When Yanukovych had come to office in 2010 Ukraine was on the verge of bankruptcy, and because the Russians had turned off the gas supply, its population was freezing. After declaring its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the country had begun to forge relationships with its Western neighbours; this had caused relations with the Russians to become complicated and, when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, matters appeared to escalate. Russia shut down the Ukrainian gas supply in a dispute over debts in both 2006 and 2009; Putin also reportedly threatened Ukraine with nuclear attack in 2009 if it joined NATO and this threat pushed relations between the two countries to an all-time low.
At the start of 2009 Russia had refused to offer Ukraine a new gas contract because of a $2.4 billion debt that Ukraine had yet to pay for the gas it had received in 2008. On 1 January 2009, at 10am, Gazprom completely stopped pumping gas to Ukraine, and on 4 January the Russian monopolist offered to pump gas back into the country for twice the amount Ukraine had once paid. Using their own gas reserves, the Ukrainian electricity generators were working to their utmost capacity but, due to sub-zero temperatures, demand was greater than the amount of gas available, so the entire housing and public utilities sectors were soon on the verge of collapse due to unworkable and unliveable conditions. Just before the 2010 elections, the country was suffering terribly and in turmoil.
Shortly after Yanukovych won the elections in 2010, the Ukrainian prosecutor general’s office launched a number of criminal cases against Yulia Tymochenko, among others, for abuse of office concerning a natural gas imports contract signed with Russia in January 2009. These legal proceedings prevented her from normal political activity and from international travel to her allies in the West.
On 11 October 2011 she was officially convicted of embezzlement and abuse of power, sentenced to seven years in prison and ordered to pay the state $188 million. The prosecution and conviction were viewed as politically motivated by many governments. It was evident that for Yanukovych, Tymoshenko remained his pain in the rear end. Forever critical of his actions and intentions, Tymoshenko accused her rival of harbouring plans to sell out to Russia.
On 30 December 2011, Tymoshenko was transferred to the Kachanivska penal colony in the city of Kharkiv. For two years she went on a number of hunger strikes intended as a protest against her incarceration. Even hidden away in such a place, she managed to be an irritant. When Yanukovych went to the EU to propose a business deal, they had demanded that he release her from prison and that she be allowed to travel to Germany before they would consider accepting his proposal.
Most Ukrainians agreed that she should be released, though many were also suspicious as to how she had amassed her wealth. Yanukovych disliked her immensely and when he was asked if he would be inclined to release her, he told the press that Tymoshenko had never once acknowledged his legitimacy as president and had furthermore refused to ask him for forgiveness, thus making it impossible for him to pardon her.
When the stout man headed for the airport on that Saturday morning in November 2013, his rival was still in Kharkiv doing time. But he himself had come a long way from being the barefoot boy once imprisoned and destined for a life of theft and abuse, and he had not forgotten to reward himself handsomely for his ascent.
Just after his presidential victory in 2010, Yanukovych had bought himself a small house in Mezhyhirya, about twenty kilometres from Ukraine’s capital, Kiev. The purchase appeared modest for a president, but the land that came with the small house was anything but paltry. The tiny structure was set on 140 hectares of stunningly beautiful countryside. As soon as Yanukovych managed to secure the property, he started turning the grounds into his own private ‘Neverland’.
The modest home was replaced by a massive three-storey mansion as well as a wooden chalet. The guesthouse, intended to receive presidents and members of state, counted five storeys and was built in a typical Russian style. To amuse his visitors and himself, he built a golf course, a private zoo and saunas. Majestic bridges traversed the river that ran through the estate.
Not many people knew of Yanukovych’s exorbitantly luxurious country home and he was very intent on keeping it that way. Only special guests and friends were invited to his private residence. Realising all too well that his wealth would not go down well with his fellow citizens, who were faced with shortages and poverty on an everyday basis, he did not flaunt his possessions and, for the time being, voters trusted him, hoping their new president would follow the democratic path the country was delicately tiptoeing along.
Yanukovych in fact appeared in no way hostile towards the European Union. To prove this, just after he was elected, he had made his way to Brussels to talk to the then EU president, Herman van Rompuy. But Yanukovych returned from this visit without having signed a European treaty. Estimates indicated that he would need US$160 billion over three years to make up for the trade Ukraine stood to lose with Russia if he turned to the West. The billions would also be useful in cushioning the pain from reforms the EU was demanding. But the EU regarded this sum to be exaggerated and unjustified, and it refused to ask its members to cough up these billions. The US$550 million that Europe had offered Yanukovych, to protect him from the wrath of Moscow, was a slap in the face for the Ukrainian president. The EU trade agreement they had offered would be worth nothing if Putin once again turned off Ukraine’s gas supply.
Moscow had been systematically blocking sales of Ukrainian-produced meat, cheese and confectionery for a number of years. Yanukovych demanded sufficient protection from Europe against any Russian sanctions before he signed anything and was disappointed by what had been offered. Van Rompuy told him that any sanctions from the Soviets would be deemed unacceptable, but Moscow, as a warning, had already started tightening the thumbscrews during the Yushchenko administration. Yanukovych did not think that the EU would be able to do anything about Moscow’s vengeance if it became thoroughly aggravated.
On the other hand, because of his humble roots, Yanukovych liked to be treated with respect and as an equal. During a meeting with the Party of Regions, the biggest pro-Russia political party in Ukraine, he had made it clear that he disliked Russia’s approach to Ukraine and felt he was being treated as a second-rate participant in negotiations. He resented being patronised.
In Brussels, by contrast, he had been treated well by EU officials. In the eyes of Europe, Yanukovych appeared to be the perfect man to persuade Ukraine’s pro-Russian eastern regions to strike up business deals with the West. The EU officials acted as if they would do anything to get him on their side, but they also showed they had reservations about a man whose reputation was considered at least dubious, and at times very questionable.
It was evident that the president of Ukraine was caught between a rock and a hard place. He feared that any treaty with the EU would enrage the Russians, so breaking from their tight grip was no small matter. Ukraine and Russia had much in common; the two countries had been economically, culturally and historically connected for decades. But his people craved democracy and wealth; they wanted clean air and water, safe food and a decent education for their children. Yanukovych knew most of his countrymen were pro-Europe and would not be happy if he did not turn to the West, but he somehow had to also deal with an angry neighbour in the east.