The U-2 is a high altitude, single seat, reconnaissance aircraft. Up to now, it was my unreachable star because I hadn’t met the qualifications. One of the requirements for flying the U-2 was having at least 1000 hours of jet time. An additional requirement stated that the applicant had to have aircraft commander experience in at least two different airplanes. My T-38 IP job gave me over 1100 hours of jet time and it was my second aircraft commander job. Now I had the qualifications needed for this dream job.
The U-2 was my top choice but I had other options in case my application was rejected. I could go back to the C-130 or fly the F-15 fighter aircraft. The F-15 was a great airplane but the location would be in Alamogordo, New Mexico, which was terrible. All my hopes were riding on the U-2 since the other options were unattractive.
There were several reasons I wanted into the U-2 program. It met my single engine, single seat criteria. It was the most challenging airplane in the world to fly, I was fascinated by its history, and it had an important mission.
In 1977 the airplane was no longer flying over hostile territory. Through the development of technology and satellite usage we no longer had to fly over dangerous areas. Cameras had been developed that could peer sideways into a country and did so with amazing resolution. The true value of the U-2, that is still true today, is its unpredictability. Bad guys knew when the satellites would be overhead, but they never knew when the U-2 would show up.
Chapter 2
The U-2 was a technical marvel and it played an important role in world political events. The Cold War era was synonymous with the U-2.
The U-2 program started in the early 1950’s. The U.S. military wanted to keep an eye on Soviet arms development post World War II. Russia had gone from being an ally during the war to being a threat after the war ended. In the early 1950’s the best intelligence we had on the interior of the Soviet Union was from captured German Luftwaffe photos taken during the war. These photos only showed the territory west of the Ural Mountains. This lack of knowledge of Soviet capabilities prompted a call for overflights of Soviet airspace. The Soviet air defenses aggressively attacked all aircraft near its borders. The existing reconnaissance aircraft, primarily bombers converted for reconnaissance duty, were vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery, missiles and fighters. Richard Leghorn of the U.S. Air Force suggested that an aircraft flying above 65,000 feet should be safe from the MIG-17. The MIG-17 was the Soviet’s best interceptor but it could barely reach 45,000 feet. Leghorn and others believed that Soviet radar could not track high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Leghorn’s belief, however, was based on outdated intelligence. Since the war the Soviets had improved their radar technology and were able to track aircraft over 65,000 feet.
The highest-flying airplane in the 50’s was the English Canberra, which could reach 48,000 feet. The U.S. version of the Canberra was the B-57. The Americans modified the B-57 with longer, thinner wings, new engines, and a lighter-than-normal airframe, which enabled it to reach 67,000 feet.
U.S. Air Force (USAF) planners reasoned that an aircraft that could fly at 70,000 feet would be safely beyond the reach of Soviet fighters, missiles and radar. In 1953 another USAF officer, John Seaberg, proposed building an aircraft that could reach this height over a target with a 1500 nautical mile operational radius. The USAF decided to only solicit designs from smaller aircraft companies that could give the project the attention it deserved. The USAF gave contracts to Bell Aircraft, Martin Aircraft, and Fairchild to develop proposals for the new reconnaissance aircraft. Officials at Lockheed heard about the project and decided to submit an unsolicited proposal. Lockheed executive, John Carter (not a relative) suggested that the design eliminate landing gear and avoid combat load factor requirements. These two items would save weight and increase altitude.
Lockheed asked Clarence “Kelly” Johnson to come up with such a design. Johnson was Lockheed’s best aeronautical engineer. He was responsible for the P-38, the P-80, and the F-104. He was also known for completing projects ahead of schedule. He worked in a separate division of the company called “The Skunk Works.” This strange name was originated by one of Johnson’s engineers. This team engineer, Irv Culver, was a fan of Al Capp’s newspaper comic strip, “Lil Abner” in which there was a running gag about a mysterious and smelly place deep in the forest called the “Skonk Works.” There, a strong tonic called Kickapoo Joy Juice, was brewed from skunks, old shoes and other weird ingredients. One day, Culver’s phone rang and he answered it by saying “Skonk Works, inside man Culver speaking.” Fellow employees quickly adopted the name for their secret division of Lockheed. “Skonk Works” became “Skunk Works” and the once informal nickname is now the registered trademark of the company.
Johnson’s design was called the CL-282. Johnson started with an F-104 fuselage. The F-104 Starfighter was basically a big engine with small, fin-like wings, and was affectionately known as the “missile with a man in it,” which describes it perfectly. To this dart-like fuselage, Johnson attached long, glider-like wings and used a General Electric J-73 engine to power the airplane. The resultant aircraft was a jet-powered glider. It took off from a dolly, landed on skids, and could reach 70,000 feet with a 2,000-mile range. The USAF rejected Kelly’s design in favor of the Bell X-16 and the modified B-57. Their reasons for the rejection were: lack of landing gear, and the use of the GE-73 engine instead of the more proven Pratt and Whitney J-57.
Some high officials in the USAF favored the CL-282 because of its higher potential altitude and smaller radar cross section. These officials recommended the design to the CIA. The CIA looked at the design and told the Intelligence Systems Panel, a civilian group advising the USAF on aerial reconnaissance, about the CL-282. Aspects of its design that the USAF saw as flaws appealed to the panel.
Edwin Land, the father of instant photography, and also a member of the panel, proposed to the CIA that they should fund and operate the aircraft. CIA Director Allen Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA conduct its own overflights. Land told President Eisenhower about the aircraft and Eisenhower agreed with Land that the CIA should operate the aircraft. Dulles finally agreed with the President. Meanwhile Seaburg helped persuade USAF to support the CL-282, but with the higher performance J-57 engine. Final approval for the joint CIA-USAF project came in November 1954. Funding came from the CIA, which used un-vouchered government money.
Lockheed received a $22.5 million contract in March of 1955 for the first 20 aircraft, with the first $1.26 million mailed directly to Johnson’s home in February 1955 to keep work going during negotiations. Lockheed agreed to deliver the first aircraft by July and the last one by November 1956. Lockheed delivered at $3.5 million under budget because the aircraft was based on the F-104; only the wings, tail and landing gear were different.
Procurement of the aircraft’s components occurred secretly. When Johnson ordered altimeters calibrated to 80,000 feet from a company whose instruments only went to 45,000 feet, the CIA set up a cover story involving experimental rocket aircraft. Shell Oil developed a new low-volatility, low vapor pressure jet fuel that would not evaporate at high altitudes. This fuel became known as JP-7. Due to the commonality of the ingredients in JP-7 and Flit, a Shell insect repellent, manufacturing several thousand gallons of JP-7 for the CL-282 in 1955 caused a nationwide shortage of Flit. Shell had no comment about the cause of the shortage.