General Wenck’s attack had made good progress that day and by the evening the leading elements of Lieutenant-General Engel’s Ulrich von Hutten Infantry Division had reached the village of Ferch at the southern tip of the Schwielowsee, some ten kilometres south of Potsdam, but in so doing reached their operational limit. The 12th Army could only improve its newly won positions a little, while holding on against increasing Soviet pressure, as it awaited the arrival of the others to break through to them. There was some particularly severe armoured fighting around the autobahn fork.
Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Müller led his Schill Division through the Lehniner Forest on the left flank, and a Major Nebel pushed forward with some SPGs along the firebreaks to the very end of the forest, where the Russian armour was waiting and engaged them. However, Nebel’s guns outflanked the danger points to hit the Soviets in their flanks and rear. The sounds of battle carried right through the Lehniner Forest to the lakes and the Potsdam garrison beyond.
Wenck contacted General Reymann of the Potsdam garrison and ordered an immediate break-out to his lines, which was begun that evening and completed the following night, the garrison making its way by boat across the Schwielowsee, or along the shore by foot. Reymann broke through with the leading groups and met up with Lieutenant-Colonel Müller. They silently shook hands before Reymann moved on to report to Wenck’s headquarters. When they arrived, the troops of the Potsdam garrison were then shared out among the Schill and Hutten Divisions as reinforcements.[39]
Wenck then signalled an invitation to General Weidling in Berlin: ‘Counterattacks by 12th Army stalled south of Potsdam. Troops engaged in very heavy defensive fighting. Suggest you break out to us.’ This signal was not acknowledged and it is doubtful if Weidling even received it.[40]
Wenck passed Busse’s message on the state of his troops on to the OKW, which in the meantime had put an end to any chances of relief from this direction by disclosing 12th Army’s dispositions and intentions in the afternoon radio communiqué. This made it even more difficult for 12th Army to hold on to its positions. The army’s situation was already precarious enough in any case with 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and 13th Army trying to cut off its line of retreat to the Elbe. That same evening Wenck’s position was further imperilled by a sudden attack northward towards Wittenberg by American troops bursting out of their bridgeheads in his rear. Fortunately this attack was not pursued, presumably because of the policy imposed from above of not intervening in the Soviet area of operations.[41]
Wenck signalled the OKW again that evening:
The 12th Army, and in particular XX Corps which has temporarily succeed in establishing contact with the Potsdam Garrison, is obliged to turn to the defensive along the whole front. This means that an attack on Berlin is now impossible, since we have also ascertained that we can no longer rely on the fighting capacity of the 9th Army.[42]
During the night Wenck received the following reluctant acknowledgement of the situation by signal from Field Marshal Keiteclass="underline"
If the Commanding General 12th Army, in full knowledge of the current situation at XX Corps, and despite the high historical and moral responsibility that he carries, considers continuing the attack towards Berlin impossible…
Wenck now had a free hand to pursue his own plans.[43]
Hitler himself must have realised that the end was near. Having rejected General Weidling’s desperate break-out plan for the Berlin garrison, he sent the following signal to Colonel-General Jodl that evening:
1. Where are Wenck’s spearheads?
2. When will they resume the attack?
3. Where is the 9th Army?
4. Where is it breaking through?
5. Where are Holste’s XXXXI Panzer Corps’ spearheads?[44]
TWELVE
12th Army Waits
30 APRIL 1945
At 0100 hours on 30 April Field Marshal Keitel replied to Hitler’s signal of the previous evening with:
1. Wenck’s attack has stopped south of the Schwielowsee. Strong Soviet attacks along the whole of his east flank.
2. Consequently 12th Army is unable to continue its attack towards Berlin.
3. & 4. 9th Army is surrounded. An armoured group has broken out to the west; location unknown.
5. Corps Holste has been forced on to the defensive from Brandenburg via Rathenow to Kremmen.[1]
Later General Wenck sent the following radio message to 9th Army: ‘12th Army now engaged in heavy defensive fighting. Speed up your breakthrough. We are waiting for you.’ This was a clear call for haste, for in fact Wenck’s divisions were only holding on to their positions with difficulty.[2]
Erika Menze continued her story of the break-out from Halbe:
At dawn on 30 April we could see how many soldiers there were in the crowds ahead of and behind us. Civilians were scattered between all the groups of soldiers, moving along with them. The rumour was that we would come out near Baruth.
In the middle of the woods was a farmstead, that was said to be the Baruth forest warden’s lodge. We went on for hours, forwards, ever forwards. But there was also some firing, even from the treetops. The soldiers had long lost their will to carry on fighting. They also knew that this war had become nonsensical in the government’s final desperation.
Then came some officers, one here, another further off: ‘Where is your weapon?’ ‘Lost in battle!’ Then the soldiers had to take the officers’ carbines and were ordered up front. One of them did not want to follow orders and was sworn at and threatened with a pistol.
It must have been past midday when we came to Luckenwalde. We had to keep moving, though we seemed to be going round in a circle. Shot-up trees, broken-down vehicles, lost or discarded equipment, pieces of clothing and other items were all lying around. Again we saw dead German soldiers. A young girl wearing a steel helmet sat leaning against a tree. One soldier said that she was asleep, but she was dead.
That afternoon we had to cross a railway line that was under heavy fire. We crossed it singly, always during the pauses in the firing. There was another wood on the other side. A shell made a big hole about 15 metres from me, and I looked back in shock.
Some soldiers came crawling out of the white sand uninjured. Then I reached the wood. On the right was an open expanse like a broad road. There were already many foxholes among the tall pinetrees, and two Volkssturm men called out to me. They dug away the sand industriously with their small spades to make enough room for the three of us. It became a little quieter once more.
We had to move on again at dusk. When night came we were already long on our way. I slept while walking, moving along totally exhausted. One of the pair put a piece of Schoka-cola in my mouth from his iron rations. ‘You mustn’t fall asleep, girl, we have to go on!’ the men said.
40
Wenck, ‘Berlin war nicht mehr zu retten’, pp. 66–7; Strawson, The
1
Gellermann,