Once the civilian population had been removed from Küstrin, the district administration’s main task was at an end. I then handed over the majority of the staff to the Volkssturm. The remainder were dressed and armed as well as the Wehrmacht could provide. On the orders of the fortress commandant, these 32 men then formed a unit under the title ‘Combat Team Körner’ which was then employed exactly the same as the troops. This team had a specific section to occupy and, in an alert, had to occupy that section with everyone. Nevertheless, the men of the district administration had to work until late at night loading textiles and foodstuffs to be conveyed by the nightly ammunition convoys to Seelow, where they were taken over by the Landeswirtschaftsamt (regional economic office). The textile stocks were almost entirely removed this way, but the foodstuffs were mainly retained in the fortress as, with the closing of the ring, the possibility of transporting them came to an end, and it can be taken for certain that they were destroyed in the subsequent fighting. Apart from this, I had all the cattle, horses, etc. gathered together and sent off from the fortress in treks in order to maintain the people’s food supplies. The men of the district administration thus not only served as brave and courageous soldiers, but also carried out some hard work worthy of recognition.
The fire brigade demonstrated quite exemplary conduct. I agree with the fortress commandant that their commitment to duty was quite unique. Many of the firemen were old men who, for example, on one occasion were on duty day and night for four days without enjoying an hour’s rest. They were in constant danger from enemy artillery, bombers and air attacks.
The police in Küstrin also set an outstanding example. They were always on duty and more prepared to help than the Wehrmacht. In both the last two weeks, when buildings and cellars were being destroyed almost every day, their work saved the lives of several people.
Unfortunately, I saw that the troops were not prepared to assist in this kind of work in their free time. Naturally there were individual exceptions. The whole Küstrin garrison had only a limited fighting capacity. As far as I could determine, the fortress garrison consisted of about one-third policemen gathered in from the Warthegau, one-third of Waffen-SS men, and the final third of soldiers of all branches of the Wehrmacht. They were all mixed up together and did not know each other, lacking unity. There were individual good officers and NCOs to reinforce them, men who gathered others around them and achieved extraordinary things in battle. Unfortunately there were too few of these good soldiers. I believe that the fortress was able to hold out as long as it did mainly due to the Probationary Battalion, which consisted of soldiers with a zest for attack. Apart from this there were companies of potential officers, who also had a fighting spirit that successfully fought several defensive battles. One such potential officer company sustained 90 per cent casualties in an attack on the bucket elevator. Another potential officer company started off with 150 men and ended with only 15. It should be considered whether it is right to commit soldiers selected for leadership qualities en masse, for this way we lose all this officer potential. Nevertheless, there was a need for taking action in Küstrin. There was a feeling among the troops that did not hold back in its criticism of the local military leadership. In my opinion, not everything was in order in the military camp. The SS-Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the Waffen SS held the Oak Leaves and was highly regarded and respected. I got on well with him in the best possible way. He is a National Socialist and values cooperation with the Party. Those around him were not so inspired. His chief of staff, Major Michalski, was a reservist and by career a theologian from a university. He was a very nervous man with no comradely contact with other officers, thoroughly distant, and I had the impression that he opposed the Party. I cannot assess his military capability, but believe that he was not all that good, as some of his actions revealed. The first liaison officer was Captain Lotz, who simultaneously held a pass as a special emissary of the Reichsführer-SS. In official circles he was known as boastful and pompous. I too had the same impression of him. These men were permanently around the general. I was often told that there was a shortage of officers in the fortress. On the other hand, there were many officers with absolutely nothing to do or who had only trifling jobs.
From the start the Volkssturm in Küstrin were engaged militarily. Later the men were withdrawn and used almost exclusively in the construction of defences. For the most part the Volkssturm showed their worth. It was a shame that the men of the Volkssturm were treated as second-class in everything. They often had to change quarters or positions that they had prepared with love and care to make way for the Wehrmacht. Apart from this, their provision of clothing, boots, etc., was very miserly. Most Volkssturm men had only what they stood up in and had no possibility of changing their clothing. The men were used partly to man the defences and partly to build them. This overstress was accepted but was hardly reasonable. As the Volkssturm came completely under the Wehrmacht in action, the question arises whether the district administration is necessary in such a case. The battalion commander received his orders directly from his Wehrmacht superior and also dealt with him directly. The district staff thus sat between two stools. Their work was simply in the notification of dependants and the execution of other formalities for the Volkssturm men. In this direction, it seems to me necessary to have clear relationships.
I therefore think it realistic that either the district staff should be disbanded in emergencies, or that the Wehrmacht superiors should issue their orders via the district staff. Then the battalion commander would have to deal with the Wehrmacht superiors via the district staff.
On the whole it is worth considering whether the Volkssturm should have remained in Küstrin. The defence of a fortress is a completely military task, for which the best and well-trained soldiers are already good enough. After the Volkssturm had been committed to action in the first military thrust and held the enemy until the Wehrmacht could organise proper defensive positions, in my opinion they could have worked on the most important defensive works in the fortress. Their further employment in the rear of the front would have been more appropriate. I have left unmentioned that during the first five weeks of the siege the Volkssturm men were only poorly armed. It could be anticipated that a breakout attempt by the remains of the garrison would be organised at the end of the battle for Küstrin. It was certain that this action would be allied with physical stress and much fighting and could only be achieved by well-trained soldiers. The predominantly old men of the Volkssturm were thus a hindrance and would also largely not survive the fall of Küstrin.
I remained with my district staff in Küstrin to the last hour and was militarily engaged with all my men in accordance with the commandant’s orders. At least the intention was correct, but it was of no significance. It remains to be considered whether the political leadership should be withdrawn in the future once their actual task has been accomplished. One likes to put one’s men at the disposal of the Wehrmacht, but even the Wehrmacht had already withdrawn their own administrative offices from Küstrin to Seelow or Müncheberg weeks before. This was annoying to the unwilling ones among the soldiers, but was necessary and useful. The bakery, abattoir, etc. could not continue operating under constant bombardment and lack of working space. They continued their duties in Seelow and Müncheberg and administered the supply of the Küstrin garrison from there. These supplies ceased at the point when the ring around Küstrin became completely closed. The district staff remained an inexplicable presence in Küstrin during the fighting. We were well established with the Wehrmacht and carried out some important work in saving textiles and foodstuffs for the Reich but, as a result of many requests, our role was gradually taken over entirely by the Wehrmacht. Until the men of the district staff were accepted by the Wehrmacht for rationing purposes, it was not easy for them. This was because we were not accepted as members of the Wehrmacht. After the district staff lost their bunker yet again in the last days from a direct hit, and had to find themselves new accommodation, it became impossible. In battle the Wehrmacht is always more important. Quite often we were asked: ‘What are you doing here? You have already done your job.’ I always replied that the person posing the question would very probably have been the one to shout loudest and shake his head over cowardly political leadership if we had not been there.