The U.S. also had two major naval anti-submarine bases in the area — one in Pensacola and another in Key West, Florida. Helicopters equipped with sonar buoy detection devices were on Gulf stand-by and regular anti-sub patrols were increased. The air recognizance patrols were designed to cover areas not covered by the SOSUS detection system. Apparently these systems failed to pick up the Russian submarine, perhaps because it got so close to the Mississippi coast line.
At this time the U.S. strongly suspected, but did not have confirming proof, that missile parts and other weapons were being transported to Cuba under the disguise of humanitarian food and agricultural equipment as part of new Soviet-Cuban relations.
The Pentagon, Naval Intelligence, the CIA, the NSA, and the FBI were all active in operations involving Cuba, and President Kennedy was being briefed on a daily and sometimes hourly basis.
A critical intelligence question for the Prowfish incident was how the Soviet submarine came so close to the U. S. Coastline without being detected. Another obvious question was what was the submarine doing there. The incident also occurred shortly after the Soviets shot down the Gary Powers intelligence flight over Russian territory. The Soviets contended that they were just sending food and agricultural equipment to Cuba on a purely humanitarian basis. This posture would be severely undermined if a Russian sub were discovered off the coast of Mississippi.
Marks’ and Simon’s meeting with the captain in the forward torpedo room had several agenda items. One was getting printouts of Captain Hodges’ sonar readings and picking Hodges’ brain. His extensive knowledge on sonar signatures would give credibility to his interpretation of those readings.
To get ready for the meeting, Hodges had bunk racks tied back and a table top brought in to create more room to meet and to lay out printouts of sonar readings and maps.
Since he was Naval Intelligence and in charge of the team, Marks did most of the talking. Simon was more of the silent type and chimed in selectively. Neither of the two men had met Hodges before, although both had heard of him and had read most of Hodges’ intelligence memos and profiles before they arrived.
Marks wanted to ensure that Hodges didn’t see the meeting as a witch hunt. To establish rapport, Marks began by talking about some areas of the Navy they had both worked in. Hodges became comfortable and began to brief the two intelligence officers. They first went over Hodges’ detailed printout of sonar readings and charts, showing exactly where the readings took place.
Hodges explained the Prowfish’s advanced electronic systems and both Marks and Simon were impressed with his knowledge. They also spoke about the strange illness that had broken out, the symptoms, and who was affected. Marks wanted to know the onshore medical officer assigned to the problem. Hodges assured them that he had confidence in the scrubbing procedures being used, the food replacement provisions, and the various inspections carried out.
Hopefully another breakout would not occur. He explained he was shorthanded with the crew, but he thought they would be all right. Marks wanted a list of all personnel and replacement personnel, and Hodges said he would forward the list as soon as they had the complete roster.
Hodges laid out a printout of his sonar, radar, infrared and thermal image readings, along with charts plotting where each sonar hit had occurred. Each chart was discussed in detail. Marks and Simon asked lots of questions and listened attentively as Hodges went through his explanations.
Questions were asked in such a way that Hodges did not feel they were questioning his decisions. They needed information, and Hodges was a good teacher. Long and short range sonar readings of the Russian submarine profile showed it by shape to be Hunter-Killer class type and not one of the Soviet’s missile carrying subs. The Russians refer to this class of submarine as Project 613 submarines. NATO classifies this type of Russian sub as a Whiskey class sub, although a number of unusual sonar signature readings brought this classification into question.
The sonar images of the prop cavitations profile were not those of a Whiskey class. The props were estimated by Hodges to be seven or eight-blade props and gave off a different signal than conventional submarine props, more common to Russian nuclear submarines. Other profile characteristics seemed to suggest that it was not a nuclear submarine. There was no reactor heat signature, nor was there the typical noise from the cooling pumps which is always telltale signs of a nuclear submarine. However, the side view underwater sonar profile of the hull seemed to be smaller and more rounded than a Whiskey class sub’s, suggesting it had nuclear sub design, minus the reactor. Hodges looking at the cavitations profile and again suggested that this was definitely a seven or eight-blade profile — a lower profile, more difficult to track when it was increasing or decreasing speed.
The Russians did have a modified electric diesel Whiskey class submarine that carried one or two missiles located in parallel on its deck. These were bulky and inefficient to operate, and the Russians ceased production of them shortly after they began. This submarine’s sonar profile didn’t indicate any missile compartment showing on deck. Captain Hodges explained that the Russian sub did not assume aggressive posture or positioning once it had been detected, even when they approached close torpedo range.
Marks asked, “Are you sure he spotted your boat?”
Hodges replied, “Because of opposing sonar clicks, I believe the sub had detected us, but I can’t be absolutely sure.” He showed them his approach patters and distances data.
Hodges further explained, “Our target used both a straight zigzag and lazy S pattern to avoid detection. I plotted both patterns, when they made their turns, and how they varied their patterns at regular intervals. It was a pattern within a pattern, which I found interesting. The target was able to increase speed at a faster rate than I had estimated.” Hodges’ facial expression indicated that this troubled him. He continued, “In that regard, the target acted like a nuclear sub, but there was no radioactive or cooling signature, which is standard for determining nuclear presence.”
“I can’t assume it’s not nuclear based on its performance. I was unable to confirm either that it definitely was or was not nuclear. My orders from CNO were to consider it nuclear, and I proceeded according to that protocol.”
Marks and Simon both agreed that intelligence suggested that the Russians would not likely launch missiles from the more unstable sub platform when they were so close to having more stable and accurate land-based missiles installed in Cuba.
Marks thought it was possible that they were using a conventional or nuclear missile sub to back up land installations, but he thought that a submarine launch was unlikely. If underwater missiles were detected in the area, the U.S. would immediately react. Marks speculated, “The Russians have intercontinental ballistic missiles they can launch from inside Russia to hit U.S. targets, so why would they risk the less accurate and less reliable submarine strike? There are some puzzles here. We thought we knew within a few square nautical miles where every Russian submarine was deployed. Apparently, we missed this one, and we’re not sure how, but we’ve got ground and Navy Intelligence people all over the question.”