SS-Lieutenant Bärmann, who was wounded in the attack, gave an account of this engagement:
Shortly before midday on 28 April we reached the place that we had been ordered to, about three kilometres north-west of Hermsdorf. SS-Sergeant Althaus took up a defensive position with his recovery tank armed with twin machine guns, and soon afterwards the Russians attacked out of the woods from the north-east. While Althaus and other combat capable men of the battalion conducted the defence, some comrades threw me into a Volkswagen jeep and drove deeper into the woods. Most of the vehicles were damaged in the fighting and had to be left behind. A rocket launcher unit fired without pause and gave us some space.
We were then ordered to regroup at the Hammer forestry office…
Low cloud kept the Russian aircraft off us, although some individual, unaimed bombs fell that could not fail to find victims in the closely packed pocket. According to the staff, the pocket now measured three by five kilometres and contained about 30,000 troops and 10,000–15,000 civilians, men women and children.[10]
The Hammer forestry office area was covered by a combat team from Panzergrenadier Division Kurmark that afternoon. On the eastern and southern parts of the perimeter, where the terrain prevented the use of armour, penetrations by Soviet infantry often split the defence, creating small pockets that were inevitably reduced in due course.
For the encircled, the situation in the pocket became ever more chaotic with constant movement, lack of sleep, scarcely enough to eat, contaminated drinking water, unbelievably high casualties and inadequate attention and facilities for the wounded. The 9th Army had no choice but to act or go under. There was now only sufficient ammunition left for another two days and there was absolutely no hope of resupply by air. Although a few of the soldiers were prepared to surrender, the majority were strongly against it. Leaflets, loudspeakers and attempts at negotiation under flags of truce and by civilians organized by the Soviets yielded no significant results.
General Busse belatedly realized that 9th Army had been betrayed and sent a radio message with the content: ‘It seems that the 9th Army is already written off.’[11] Kleinheisterkamp’s independent break-out attempt of that morning must also have come as a form of betrayal to him, but at last seems to have spurred him into taking action himself. However, when one examines his actions, the tardy transfer of his headquarters into the Spreewald indicates an indecisiveness and reluctance to assume responsibility for the break-out to the west, even though he had Hitler’s authority and orders to do so. By the time he reached Hammer on 26 April, the congestion in the area was such that he had little chance of exercising effective control over his subordinates. He had failed to support Battlegroup von Luck’s attempt on 25 April. This, and the apparently independent attempts by subordinate formations stemming from pressure from below, had cost him dearly in armour and fighting troops, severely weakening his chances of a successful mass penetration of the Soviet forces facing him. And then, as we shall see, he placed himself and his headquarters staff immediately behind the strongest armoured spearhead for 9th Army’s break-out, in which his exercise of control became purely local as contact was lost with other units, and the rearguard was abandoned to its fate.
The 9th Army’s very last conference took place at 1500 hours that afternoon, when all available generals and divisional commanders met in a sandpit close to the forestry office at Hammer on Reichsstrasse 179. Following an appraisal of the situation, the decision was made to risk a last break-out attempt and break through to 12th Army. Contact had been lost with the commanders of V Corps and V SS Mountain Corps, so what remained of XI SS Panzer Corps would have to take the lead. The plan was for them to break out to the west in three groups that evening. Those tanks still remaining would pave the way, and General Busse would go with them.
The desperate situation in which the encircled troops found themselves left little choice of action. The officers present at General Busse’s conference were unanimous that the break-out should take place immediately, and that it could only be achieved with the concentrated action of the remaining armoured forces and the whole of the available artillery. There was little enough left; in essence only the reduced Kurmark Division, 502nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion and the few remaining guns and mortars. No participant at the conference could identify any worthwhile break-out route other than through Halbe, which was known to be occupied by strong Soviet units. This almost unknown village would become the eye of the needle through which everyone would have to pass. It was not difficult for the Soviet commanders to work out where the next attack would come, as the German preparations could hardly be concealed from aerial observation, so any possibility of surprise could be ruled out.
There was no information about the Soviet forces. The 9th Army no longer had any facilities for aerial reconnaissance, so knew nothing of what lay outside its perimeter. No one knew anything about the Russian positions, the organization or strength of the opposing troops, nor of the possibility of counterattacks in the depths of the 60-kilometre stretch of wooded country, bounded by the lakes around Zossen and Teupitz in the north and the Hammerfliess stream in the south, through which the already exhausted troops would have to march. It could take days for them to reach 12th Army’s positions near Beelitz.
Meanwhile command and control within the pocket had virtually collapsed. Even the basic military requirement of reliable communications for the conduct of the forthcoming action was lacking. There was now only sporadic radio communication with Army Group Weichsel, and Headquarters 9th Army had only occasional contact with its subordinate formations, none of which was able to establish a stable network. Finally, the lack of maps made it difficult to command the troops in action.
The planning and execution of the breakthrough demanded immediate decisions that had to be made almost blind, contrary to all operational experience. The orders were thus kept correspondingly brief and went directly to the commander of XI SS Panzer Corps: ‘XI SS Panzer Corps will strike the breakthrough breaches. 1800 hours assemble for break-out.’
At this point the command post of this corps was at the Klein Hammer forest warden’s lodge near Hermsdorf. In order to fulfil the task allotted him, SS-General Kleinheisterkamp summoned those of his subordinate commanders who could be contacted to his command post. He decided that the spearhead would be formed by the remains of the Kurmark Division and the 502nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion, split into two wedges. The more northerly one would consist of the remaining Panther tanks of the Kurmark’s Panzer Regiment Brandenburg, now down to less than battalion strength, and other elements of the division. Behind the 502nd in the southern wedge would come HQ 9th Army, HQ XI SS Panzer Corps and HQ Panzergrenadier Division Kurmark. The remaining forces still under command would then follow on behind. What remained of 21st Panzer Division would cover the breakthrough from the north-west, with the remnants of 32nd SS Panzergrenadier Division 30. Januar guarding the east. This formation would provide the rearguard under the divisional chief engineer, SS-Major May, with orders to disengage from the enemy at 0500 hours on 29 April.[12]