The Command's procurement strategy emphasized a streamlined acquisition process — by modifying existing weapons or buying "nondevelopmental" (off-the-shelf technology) systems. This approach permitted quick, economical improvements to operational capabilities.
Since 1987, USSOCOM has fielded a number of modified or new systems, affecting nearly every aspect of special operations. Some of the more notable arc the MC-130H Combat Talon II long-range insertion aircraft and a state-of-the-art intelligence system (the most advanced in any command), both of which were used in DESERT STORM; and the Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships, used in Operations SUPPORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Other significant acquisitions included the MH-47E Chinook, a medium-range heavy-lift helicopter designed to conduct insertion operations under all weather conditions; the AC-130U Spector gunship, used for close air support and reconnaissance; the Mark V special operations craft, a high-performancecombatant boat capable of being transported over land or aboard C-5 aircraft; and the rigid inflatable boat (RIB) for the Naval Special Warfare Command, which provides a long-sought capability for a high-speed SEAL insertion-and-extraction craft. The RIB program, completed under cost and months ahead of schedule, exceeded every performance objective and won the 1998 Defense Department's Packer Award for excellence in acquisition.
Another major program now coming to fruition is the Advanced SEAL Delivery System. The CV-22 Osprey aircraft program will also give the Command's forces much greater capability for long-range insertions and extractions under all weather conditions.
By completing the POM and establishing control of major programs, USSOCOM had complied with all the provisions of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. Six years after President Reagan approved the Command, USSOCOM now controlled all SOF forces, its own budget, and its modernization programs.
USSOCOM has used its acquisition capability a number of times during contingencies to provide SOF with the latest technology or to accelerate modifications. During DESERT STORM, for example, the Command modified Chinooks with aircraft survivability equipment before they deployed to the Iraqi area of operations.
Following the Gulf War, I spent a great deal of my time educating commanders, particularly regional CTNCs and serving ambassadors, in the capabilities of SOF — showing the CINCs how to integrate SOF into their theater engagement plans, and showing the ambassadors how to integrate SOF into their country-security plans.
A theater engagement plan is based on the national security strategy for each of the world's regions, and it is the responsibility of the regional CINC. The plan, which is country-specific, is developed with each ambassador, and details the security-assistance needs for that country.
We also educated newly appointed ambassadors on SOF capabilities before they took their posts. Every couple of months, in coordination with the State Department, we brought a new crop of ambassadors to Fort Bragg for a detailed orientation. Afterward, the ambassadors were far better prepared to use SOF forces to their fullest.
I also devoted a lot of effort to upgrading the Special Operations Commands (SOCs) assigned to the regional CINCs. A special-operations-qualified flag officer was placed in charge of each SOC, and it was staffed with qualified SOF personnel. The SOCs exercised both operational control (for the CINCs) of SOF forces involved in peacetime engagements and command of SOF forces in times of crisis.
Training is the most important thing we do — we must always train as we will fight. It was therefore my highest continuing priority.
Training should always be based on potential mission scenarios (including peacetime engagement missions) and serve as a rehearsal for what may ultimately become a no-notice contingency requirement. As such, it needs to cover all the bases: individual, collective, multi-echelon, and joint. Proper training — tough, realistic, demanding, and designed to develop and sustain individual and special skills — builds highly motivated individuals and units that function as an efficient, effective, and professional team. The primary focus of any training program must be the development of:
• Technically / tactically proficient leaders, sound in judgment, who will exercise initiative within the commander's intent
• Disciplined, mature troops, physically and emotionally prepared to withstand the hardships and dangers of combat
• Troops highly skilled in individual tasks, and mature beyond their years
• Small units / crews well grounded in basic technical tactical tasks and drills
There are three fundamentals to successful mission accomplishment:
1. Disciplined, competent leaders with high ethical and professional standards are the key element of any training program — and any effective combat unit. The central focus of all SOF-related training must be to develop leaders.
2. Language skills and culture training make SOF uniquely suited to our assigned mission and is fundamental to success.
3. We must focus our training on joint requirements, and we must train as we expect to fight. We will fight jointly in the future.
In the past, each service trained its own medics — to varying levels of technical proficiency.
With the assistance of the surgeons general of all the services, we established a medical university at Fort Bragg to train all the medics of all Special Operations units — an innovation that greatly improved medical proficiency and readiness, and at considerable savings.
ln 1992, we established a Special Operations Aviation Foreign Internal Defense training capability. Many nations that we help had outdated, practically useless air forces. By developing a SOF training cadre proficient in both vintage aircraft and native languages, we have been able to help them greatly upgrade their air capability for meeting their own security needs.
One of USSOCOM's primary responsibilities is to anticipate the unanticipated, and then to develop the capability to deal with the potential threat. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the increased sophistication of state-sponsored terrorism, the threat of an asymmetrical attack with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) has increased significantly.
Advanced information technology allows extremists to communicate widely and efficiently; publicly available databases serve as repositories for technical information relating to weapons production; and materials and technology used to make WMDs are increasingly available. Many of these materials are widely used for legitimate commercial purposes.
The disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and the potential unemployment and proliferation of thousands of skilled scientists, increased concerns about the protection, control, and accountability of WMD-related materials and technologies. Transnational threats by terrorist organizations have increased the potential for attacks against nonmilitary targets within our borders.
Non-nuclear WMDs are relatively easy to manufacture and deliver. Facilities to produce biological and chemical weapons are small and hard to detect.
As far back as 1991, USSOCOM took high-priority actions to deal with this threat. There are two primary requirements for success:
• Timely and accurate intelligence information for predicting the threat, the likely target, the type of weapon, and its general location is a responsibility of our national intelligence agencies (for threats abroad), and the FBI (for threats within the United States).