The CL-282 was renamed the U-2 in July 1955. The “U” referred to the deliberately vague designation “Utility” instead of “R,” the normal designation for reconnaissance aircraft. The U-1 and U-3 already existed, so the U-2 was chosen. The joint CIA-USAF project was called Project Dragon Lady.
The USAF sought to take total control of the project but President Eisenhower was opposed to military personnel flying the aircraft. USAF recruited pilots for the program but they had to resign their military commissions before joining the agency as civilians. The program offered high salaries and the USAF promised that pilots could return to their units at their former ranks when their U-2 duties ended.
On August 1, 1955, the first flight occurred at Groom Lake, a salt flat in Nevada on the north side of Area 51. The test pilot, Tony LeVier, was only supposed to do a high-speed taxi. The wings were so efficient that the aircraft became airborne at 70 knots. On August 8, the aircraft flew on purpose and reached 32,000 feet. By August 16, it reached 52,000 feet, an altitude never before reached in sustained flight. By September 8, it reached 65,000 feet. Testing continued with eight overflights in the United States. By April 1956 the project leaders were convinced that the aircraft was ready for actual deployment.
A committee of Army, Navy, USAF, CIA, NSA, and State Department representatives created lists of priority targets for the aircraft. The U-2 project received the list, drew up flight plans, and the committee provided a detailed rationale for presidential approval.
With approval from the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), the CIA developed a cover story for the U-2 that described the aircraft as a high altitude weather research plane. The cover story would be used if the aircraft were lost over hostile territory. To support the story, U-2s took weather photos that appeared in the press.
Some advisors disagreed with the cover story. They believed that if the U-2 was lost, the U.S. should acknowledge its use as prevention against surprise attacks. This advice was not followed and the weather cover story led to the diplomatic disaster that followed the downing of a U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers in May of 1960.
President Eisenhower worried that overflights of the Soviet Union might cause a war. While the U-2 was under development, Eisenhower proposed to Khrushchev that the Soviet Union and the U.S. should grant each other access to airfields to photograph military installations. Khrushchev rejected this “Open Skies” policy. Meanwhile, the CIA told Eisenhower that the Soviets could not track the U-2. The CIA belief was based on old Soviet radar systems, which were not as effective at high altitudes as current Soviet systems. CIA Director Dulles also told Eisenhower that if an aircraft were lost, the pilot would almost certainly not survive. For all of these reasons, Eisenhower approved 10 days of overflights.
The first overflight of hostile territory covered Poland and East Germany in June 1956. The first Soviet overflight was on July 4, 1956. The main target was the Soviet submarine construction program in Leningrad. The next flights overflew both Moscow and Leningrad searching for “Bison” bombers and rocket factories. The U.S. intelligence community feared that the Soviets were outbuilding us in bombers, creating what came to be known as the “Bomber Gap.”
The CIA found that the Soviets could not consistently track the U-2s so the Soviets didn’t know that Moscow and Leningrad had been overflown. The U-2s’ photos showed images of MIG-15s and MIG-17s attempting and failing to intercept the aircraft. This strengthened the CIA’s belief that the Soviets could not shoot down a U-2.
The Soviets protested the overflights. The U.S. replied that no American military planes had overflown Soviet territory. The Soviet protest showed that they could track the U-2 for extended periods and this caused Eisenhower to halt the overflights. The eight overflights had already shown that a “Bomber Gap” did not exist, but because the Eisenhower Administration could not disclose the source of its intelligence, congressional and public debate over the supposed bomber gap continued.
In May 1957, the President again authorized overflights over certain important soviet missile and atomic facilities. Eisenhower personally authorized each flight. Lockheed meanwhile, painted the U-2 in a blue-black color that helped it blend against the darkness of space.
In April 1958, The CIA concluded that the U-2 project had a security leak. The source of the leak was never identified, but it was speculated that Lee Harvey Oswald, then a radar operator at a U-2 base in Japan, was the source.
The Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957 gave credence to claims of a missile gap between the Soviets and the United States. Some claimed the Soviets might have a three-to-one advantage in ICBMs (InterContinental Ballistic Missiles). The concern over the missile gap caused Eisenhower to reauthorize one Soviet overflight as well as many electronic intelligence gathering (ELINT) flights along the Soviet border. These missions could not confirm or deny the missile gap and Eisenhower authorized one overflight in April 1960. The Soviets, with their advanced radar, were able to quickly track this flight. But despite the greater risk now, the CIA failed to stop the overflights because of overconfidence from the years of successful missions. Eisenhower authorized one more overflight to occur no later than May 1, 1960 because the important Paris Summit would begin May 16.
The 24th deep penetration Soviet overflight occurred on May 1, 1960. It was an ambitious flight plan crossing the Soviet Union. The flight launched from Peshawar, Pakistan, and was to land in Bodo, Norway. Previous flights had always exited in the direction from which they originated. Francis Gary Powers, the most experienced pilot with 27 missions flown, was chosen to fly. The Soviets began tracking the U-2 15 miles outside the border. Over Sverdlovsk, 4 ½ hours into the flight, one of three SA-2 missiles detonated behind the aircraft at 70,000 feet. Another missile hit a Soviet interceptor attempting to reach the U-2. Powers’ aircraft was disabled by the missile blast and because of transverse “G” forces he was unable to reach the plane’s self-destruct mechanism. He ejected, parachuted to the ground and was quickly captured. The crash did not destroy the U-2 and the Soviets were able to identify much of the equipment. The CIA knew none of this.
The CIA, believing that a U-2 crash would not be survivable, used the pre-existing cover story. On May 3, NASA (the successor to NACA) announced that one of its aircraft, making a highaltitude research flight in Turkey, was missing. It stated that a “weather plane” had strayed off course after its pilot had oxygen difficulties.
By remaining silent, Khrushchev lured the Americans into reinforcing the cover story until he revealed on May 7 that Powers was alive. Eisenhower publicly took full responsibility for the incident on May 11. The Paris Summit collapsed after Khrushchev demanded an apology from the U.S., which Eisenhower refused.
Powers confessed after months of extensive interrogation. In August 1960, he was convicted of espionage and sentenced to three years of prison followed by seven years of hard labor. In February of 1962, Powers was exchanged for Russian spy Rudolf Abel.
Powers returned home but he was criticized for failing to activate the self-destruct system, which would have destroyed the camera, the film, and the classified parts of the airplane. Some officials also criticized him for not using an optional CIA suicide pin hidden inside a hollowed out silver dollar. The CIA, USAF, and Lockheed debriefed Powers extensively. He appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee. They determined that Powers had followed orders, had not divulged any critical information to the Soviets, and had conducted himself “as a fine young man under dangerous circumstances.”
Powers took a job with Lockheed as a test pilot from 1963 to 1970. In 1970, he wrote a book titled “Operation Overflight: a Memoir of the U-2 Incident.” The book cast negative publicity on the CIA and Lockheed fired him. He eventually got a job with KNBC, Los Angeles, as a helicopter pilot.