Numerous sovereignty issues will also have to be worked out at the national level. We will encounter hostile governments and hostile populations, and most operational environments are likely to be nonpermissive.
We will be required to operate in very rugged terrain and in urban areas, and we will be at great distances from our logistical bases. The enemy is elusive; he does not stand and fight on our terms. He has better field intelligence than we do. He knows the terrain, has his own support infrastructures, and uses civilians as shields. He does not recognize treaties, our principles of warfare, or our ethics. The organizations we will face do not take prisoners.
There will be many necessary missions, and each will be unique. Tactical, "cookie cutter" solutions will not be available from past military studies. The solutions to such tactical challenges are best left to those who will fight the battles. Therefore, the most effective solutions for dealing with this enemy will have to be unconventional.
All this will take time. Our enemies believe that the United States has no "staying power — as demonstrated by our "abandonment" of Somalia and Lebanon after terrorist onslaughts. They will learn a different lesson in the coming months — or, if necessary, years.
As a nation, we arc very fortunate to have special operations forces of such quality. We must give them the necessary latitude to deal with the challenges they will face. They have the judgment and skills to react appropriately and do what must be done.
The least we can do as a nation is to be patient and to stand behind them. We have no other alternative.
APPENDIX I:
THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND: A BRIEF HISTORY
Before the book concludes, a quick overview of USSOCOM is in order.
President Reagan approved the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command on April 13, 1987, and on April 16, the Department of Defense activated USSOCOM and nominated General James J. Lindsay to be the first commander in chief. The Senate accepted him without debate.
USSOCOM had its activation ceremony on June 1, 1987. Guest speakers included William II. Taft IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Admiral William J. Crowe, both of whom had opposed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. Admiral Crowc's speech cautioned General Lindsay to integrate the new command into the mainstream military: "First, break down the wall that has more or less come between special operations forces and the other parts of our military, the wall that some people will try to build higher. Second, educate the rest of the military — spread a recognition and undcrstanding of what you do, why you do it, and how important it is that you do it. Last, integrate your efforts into the full spectrum of our military capabilities." Putting this advice into action, General Lindsay knew, would pose challenges (a "sporty" course, he called it) considering the opposition the Defense Department had shown to the creation of SOCOM.
The mission assigned to USSOCOM by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was "to prepare SOF to carry out assigned missions and, if directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to plan for and conduct special operations." Mission responsibilities included to:
• Develop SOF doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures
• Conduct specialized courses of instruction for all SOF
• Train assigned forces and ensure interoperability of equipment and forces
• Monitor the preparedness of SOF assigned to other unified commands
• Monitor the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional development of all SOF personnel
• Consolidate and submit program and budget proposals for Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11)
• Develop and acquire special-operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services
These last two tasks, managing MFP-11 and developing and acquiring special-operations-peculiar items, made USSOCOM unique among the unified commands. These responsibilities — dubbed "servicelike" — had heretofore been performed exclusively by the services. Congress had given the command extraordinary authority over SOF force structure, equipping, and rcsourcing.
The Command's mission evolved with the changing geopolitical environment. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of regional instability put SOF's capabilities in ever-greater demand, and this increased operational tempo (optempo) and called for a large SOF involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. USSOCOM later added counterprolileration and information operations command-and-control warfare to its list of principal missions, and expanded the counterterrorism mission to include defensive measures (antiterrorism).
Since 1987, there have been six CINCSOCs: General James J. Lindsay served from April 16, 1987, to June 27, 1990; Carl W. Stiner from June 27, 1990, to May 20, 1993; Wayne A. Downing from May 20, 1993, to February 29, 1996; Henry H. Shelton from February 29, 1996, to September 25, 1997; Peter J. Schoomaker from November 5, 1997, to October 27, 2000; and Charlie R. Holland from October 2000 to the present. Each CINCSOC left his mark on the SOF community as he responded to significant changes on the military landscape. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the downsizing of the U.S. military, the appearance of new aggressor states, heightened regional instabilities, highly organized international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — all led to an increased use of SOF by conventional U.S. military commanders, ambassadors, and other governmental agencies.
General Lindsay's greatest challenge was to make the command the driving force behind the congressionally mandated revitalization of SOF without alienating conventional military leaders. This was no casy task, given the opposition in many military circles to the command's mere existence. As the first CINCSOC, he developed priorities to get the command functioning. They were to: organize, staff, train, and equip the headquarters; establish the necessary operating systems, including intelligence, as well as information and logistical support; develop the relationships necessary to discharge his roles and missions; create Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) to ensure SOF controlled its financial destiny; build command-and-control relationships with the components, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and the special operations commands assigned to the theater CINCs; define worldwide SOF requirements; and plot the future of the command. General Lindsay also faced two major operational tests — for which he provided trained and ready forces — Operation EARNEST WILL/PRIME CHANCE ONE in the Persian Gulf, and Operation JUST CAUST/PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama. The use of SOF by the theater CINCs increased significantly during General Lindsay's tenure.
The creation of MFP-11 was a special and unique priority for both General Lindsay and Congress. Like the services, USSOCOM was to have its own budget and would be responsible for determining its own funding needs, including research and development, and equipping and training all the Special Operations forces of all the services.
Although the Nunn-Cohen Amendment had created MFP-11 to reform SOF funding, the wording of the law permitted varying interpretations, and some Defense Department officials argued that the new command should not submit its own Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which defines and justifies all programs and initiatives necessary for readiness, including the spread of funding over time (the POM thus serves as the basis for building the budget). The services wanted to keep control of the budgeting process for SOF forces so they could use the money on things other than SOF, as they had always been accustomed to doing.