It was his opinion that the men were well trained, but young, and had not been professional spies for very long. He didn’t feel either had been captured before. Both men came from very poor families and the Russians were good at selecting these types of men and filling them with indoctrination on the “evil western powers.” With a little money and time in a Russian-led training camp, they could become Central American Soviet-trained agents within months.
Both men confirmed that the Russian submarine surfaced off the coast of Mississippi on the date and location Simon had suspected. The men were brought to shore on a shrimp boat. The two men told interrogators there were three possible shrimp boats that could meet them. Simon already knew the names of two of the shrimp boats. The existence of a third shrimp boat by the name of Bonnie Q was new information. Simon immediately put the Bonnie Q under surveillance.
The two captives provided the name of the Russian submarine captain. They also confirmed that at one point the Russian captain knew they had been detected by a U.S. submarine. Following the sub’s detection, the two subjects separately recounted that two Russian crewmen dressed in “biological suits” released canisters containing biological material out of the aft torpedoes tubes.
Each man detailed his mission of infiltration and misinformation within his assigned organizations after reaching shore. Both subjects gave the interrogators names and locations of places where they were to make contact with Russian agents in Miami for drops and additional orders. The captives gave information about the Russian training camps in their countries, including locations, who ran them, and how they were staffed and guarded.
When the interrogations were complete, the captives were given water and food and turned over to the FBI, arrested, and charged with espionage. The third member of their team was picked up by the FBI shortly after and charged with the same crimes. With the information from the interrogations, combined with other information obtained from Simon’s covert operatives, the leaders of many of the subversive Cuban organizations were arrested and the organizations were shut down.
Information from the interrogations quickly reached the Task Force. One segment of the Intelligence Task Force was able to piece together the mysterious Soviet submarine puzzle. The target submarine was one of three experimental submarines secretly built to test a new hull design for the Soviets’ new hunter-killer class nuclear submarine that was to become part of Russian’s November Project 627 Kit Class. Of the three experimental submarines, one was lost due to mechanical failure, leaving the Cuban Target sub and her sister boat still on active duty.
The Task Force learned that the sister boat was in a different part of the world. It was immediately added to the Naval tracking system. The Task Force confirmed the Soviet-Cuban Target sub did not carry missiles but was well armed with torpedoes and the latest Russian electronic equipment.
Naval Intelligence still believed that the Russian undersea electronic equipment was not as good as U.S. undersea electronics at the time. The target sub had a shallow draft, which allowed her to get close to shore and display a low profile when on the surface. The three boats were built at the highest Soviet security level under a covered dock at the Russian Severodvinsk Naval Yard.
Naval Intelligence learned that after the Russian submarines had been constructed, the boats were brought out of the covered dock facility submerged under the hull of a surface ship, at night, which shielded them from any possible aircraft surveillance. The Task Force team did not have an explanation as to how the Cuban target sub penetrated the Pensacola, New Iberia, Louisiana, and Key West AWS patrols or the SOSUS system of underwater detection buoys. Members of the Task Force were hard at work trying to find answers to these questions.
While the Miami interrogations were being conducted, information from the Naval Medical Research Laboratory reached Marks, and it was not good news. The new report showed the cause of the infection was a new and particularly virulent strain of botulism which was resistant to antibiotics and which seemed impervious to salt water. In fact, the bacteria thrived in sea water, which meant it could be released from undersea canisters.
The recovery prospects for some of the crew members were not good. After receiving the initial call, Marks turned the information over to Task Force members working on the hazardous material component of the incident for follow-up.
The team learned that the strain of the botulism bacteria was grown on a supportive extracellular matrix biofilm which provided a strong binding substance, allowing it to adhere to the hull of the Prowfish. In the case of the Prowfish incident, the biofilm and its bacterial host were genetically engineered, replicating a substance found on the foot of sea urchins. This substance allows sea urchins, corals, and tubeworms to adhere strongly to rocks on the sea floor or the hulls of ships. The “syringe” antennae produced by the matrix provided the ideal medium for botulism bacteria to quickly grow.
Simon immediately returned to Washington. He and Marks met to discuss the next steps. Marks said to Simon, “Hodges is about to deploy SEAL Team Bravo. Do we make any changes to his orders?”
“No. We need Bravo in place in case the Russian’s don’t back down from the president’s upcoming position. Hodges will soon be tracking the Russian sub again, and I’m wondering how much of the new information should be communicated to him.”
Marks said, “He needs some of the new information to complete his mission, but I don’t think we should communicate details he doesn’t need to know.”
Simon agreed and Marks asked Simon to draft the message to Hodges. Simon said he would be back with a draft within the hour.
After their meeting Marks pondered, “We now know what the Russian sub’s mission was. Where the hell is it now and what is its current mission?”
27
Hanna was near the end of his duty watch when XO Benson handed Captain Hodges two decoded message from CNO. Hodges opened and read the messages aloud in ear shot of those in the control room. The first message read, “AIRBORNE RECOGNIZANCE IDENTIFIED RUSSIAN MINE SWEEPER OPERATING IN SECTOR 16. VESSEL IS BELIEVED TO BE LAYING MINES ALONG CUBAN SHORE SECTION 16. PROCEED WITH EXTREME CAUTION.”
Hodges commented to Benson, “That’s a new twist.” He opened the second coded message. It only read: “DEPLOY CUTLASS — SECTOR 21 –2300 HOURS.”
Sector 21 was code for specific navigational coordinates given to Captain Hodges before he left port. Hodges asked Benson, “How close are we to the coordinates?”
The XO replied, “About two and a half hours at our current speed.”
Hanna was getting ready to end his duty shift and head to the mess at his assigned chow time. Ben Schneider, sonar operator and Hanna’s friend, also changed duty shifts at this time and they often went to mess together. Captain Hodges waved Hanna and Schneider over to him and said, “Why don’t you two grab some quick chow and return to control. I want you both as lookouts when we surface.”
Hanna and Schneider both nodded and said “Yes, sir,” and quickly made their way to the mess. Both grabbed a tray and got through the mess line quickly and sat down to eat. Tom Guerra, one of the SEAL team members, had a duty schedule similar to Hanna’s. They frequently came to the mess at the same time. Hanna had gotten to know Tom quite well.
Neither Wade nor Schneider uttered a word about the messages they just heard read in the control room. Both knew Hodges’s rule that, “What you hear in the Control Room stays in the Control Room.” This rule especially applied to all who worked in or around the control room.