Hoping to establish a dialogue between the parties, Putin urged the activists to postpone the referendum date in view of an agreement that had been made in Geneva between the United States, European Union, Russia and Ukraine; it was intended to demilitarise and de-escalate the conflict. To meet the demands of the pro-Russian population, three pro-Russian activists were freed on 7 May in exchange for some officers from Ukraine’s security force who had been captured by the rebel militia in Donetsk.
Initially both the separatists and the government in Kiev were cautiously positive in response to Putin’s proposal, and both expressed their willingness to talk to one another. However, while the organisers of the referendum had initially considered a postponement, they in the end decided to maintain the original date. One of the separatist leaders claimed it wasn’t his call to decide about the postponement—he was simply obeying the people’s wishes.
On Sunday 11 May, large queues of people gathered in front of polling stations all over the region. The ballot papers in Ukrainian and Russian asked the voters to answer just one question: ‘Do you support the Act of State Self-rule of the Donetsk People’s Republic/Luhansk People’s Republic?’ The wording was vague, and it was somewhat unclear to voters what these words actually meant. Some of the electors who voted yes wanted more autonomy but not necessarily to split from Ukraine, whereas many people assumed their ‘yes’ would be a vote for the region to join Russia, much as Crimea had done in March. Some pro-Russian voters cast their votes to protect the region from ‘fascists’ in Kiev.
As the voting day approached, it had become evident that support for self-rule in the Donbas region threatened to deepen divisions in a country already heading perilously towards civil war. Ukraine’s foreign ministry labelled the vote a ‘criminal farce’ arranged by a ‘gang of Russian terrorists,’ reflecting the government’s view that Russian agents were behind the breakaway movement. The EU and US both announced that they would not recognise the outcome of the vote, which they deemed illegal. It was claimed that the polls were rigged, that voters were allowed to vote more than once and those who wanted to vote ‘no’ were often too afraid to head for a polling station. Nonetheless, the turnout in the region was massive, and the result of the poll left no doubt. It was a landslide victory, in which almost 90 per cent of the electorates in the eastern regions voted ‘yes’.
After the official announcement of the results, state and military authorities quickly established control over the region. All Ukrainian military troops within the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were now considered illegal occupiers. Alexander Borodai, a Russian from Moscow, was appointed prime minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic.
In Luhansk, Russian-born Marat Bashirov was installed as interim prime minister and his governor was Valeri Bolotov, also a Russian. The militia in the region were led by two Russians. It was a motley bunch: in the snapshots of these men and their associates that began to appear in the media, they disturbingly resembled a bunch of armed football hooligans or bandits. The West and Ukrainians alike were left wondering who these ‘leaders’ were. The conflict appeared to be throwing up self-proclaimed leaders, who preened themselves like dubious strongmen and had seemingly popped up out of nowhere.
The most notable figure was no doubt the self-proclaimed, and previously obscure, prime minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic, Alexander Borodai, nicknamed ‘The Fixer’. Borodai had been born in Moscow in 1972, where he obtained a degree in philosophy from the prestigious Moscow State University. In the 1990s he worked as a Moscow-based journalist for an ultra-nationalist newspaper, developing a reputation as an enthusiastic supporter of pro-Russian separatist movements across the former Soviet Union. In 1994 he worked as a military correspondent during the first Chechen war. After the Chechen war he worked as a political scientist specialising in elections, hence the nickname ‘The Fixer’.
From 2001 Borodai headed a consulting business specialising in crisis management. It was rumoured that he was appointed deputy director of Russia’s FSB (the successor of the KGB) security service after an article he wrote appeared in Pravda. But Borodai and the FSB swiftly denied any such thing. Borodai, however, never denied his involvement with the Crimean annexation, in which he had functioned as a political fixer and adviser to the new prime minister there. In the months to come he became the public face of the east Ukraine secessionist movement, always appearing comfortable with media attention and liking the spotlight.
An important military leader who had emerged in the region was Igor ‘Strelkov’ Girkin, who became the minister of defence of the Donbas. Born as Girkin, he was mainly known as Igor Strelkov, which loosely translates from Russian as ‘shooter’ or ‘rifleman’. He had also been dubbed Igor Grozny (‘Igor the Terrible’). He had previously worked closely with Borodai during the Crimean takeover; he had a long record of involvement in conflicts in which Russia was a participant, including service in Chechnya, Serbia and Trans-Dniester, a self-proclaimed republic in Moldova.
Born around 1970, Girkin was a shady character and little is known about his life. A Russian from Moscow, his record shows he worked for the Russian secret services. He took part in commanding Russian troops in their capture of the Crimea Simferopol airport. Clad in military camouflage outfit, he customarily travelled round in a black Mercedes with heavily tinted glass.
Ukrainian authorities claimed that he had been behind the 17 April kidnapping, torture and murder of local Ukrainian politician Volodymyr Rybak, as well as a nineteen-year-old student. When Rybak’s corpse was found in a river, his head had been smashed and he had suffered multiple stab wounds to his body; the young student’s mutilated body was found nearby. Ukraine authorities accused Girkin and one Igor Bezler of orchestrating these murders; Bezler, however, always denied his involvement. Although portrayed by his neighbours in Moscow as ‘polite’ and ‘quiet’, Girkin, after the discovery of the bodies, was described by Ukraine’s interior minister as ‘a monster and a killer’.
The actual commander of the pro-Russian separatist troops was Lieutenant Colonel Igor Bezler, nicknamed Bes (‘demon’). Although Bezler’s father was an ethnic German and his mother was an ethnic Ukrainian, Bezler considered himself Russian. Known for his walrus moustache and explosive fits of rage, he was feared by friend and foe alike. Because of his volatile nature, he was also considered somewhat of a liability by his superiors.
President Marat Bashirov and Governor Valeri Bolotov were the key players in the Luhansk area. Bashirov was a Muscovite who had previously worked as an employee of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs and appeared to have no links to Ukraine; Bolotov had been born in Taganrog, Russia on 13 February 1970 and had participated in a number of conflicts including those in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Karabakh. The key players, however, came and went as their reputation deteriorated. As more and more ‘volunteers’ were called to take up arms, this also attracted criminal elements drawn in by the prospect of free access to weapons and the opportunity to steal and plunder. Girkin by now had reportedly shot two of his own commanders, claiming they were looters. He had also arrested the people’s mayor in Sloviansk.
As ever more mercenary Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Ossetians and Chechen fighters joined the ranks, the armed and often drunk fighters were now frequently regarded as criminal gangs by the people of the region. Driving around in convoys, living in university buildings and hanging around on the streets, the gangs appeared to be much more interested in looting than actively fighting the Ukrainian army. Many citizens claimed these ragtag, aggressive ‘invaders’ were in no way helping the people’s struggle for autonomy and were not even Ukrainian—or Russian for that matter. In Donetsk the question arose whether Borodai or even Girkin was really in charge of the disparate and often chaotic rebels, or were these gunmen actually running the self-proclaimed republic? To ease public opinion, Borodai publicly declared pride in his ‘volunteers’.