary for success. The majority of the civil populations of both countries were friendly to the United States and supported our actions.
The war against terrorism will be in stark contrast to any threat we have faced before, and carries with it greater challenges and risks. In the first place, we will not be focusing our efforts on just one individual or target, or even on several — as in Panama, where we had twenty-seven. We will be focusing on all key personnel and infrastructures associated with the Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, and will attack several targets embedded covertly in many nations throughout the world. We have yet to identify most of these cells; critical intelligence is not available, and in many cases forces will have to produce their own.