“Good morning, sir,” Navy Captain Rebecca Rodgers, senior staff officer, Pacific, of J-2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Intelligence Directorate, began. “Captain Rodgers with this morning’s intelligence report. The briefing is classified top secret, sensitive sources and methods involved, not releasable to foreign nationals; the room is secure.” She paused to double-check that the thick mahogany double doors to the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference Center, referred to as the “Tank” or the “Gold Room,” were closed and locked and that the red “Top Secret” lights were on. Rebecca “Becky” Rodgers could feel the tension of the men and women in the Tank that morning, and her news was not going to help to cheer them up one bit.
Captain Rodgers was at the briefer’s podium at the base of the Tank’s large, triangle-shaped conference table where everyone could see her and the screen clearly. It was a most imposing and decidedly uncomfortable spot — seven of the most senior, most powerful military men on the planet watching her, waiting for her, no doubt evaluating her performance every moment. The first few sessions in this room had been devastating for her. But that was a half-dozen crises ago, and it seemed like old hat now. She didn’t need the old trick of trying to imagine the Joint Chiefs naked to get through her nervousness — the fact that she knew something that these powerful men and women did not know was comfort enough.
Present for the briefing was JCS Chairman General Wilbur Curtis; the Vice Chairman, Marine Corps General Mario Lanuza; the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Randolph Cunningham; Commandant of the Marine Corps General Robert Peterson; Air Force Chief of Staff General William Falmouth; and Army Chief of Staff General John Bonneville, plus their aides and representatives from the other J-staff directorates. Curtis insisted on attendance by all Joint Staff members and directorates for these daily briefings — it was probably the only opportunity for the staff to get together as a team during their busy week.
The Chairman sat at the blunted apex of the triangle, with seats available beside him at the head of the table for the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States if they chose to attend, although in his two years of office, the President had never set foot in this place. The four-star Joint Staff members and their aides and staffers sat on the Chairman’s left, the J-staff directorate representatives on the right, and guests and briefers at the base of the triangle near the back. Each seat had a small communications console and computer/TV monitor embedded in the table, which was fed from the giant Global Military Communications, Command, Control, and Intelligence Network operations center on another level of the Pentagon. The back wall of the Tank was a large rear-projection screen. Arranged above it was a series of red LED digital clocks with various times, and several members of the staff, by force of habit after long years aloft or at sea, gave themselves a time hack from those ultra-precise clocks every morning.
“The number-one topic I have for you today is the Philippines and South China Sea incidents,” Rodgers said after concluding her routine force status briefings. “In response to the attack on an oil-exploration barge a few months ago in the neutral zone in the Spratly Island chain, both the Philippines and China have stepped up naval activity in the area.
“Specifically, the Chinese have not added any new forces except for a few smaller shallow patrol boats. They have a very strong contingent there, including the destroyer Hong Lung, which carries the Hong Qian-91 surface-to-air missile system, the Fei Lung-7 and Fei Lung-9 antiship missile systems, and a good complement of dual-purpose guns. Additionally, they have two frigates, four patrol boats, some minesweepers, and other support vessels. They usually detach into three smaller patrol groups, with a missile craft leading two groups and Hong Lung and its escorts comprising the third. Vessels from the South Sea fleet, headquartered at Jhanjiang, rotate with the ships about once per month; however, Hong Lung rotates very seldom. Their base on Spratly Island is very small, but they can land medium-size cargo aircraft there to resupply their vessels.
“The Filipinos have substantially increased their presence in the Spratly Islands following the attack on the oil barge. They have sent two of their three frigates into the disputed area and are now patrolling their section vigorously with both sea and air assets.
“But despite the naval buildup, the Philippine naval fleet is practically nonexistent,” Rodgers concluded. “All of their major combatants are old, slow, and unreliable. The crews are generally not well trained and rarely operate more than a day’s cruise away from their home ports.”
“So without the United States forces to back them up, they’re sitting ducks for the Chinese,” Admiral Cunningham said.
“Sir, the Chinese fleet is not that much more advanced than the Philippine fleet, at least the vessels that operate near the Spratly Islands,” Rodgers said. “Most are small, lightly armed patrol boats. The exception, of course, is the flagship, Hong Lung. It is without question the most capable warship in the entire South China Sea, comparable in performance to U.S. Kidd-class destroyers but faster and lighter. The frigates are heavily armed as well; most have HQ-61 SAM missiles, which would be very effective against the Filipino helicopters and may even be capable against the Sea Ray antiship missile. All are comparable in performance to U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates, except without helicopter decks or the sophisticated electronics.
“The main Chinese offensive thrust would obviously be their overwhelming ground forces — they could land several hundred thousand troops in the Philippines in very short order,” Rodgers concluded. “Although we generally classify the Chinese Navy as smaller and less capable than ours, their naval forces are very capable of supporting and protecting their ground troops. An amphibious assault on the Philippines by the Chinese would be concluded very quickly, and it would push the necessary threshold of an American counterstrike to very high levels — very much along the lines of our DESERT SHIELD deployment, although without the advantage of forward basing.”
“So if the Chinese want to take the Spratly Islands, there’s not much we could do about it,” General Falmouth summarized.
“Sir, at the current force levels in the area, if the Chinese wanted to take the Philippines, there would be little we could do about it…”
There was a very animated murmur of voices at that comment. Curtis was the first to raise his voice above the others: “Wait one, Captain. Is this a J-2 assessment or an opinion?”
“It is not a directorate finding, sir, but it is nevertheless a statement of fact,” Rodgers replied. “If they so decided, it would take the People’s Liberation Army Navy less than a week…
“Ridiculous…”
“They wouldn’t dare…”
“Absurd…”
“According to the directorate’s preliminary report, sir,” Rodgers explained, getting their attention, “if the Chinese captured five strategic military bases — the naval facilities at Subic Bay and Zamboanga, the Air Force bases at Cavite and Cebu, and the Army base at Cagayan de Oro — and if they defeated Second Vice President Samar’s militia at Davao, they could secure the entire country.” She paused, then looked directly at them. “Gentlemen, the New Philippine Army is nothing more than a well-equipped police force, not a defense force. They have relied on the United States for its national defense — and obviously would have to again, if the need arose. General Samar’s Commonwealth Defense Force is a well-trained and well-organized guerrillafighting force, but they cannot stand up against a massive invasion. The Chinese have a thirty-to-one advantage in all areas.”