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Seizing on Battlegroup von Luck of the 21st Panzer Division, which had only reached him that day, he promptly took it under his immediate command. This battlegroup consisted mainly of Colonel Hans von Luck’s 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment, accompanied by the remaining Panther tanks of 22nd Panzer Regiment. Busse’s plan was for two armoured battlegroups to break out simultaneously, secure the nodal point of Baruth and obtain use of the roads leading west from there to Jüterbog and Luckenwalde. These attacks would be led by Battlegroup von Luck from Halbe and Battlegroup Pipkorn from further south.

Busse’s orders to von Luck were as follows:

Tonight at 2000 hours you will attack with your battlegroup and all available armoured vehicles allocated to you westward over the Dresden–Berlin autobahn in the Luckenwalde area in the rear of the 1st Ukrainian Front attacking Berlin. The break-out point is to be kept open to enable the following elements of the 9th Army to reach the west on foot. This is not open to the civilian population: thousands of refugees would hamper the operation.[16]

Similarly, Battlegroup Pipkorn, led by SS-Colonel Rüdiger Pipkorn, and consisting of the remains of his 35th SS Police Grenadier Division and the remaining tanks of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, was to strike out westward from Schlepzig, north of Lübben. Pipkorn happened to be an old friend of von Luck’s from their recruit days, but had more recently been compulsorily transferred as a General Staff officer to the Waffen-SS.

By 1900 hours several tanks had arrived to join von Luck’s battlegroup, including some small, fast Hetzer tank-hunters. Ammunition was loaded and fuel shared out, but as no supply trucks were to accompany them, their capacity for fighting and movement was limited to what they were now carrying. These preparations could not go unnoticed and by nightfall some hundreds of women and children with their primitive carts and baggage had gathered round, and von Luck did not have the heart to turn them away.

They set off at 2000 hours, their first objective being Baruth, the important traffic junction astride the swampy bottom of the Nuthe glacial valley. When they reached the Berlin–Dresden autobahn, they found individual Soviet supply trucks on it, heading for the capital, so road blocks were established north and south of the crossing point.

There were then (no longer) two bridges across the autobahn south of the Teupitz–Halbe exit, the southernmost of which had been blown. From there one of the original tracks connecting the villages before the forestry grids were imposed led in a shallow S to Baruth. von Luck’s force made good progress, despite having to traverse these woodland tracks and fire breaks in the dark. Whenever the tanks stopped the civilians would close up behind and wait for the next move.

In order to reach the Juterbog road, von Luck would have to seize, pass through and hold Baruth, as the valley bottom that the town straddles is otherwise virtually impassable to tanks because of the network of irrigation ditches running through the water meadows.

They reached the outskirts of Baruth at about midnight but, as they emerged cautiously from the woods, they suddenly came under heavy anti-tank and machine-gun fire. Clearly the Soviets had anticipated a break-out attempt at this point. The defences here included some Josef Stalin heavy tanks which had been dug in so that only their turrets were exposed. The Stalin tank was superior in armour to anything the Germans had, its only known weakness being the time it took to reload its formidable 122mm gun. These tanks effectively blocked the line of advance, so Colonel von Luck decided to wheel his battlegroup round to the right and then send in his Panzergrenadiers to take the town from the north, this appearing to be the easiest break-out route, providing he did not get involved in lengthy fighting that would give the Soviets time to reinforce their positions.

Just then some Panthers of Battlegroup Pipkorn appeared from the east. The southern group’s attack from its positions near Schlepzig in the Upper Spreewald had also begun at about 2000 hours, but proved unsuccessful. When the leading elements reached the defensive positions of 329th Rifle Division, they had encountered heavy fire and come under repeated flank attacks, which gave them a severe mauling and caused the leading elements to scatter. Only a few individual groups actually got as far as the autobahn near Staakow, where the bridge crossed the autobahn south of Halbe, and then pushed on via Dornswalde for Baruth.

Despite these welcome reinforcements for the Germans, the Soviets were able to do better and towards dawn it became clear that, with ammunition and fuel rapidly running out, the German troops would be unable to break through. von Luck therefore radioed General Busse informing him of the hopelessness of the situation, together with his decision to continue the attack while the cover of darkness lasted, but that he feared more counterattacks and air attacks with the coming of daylight. Busse ordered the battlegroup to stay where it was, avoid direct attacks and wait for the remainder of 9th Army to catch up.

Instead von Luck summoned his subordinate unit commanders and told them that he had decided to disband his force and give them the opportunity of breaking out in small groups. He himself would return to the pocket with his adjutant, Captain Liebeskind, a liaison officer and a runner to explain his actions. However, as it turned out, Pipkorn was killed during this action and von Luck captured early on 27 April on his way back. Some of his men actually reached the Elbe, but most were either killed or captured.[17]

From Radeland, the nearest village east of Baruth, schoolboy Erwin Hilldebrands reported:

During the fighting Soviet soldiers hid under the roofs, in the sheds and barns, facing north-east, and many foxholes were dug along the eastern edge of the village. In addition, there were some 122-mm artillery pieces also aimed towards the woods. One gun was destroyed and lay on the roadside for weeks. There were over fifty SS dead lying just inside the woods on the right-hand side of the track leading to Neuendorf.

The crew of an unknown type of tank heading towards Baruth from Dornswalde were shot at the entrance to Radeland by the Soviets, their bodies being put into the mass grave with the others mentioned above, the tank crews in their black uniforms being treated as SS.

The northern part of Baruth was attacked by Soviet aircraft on 25 or 26 April, as we could see clearly from the west side of Radeland.[18]

One of the last messages from 9th Army reported at 2230 hours:

…continual air attacks over the whole of the army’s area, heavy losses of men and equipment, as well as considerable changes of route… V Corps attacked towards Baruth with the southern group from the Schlepzig area at 2000 hours. Strong enemy attacks at the moment at Teupitz and Märkisch Buchholz. Following defensive action, northern group attacking from Teupitz and Märkisch Buchholz at about 2400 hours. The southern group has had partial success south of Krausnick. Two bridges under construction over the Dahme. First impressions: the enemy is constantly reinforcing. The army is engaged in heavy defensive fighting along the whole front Schwielochsee– Königs Wusterhausen, with main points at Beeskow and north of Neugolm, Storkow, Zernsdorf.[19]

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16

Von Luck, Gefangener meiner Zeit, pp. 272–3.

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17

Koniev, Year of Victory, p. 168; Lakowski/Stich, Der Kessel von Halbe 1945, pp. 72–96; von Luck, Gefangener meiner Zeit, pp. 272–6.

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18

Schulze, Der Kessel Halbe–Baruth–Radeland, pp. 54–5.

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19

Lakowski/Stich, Der Kessel von Halbe 1945, pp. 91–2 [citing Federal Military Archives RH 19 XV/10, Sheet 334].