and others, in order to ruin this war (using “fighting fire on fire” method) forestally organize Georgia military venture at S. Ossetia, thus after armed conflict with Russia Georgia becomes unsuitable for using in USA war against Iran.
2.4. “Tough patriots”: in Russia and in USA
However, side by side with this, not all “true patriots” in Russia understand that this Russian military-politic victory doesn’t “appear out of the blue” or “happen by itself” to Dmitry Medvedev’s and Vladimir Putin’s delight and despite of their intentions, which, – according to opinion of “true patriots”, – think only about how to enter “the world association” by themselves and to finally “surrender Russia to their bosses from the West”. This Russian military-political victory was made ready namely by post-Yeltsin regime, which represents the result of many years purposeful activity of one of internal KGB[16] mafia, which created present regime at post-Yeltsin Russia.
Generally speaking, in order to be true patriot, but not a “tough patriot”, it is necessary to cultivate global-strategic thinking.
“Tough patriots” trouble and danger for people is instantly that according to lack of global-strategic thinking they easily may be involved in this or that “trickery” in channel of strategies hostile to their motherland. This concerns not only “tough patriots” from RusZionia, but also from all other countries.
Essentially this became nervousness subject of Zbignew Brzezinski – “elite”-patriotic American with Polish roots US national security advisor to J. Carter, and also hater of Russia and follower of US complete world dominion conception. While having global-strategic thinking, Brzezinski for many years is displeased with George W. Bush’s administration policy.
“Bush’s and his encirclement’s nearsighted and non-professional actions at world arena threaten to follow USA to break-up”
“Administration’s recklessness will bring politic benefits to USA main geopolitical r i vals – Russia and China”
Even now Zbignew doesn’t change these estimations maiden in 2005.
And though Zbignew Brzezinski as US “elite” patriot is right in his estimations of George Bush Junior administration policy consequences, but Bush’s administration carries out namely that policy, because it is also a puppet – not concerning some third world power, but concerning “world backstage – world hidden forces”. “World backstage” works out on global scale: for this purpose USA have to create global significance revolutionary force – “Islamic” caliphate, – to begin with Afro-Eurasian and primarily nuclear-armed (Pakistan has nuclear weapon); and to let this psycho-Trotskyist [i.e. revolutionary; from the term “permanent revolution” by Lev Trotsky] “caliphate” appear, it is necessary to bring down states of traditional Islam — George W. Bush administration is obliged to do this after September 11, 2001 (9/11). The administration is doing it with obstinacy, which may be used to better things, and despite of common Americans wishes, which don't understand what is going on and majority of them think that Bush just “behaves in a queer way” according to his weak-mindedness and alcoholic past.
3. Russia’s main problem
However, in the history of centuries-old battle for development of originality of multinational Rus’ Civilization military-politic victory over USA at South Ossetia on August 2008 as to its importance and long-term consequences is just one of many “local importance” fights. And itself it is not rather important, if the basis of Russia' policy has no global strategy of victory and equally no own conception of globalization.
In particular, there wasn’t qualitative military-technical superiority over Georgian party during military actions at South Ossetia.
This is straight consequence of that social-economic policy, leaded by Boris Yeltsin’s regime during all 1990-s, resulted in degradation of military-industrial complex (MIC) schools and design offices. And it is necessary to rise them up from almost nought.
But this is only upper layer of military-technical character problems. Deeper layer problems are that Russian MIC fell into stagnation before the beginning of Perestroika. As a result, many models of military weapons and equipment, with low level of unification and standardization and not defined purpose according to military actions tactics and strategy, were designed and adopted. Besides that, Russian MIC lost arms race against USA and NATO by many military equipment characteristic parameters.
But there are also consequences of even deeper layer of problems: of moral-worldview character. They resulted in non-adequateness of world-understanding and of management, organizational, technological, scientific, technical and all other decisions on society life worked out on base of wrong world-understanding.
The Soviet MIC at Stalin times developed to correct direction, but before 1970-s beginning it deviated in its development to bureaucratism, dynasty careerism, and in technical sphere — unsystematic imitation and non-system “asymmetric” answers to potential enemy.
Society can’t conceal information of instant strategic significance: it imprints on all production, – though not everyone can read it (it is necessary to see the worked with its completeness and integrity and to select indeed significant facts).
Russia’s main problem is that everything from the very beginning must be done in the best way, everywhere in common to all global significance strategy according to full function of management – not under governor’s indications, but under initiative by provinces.
All this demands for domination of different moral, different ethics, different culture of personal psychic activity in society.
While lacking these, after failure of certain operations against Russia its enemies may just “procrastinate” undertaking some demonstrations of power – real or illusive. As answer to these demonstrations RusZion ruling “elite” by its unsystematic copying of foreign elaborations and by fussy unsystematic “asymmetric” answers (not laying in channel of any global-politic strategy) would turn by itself Russia’s past victories and preconditions to new victories into Russia’s future defeats.