After most of my men had lost even the poorest items of their clothing, despite my protests to the fortress commandant it was still impossible to get them new clothing. This was partly because the uniforms were at an end, but the main reason was because, on the orders of the commandant, the officers and Wehrmacht officials regarded the district staff as unimportant in the combat area and made no effort to supply them with the necessary items.
When officials and their associates or even those of other important roles (Reichs Post, town administration, etc.) are requested or expected to remain in the combat area to the last shot, then the Wehrmacht should be given an explicit order to treat these men exactly as their own soldiers.
In general, however, I can say that the presence of a political leader until the last minute within the Küstrin fortress worked positively with regard to the Wehrmacht, Volkssturm, etc. One noticed that the soldiers when visited suddenly in their positions expressed surprise and pleasure at seeing a brown uniform. It was especially so when firing broke out during a visit. If one took the first good rifle in one’s hands and joined in without suddenly curtailing the visit, one had the soldiers feeding out of one’s hand and could do with them as one liked. On such visits the soldiers did not know how they should respond to ‘all the best’. Mostly I came away with a rich donation for the WHW [Winter Relief Fund]. In one visit to Second-Lieutenant Hollmann’s platoon, I came away with a donation of RM 4,000, which meant that every soldier in this little unit had contributed RM 120. Almost always one had to promise to return. My relationship with many of the officers was much the same. I was, and remained until the end, a free person to whom the officers could speak freely and openly whatever had to be said. While the officers had to follow their paths of duty and not waver from setting a good example, they often came to me with their thoughts and concerns. This did not involve personal matters but only concerned the basic faults in the military leadership that they could see. SS-Gruppenführer Reinefarth was always grateful for advice on such matters, although he never or seldom expressed his thoughts to me. An uncomfortable troublemaker remained, if the reports were accurate, among those officers around the Gruppenführer.
So the battle for Küstrin continued. The enemy artillery fire, air attacks, etc., became ever stronger. Our own situation regarding ammunition, foodstuffs, etc., was frequently affected. More and more vehicles and weapons were knocked out and supplies became scarcer. Every day the fortress suffered a large loss of men. Care for the wounded, despite the superhuman efforts of the doctors, was always very scanty. Again and again new cellars had to be found for the wounded, until they too were knocked out and hardly any accommodation could be found for them. For those men remaining in combat, the whole ten weeks of the battle for Küstrin were an undesirable test of the nerves. It was not only enemy action, but the fact that no help was coming from outside, and at the end we could do absolutely nothing about the enemy aircraft, which depressed everyone. There were also many cases of death among the soldiers, policemen, firemen, etc., due to heart attacks and other natural causes.
So the day came for Küstrin when the ‘corridor’ was closed. This ‘corridor’ involved not just a drivable route, but included a narrow strip of land that German troops had held free until then and through which the convoys brought ammunition every night. Because of the state of the ground, this route could only be used by tracked vehicles. This meagre last connection with the outside world also fell, despite the anticipated help from outside, and the constant hope it gave to the Küstrin troops that one day the main road from Küstrin to Seelow would be fought free again. The men were simply shattered by this misfortune, and the feeling spread that Küstrin had long since been written off, and that all their efforts and courage had been for nothing. One should also particularly recall that no field post had been arriving in Küstrin. The Volkssturm men for the most part knew nothing about the fate of their families. The field post traffic had slowly died out, and was soon at an end with this closure. The confidence of the soldiers sank even lower when they were told that it was no longer possible to retain this small connection for supplies, and that it was no longer possible for the Wehrmacht to undertake the relief of Küstrin. But at the same time the Küstrin troops came to terms with the idea that their fate was as good as sealed. No one doubted that he would have to fight to the death in the fortress. As soon as a Wehrmacht vehicle appeared on the streets, Russian aircraft shot it up. One result from all the casualties was that more effort was demanded from those remaining. They were all overstressed and overfatigued. A new unrest set in when the Russians shelled the Oder Bridge connecting the two parts of the Altstadt fortress and rendered it unusable. The fate of the fortress appeared to be sealed from day to day. One had no doubt that, if the Russians made a determined attack with their vast superiority, they would take the Altstadt without too much difficulty. On the other hand, the core elements of the fortress troops were tough enough to fight to the last bullet and use their assault knives if necessary.
On the 22nd March the day began with an unusually strong artillery barrage. This was followed by several attacks by the Russians coming from all sides, but they were beaten back. This was repeated in the days to come. If the enemy artillery was not firing, their aircraft were over Küstrin.
On the 25th March there was a concentrated artillery bombardment on the north-eastern part of the Altstadt from all points of the compass. It was immediately clear that this part of the town had been targeted. The uninterrupted bombardment by weapons of all calibres lasted five hours. Then came the enemy aircraft in several waves dropping German bombs of the heaviest kind. Duds lying around confirmed the German origin of these ten-hundredweight bombs. The Wehrmacht observation posts reported 165 enemy aircraft. After these heavy bombs had been dropped, more aircraft arrived and dropped phosphor canisters, setting light to everything.
On the 26th March and during the preceding night, the concentrated bombardment was repeated on the north-eastern part of the Altstadt as far as the Marktplatz, including the town hall. During the night of the 26th/27th March the artillery continued to fire on the burning part of the Altstadt. Whenever it stopped, the enemy aircraft prevented the fire brigade from putting out the flames with their machine guns. This part of the town was reduced to the ground and most of the cellars were destroyed.