Elements of Social Organisation (London: Watts and Co., 1951), pp. 183, 184; D. Michael Stoddart, The Scented Ape: The Biology and Culture of Human Odour (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 126.42. Napoleon A. Chagnon, Yanomamo: The Fierce People (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1968), p. 65.43. Desmond Morris, The Biology of Art (London: Methuen, 1962); R. A. Gardner and B. T. Gardner, “Comparative Psychology and Language Acquisition,” in K. Salzinger and F. E. Denmarks, editors, Psychology: The State of the Art (New York: Annals of New York Academy of Sciences, 1978), pp. 37–76; K. Beach, R. S. Fouts, and D. H. Fouts, “Representational Art in Chimpanzees,” Friends of Washoe, 3:2–4, 4:1–4. Oil paintings by a chimp named Congo, which today hang in several private collections, exhibit a gaudy abstract expressionism and are considered the best of the chimp oeuvres.44. Birds, for example, recognize and mob a novel predator (or even a milk bottle) that frightened their ancestors four generations earlier. And speaking of milk bottles, soon after one blue tit pierced the metal foil cap of a milk bottle left on a doorstep and drank the cream, blue tits all over England are said to have begun drinking cream. (John Tyler Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980].) Of course no one knows who this pioneering bird was. This may not be learning by imitation, though. An already opened milk bottle and another bird present nearby and happy may be enough to give a naive bird the idea. (D. F. Sherry and B. G. Galef, Jr., “Social Learning Without Imitation: More About Milk Bottle Opening by Birds,” Animal Behaviour 40 [1990], pp. 987–989)45. Zuckerman, op. cit., pp. 315, 316.46. Nishida, “A Quarter Century of Research,” p. 12.47. So could souls have provided consciousness back then? A deity responsible on a case-by-case basis for precision injection of souls into this immense host of tiny creatures over the full range of geological time would be a very fussy as well as a very inefficient creator. Why not design it right from the beginning, and let life run by itself? Would the god responsible for the subtle, elegant, and universally applicable laws of physics do such slapdash, error-ridden, journeyman work in biology—requiring hands-on attention to every pathetic little microbe when they already know perfectly well how to reproduce themselves and vast stores of information? Instead, all the god has to do is to encode directly into the DNA of a few ancestors whatever information souls are required to know. Souls and consciousness could then pass, on their own, from generation to generation, freeing the god for other matters, perhaps some of greater urgency. But if the information in the DNA has come to be through the patient evolutionary process, why is a god needed to explain the injection of data, genes, or souls in the first place?48. A. I. Hallowell, “Culture, Personality and Society,” in Anthropology Today, A. L. Kroeber, editor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 597–620; Hallowell, “Self, Society and Culture in Phylogenetic Perspective,” in Evolution After Darwin, Volume 2, S. Tax, editor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 309–371. The contention that only humans are self-aware can be found in many philosophical and scientific disquisitions, e.g., Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (New York: Springer, 1977).49. G. G. Gallup, Jr., “Self-Recognition in Primates: A Comparative Approach to the Bidirectional Properties of Consciousness,” American Psychologist 32 (1977), pp. 329–338.50. A common literary and iconographic theme in medieval Europe beginning in the thirteenth century is an alleged propensity for apes to admire themselves in mirrors. Cf. H. W. Janson, Apes and Ape Lore in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: University of London, 1952), pp. 212 et seq.51. Montaigne, The Essays of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, Book II, Essay XII, “Apology for Raimond de Sebonde,” translated by Charles Cotton, edited by W Carew Hazlitt, Volume 25 of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), p. 227. In a nearby passage, Montaigne quotes the Roman epigramist Juvenaclass="underline" “What stronger lion ever took the life from a weaker?” But, as we’ve mentioned, lions routinely kill all the cubs on taking over a pride. This saves the male the trouble of caring for young not his, and helps bring the females back into heat.52. E.g., R. L. Trivers, Social Evolution (Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin/Cummings, 1985), especially the chapter “Deceit and Self-Deception”; Joan Lockard and Delroy Paulhus, editors, Self-Deception: An Adaptive Mechanism? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989).53. C. G. Beer, “Study of Vertebrate Communication—Its Cognitive Implications,” in D. R. Griffin, editor, Animal Mind-Human Mind (Report of the Dahlem Workshop on Animal Mind-Human Mind, Berlin, March 22–27, 1981) (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1982), p. 264; E. W. Menzel, “A Group of Young Chimpanzees in a One-acre Field,” in A. M. Schrier and F. Stollnitz, editors, Behavior of Nonhuman Primates (New York: Academic Press, 1974).54. Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (London: Chatto and Windus, 1959).55. T. H. Huxley, Evidence as to Mans Place in Nature (London: Williams and Norgate, 1863), p. 132.56. Letter of February 5, 1649, in Mortimer J. Adler and Charles Van Doren, Great Treasury of Western Thought: A Compendium ofImportant Statements on Man and His Institutions by the Great Thinkers in Western History (New York and London: R. R. Bowker Company, 1977), p. 12.57. See, for example, Eugene Linden, Silent Partners: The Legacy of the Ape Language Experiments (New York: Times Books, 1986); Roger Fouts, “Capacities for Language in the Great Apes,” in Proceedings, Ninth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences (The Hague: Mouton, 1973).58. For example, “Man is the only animal … that can use symbols” (Max Black, The Labyrinth of Language [New York: Praeger, 1968]); “Animals cannot have language … If they had it, they would … no longer be animals. They would be human beings” (K. Goldstein, “The Nature of Language,” in Language: An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function [New York: Harper, 1957]); “There seems to be no substance to the view that human language is simply a more complex instance of something to be found elsewhere in the animal world” (Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind [New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972]). These examples are taken from Donald R. Griffin’s The Question of Animal Awareness, revised edition (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1981). Only occasionally is a contrary note sounded (e.g., A. I. Hallowell, Philosophical Theology, Vol. 2 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937], p. 94.)59. Derek Bickerton, Language and Species (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), especially pp. 8, 15–16.60. Bickerton, op. cit., proposes that the early speech of children is a “protolanguage” fundamentally different from fully developed human languages, that this protolanguage may be accessible to apes, and that it was used by our ancestors in the transition from apes to humans.